

# Reporting on Terror: Assessing the Viability of Peace Journalism in the Kenyan News Media

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## Abstract

This study examines the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan context when reporting on terror. It focuses on the applicability of peace journalism, to the Kenyan media system, as an alternative way of reporting on conflict and violence. This thesis aims to contribute to knowledge about peacebuilding and the processes of reconciliation and de-escalation through the use of the news media as a peace promoting tool using peace journalism. The study focuses on a textual analysis of Kenyan newspapers, identifying how the Kenyan news media reports on terror, alongside an in-depth analysis of interviews carried out with Kenyan journalists and editors, critically exploring and analysing why the Kenyan news media reports on terror the way that it does.

The study draws on connections between the complexities of reporting on terror, the nature of the Kenyan news media system and environment based on social, cultural, historical and economic factors and the systemic factors and structures that steer journalistic principles and practice when reporting on conflict. It also draws on the principles of the “good journalism” school of thought on peace journalism and assesses the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan news media as an alternative way of reporting on terror.

The study draws several conclusions, based on the data collected: one, the Kenyan news media reports on terrorism predominantly through a war journalism lens; and two, there is a prevalence of war journalism in the coverage of terrorism in the Kenyan news media because of internal and external structural constraints, which primarily manifest through compromised media freedoms and limited access to information, and which affect the quality of the practice of journalism in

## Abstract

Kenyan newsrooms and the agency and autonomy of individual journalists. This therefore affects the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan news media environment and prevents its full adoption within this environment. However, the study concludes by arguing that some aspects of peace journalism, such as the inclusion of the voices of ordinary people and peacemakers and the “tools” that touch on language, word choice and framing, can be adopted by the Kenyan news media in order to facilitate a better understanding of terrorism for Kenyan audiences.



## Declaration of Originality

I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in my name, in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text.

In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission in my name, for any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of Adelaide and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint-award of this degree.

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Rukia Yusuf Abdulrahman Nzibo, December 2020

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## Chapter 1: Terrorism, the Kenyan News Media, and Peace Journalism

### 1. Introduction

On the 21<sup>st</sup> of September 2013 at noon, several gunmen stormed into the Westgate Mall, in Nairobi, and opened fire on shoppers and staff. The attack, initially believed to be a robbery, but later confirmed to be a terror attack by the Somali Islamist group Al-Shabaab, lasted four days, injuring 175 and killing 67 civilians (Onuoha 2013, p. 3). According to a report by The Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, the Westgate Mall attack was deliberately planned and set out to achieve three things: one, to attract local and international media attention by targeting a high-profile mall, to legitimize the Somali Islamist group in the global ranks of Jihadism; two, to pressure the Kenyan government into withdrawing its troops from Somalia, where the Islamist group has a stronghold; and three, to communicate to vulnerable Muslim minds in a bid to radicalize and recruit new members and sympathizers (Onuoha 2013, pp. 3-7).

What became evident after the Westgate Mall attack was that at least one of these goals was successfully met, as the attack created a scene that offered newsworthy content that the media could not resist. The attack, targeting a mall in the capital city frequented by the upper class and affluent Kenyans and expatriates (Onuoha 2013, p. 6) branded itself as a revenge mission, whilst stepping out of the suicide bombing norm. Instead, the attackers resorted to selective killing and hostage-taking where some Muslims, after proving their faith, were released (Onuoha 2013, p. 7). This ensured that live media coverage of the attack was inevitable. Additionally, the Westgate Mall attack dismantled and exposed weaknesses in Kenya's security and intelligence, which ensured peak interest in the attack but also

offered an opportunity to legitimize the group by giving them access to an audience (Onuoha 2013, p. 7). Consistent with Jenkins (1974, p. 5), the Westgate Mall attack seemed to be carefully “choreographed” towards attracting the most media attention, which Jenkins (1974, p. 5) highlights as a strategy terrorists use to achieve,

... broader goals, which may range from attracting worldwide attention to the terrorists’ cause to the dissolution of society or of international order. [As] terrorism aims to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm – of terror. Such an atmosphere causes people to exaggerate the apparent strength of the terrorists’ movement and cause, which means that their strength is judged not by their actual numbers or violent accomplishments, but by the effect they have on their audience.

What followed during and after the Westgate Mall attack was an atmosphere of alarm and fear, perpetuated by the Kenyan news media, which took its place zealously in the forefront, disseminating panicky headlines, inflammatory catchwords and bloody and altered images, mishandling victims, providing contradictory information and violating the media code of conduct, all in a bid to break the news of the attack first (Media Council of Kenya 2014, pp. 22-25). As a result of this coverage, the Kenyan news media found itself under fierce critique by the government, security personnel and scholars for fostering “... a platform that allows terrorist groups to advance their course” (Media Council of Kenya 2016, p. 1). The main critique expressed towards the Kenyan news media is that it was a significant hindrance to counterterrorism efforts, especially due to its reach and influence on the wider society, a sentiment shared by Goretti (2007, p. 3), who argues that the role of the media should be taken seriously especially during times of conflict.

The next section in this chapter delves into the research motivation and process and the structure of the thesis. It is divided into three parts: The first explores the research questions, aims, objectives and the significance of the study. The second part outlines the background of the research, contextualizing terrorism in Kenya, exploring the relationship between the media and terrorism and introducing peace journalism as an alternative way of reporting on terror. The chapter concludes by summing up the subsequent chapters in this thesis and its content.

## 2. Research Questions and Objectives

This thesis investigates the following research questions:

The overall research question of the study,

Based on the influences on the Kenyan media system and environment and how the Kenyan news media reports on terror, is peace journalism a viable alternative for the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror?

The objectives are distributed across three research questions:

RQ1. How does the Kenyan news media report on terror?

RQ2. From the perspective of Kenyan journalists and editors, what systemic factors and structures influence how the Kenyan news media reports on terror?

RQ 3. Is peace journalism a viable alternative for the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror?

This thesis will address these questions by exploring the nature of the coverage of terrorism in the Kenyan news media, specifically television and newspapers, which are the primary sources of information for the majority of Kenyans, according to FreedomHouse (2016).

This exploration will be aimed at assessing the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan context, considering the systemic and structural factors influencing news media practice in Kenya, to assess whether the news media can be utilized as a peace-promoting tool. The findings also aim to contribute towards knowledge and understanding of peace journalism, particularly from the perspective of non-western media systems, and to inform and influence media policies that simultaneously allow the preservation of media freedoms and ethical and professional standards while influencing the promotion of peace when reporting on terror. Additionally, by identifying systemic and structural influences on conflict reporting, this thesis seeks to provide insights into the complexity of reporting on terrorism from the perspective of Kenyan editors and journalists, to steer the implementation of peace journalism, towards accommodating African contexts.

This thesis, while taking into account the challenges and critiques, starts from the premise that peace journalism potentially provides a more effective foundation for conflict reporting. It departs from the idea that peace journalism has much to offer in facilitating a better understanding of the root causes of terrorism in Kenyan society while solidifying the important role that the media could play in contributing to peacebuilding, reconciliation, and the de-escalation of conflict and violence. The thesis, therefore, aims to provide insight and contribute particularly towards scholarly studies conducted in African contexts. More specifically, the ideas around the development of “hybrid” peace journalism, a concept proposed by Ogenga (2019a) in his study on African-centred journalism, will be considered. The thesis aims to help offer African solutions to African problems.

### 3. Research Motivation and Process

Peace journalism has been the subject of considerable academic discourse in the West and the Middle East, but to a very limited extent in Africa, and particularly in Kenya. While there is a significant body of literature on the shortcomings of the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror and whether the news media can be utilized as a peace-promoting tool, studies of peace journalism in the Kenyan and broader African contexts have primarily focused on the need for peace journalism as a solution to conflict reporting (Adebayo 2015a; Kisang 2014; Mwangi & Bwire 2013; Ogenga 2012, 2019a; Youngblood 2017). Peace journalism also comes highly recommended for the training and practice of journalism in Kenya, with calls for more research on the concept within African contexts (Ogenga 2019a).

However, many of these studies remain limited to the implementation of peace journalism as a solution, and very few have addressed the implications of the systemic structures and factors that steer news coverage, particularly about terrorism in African contexts, through a peace journalism lens. The implications for the Kenyan news media of legacies relating to political phases and volatility, economic and societal remnants of colonization and the on-ground realities of major terrorist attacks that have impacted the country since 2011 have remained areas that are not explored extensively, especially when pertaining to the implementation of peace journalism on a media system that is still deeply entrenched in its colonial legacy. The significant impact of these systemic factors and structures that govern the Kenyan news media and the practice of journalism has remained an area that is not widely considered when assessing journalistic practices such as peace journalism and its validity in African contexts.

This thesis aims to bridge that gap by assessing the implications of systemic structures and factors that influence news production in the Kenyan context, about the news media coverage of terrorism and the implementation of peace journalism as an alternative way of reporting on terror. **It aims to do this by critically exploring and analysing how the Kenyan news media reports on terror; the systemic factors and structures that influence how the Kenyan news media reports on terror and the implications and opportunities available for the practice and implementation of peace journalism within the Kenyan media system when reporting on terror.**

#### 4. Structure of Thesis

Specifically, this thesis engages with the core ideas of peace journalism that call for the inclusion of peacemakers and peaceful alternatives in the news media agenda when reporting on conflict and violence. It engages broadly with the principles and practice of peace journalism that focus on the selection of news content by journalists, that is, the “gatekeeping” process, which includes the criteria that journalists apply to determine newsworthiness and the contexts in which an event is placed and analysed. Based on the premise that the choices journalists make in determining what is newsworthy are based on a set of well-defined but deeply flawed criteria, as is the view of many traditional media critics, peace journalism seeks to understand why these choices cannot also include criteria that acknowledge peace (Youngblood 2016, pp. 66-71).

This thesis is founded on three main assessments, including conceptual and contextual backgrounds. The first is a textual analysis that examines the framing of three different major terror attacks by the Kenyan news media between 2013 and 2019. Through the



textual analysis of two Kenyan newspapers, *The Daily Nation* and *The Standard*, selected based on popularity and circulation, this thesis identifies how the two newspapers frame terrorism, using a *conflict escalating* and *conflict de-escalating* reporting news frame criteria developed by Hussain and Rehman (2015b) to suit non-western media systems and derived from Galtung's (2003) war and peace journalism framing model. The second, a thematic analysis of interview data, identifies and explores the role perceptions of Kenyan editors and journalists when reporting on terror while identifying from their perspectives the systemic factors and structures that influence how they report on terror. The last then applies theory to practice by outlining the implications that the systemic structures and factors identified by the Kenyan editors and journalists may have for the implementation of peace journalism in Kenya and its adaptability to an African context.

Ultimately, the main argument of this thesis is that peace journalism could provide well-defined criteria for reporting on terror, however, the systemic factors and structures that govern news production in the Kenyan context also need to be taken into consideration. Central to this is the idea that African problems need African solutions. However, because western traditions around mainstream journalism have always been considered ideal and useful in Africa, this analysis will be valuable in assessing whether they are necessary and/or can be adjusted to fit specific non-western contexts.

The next section lays out the definition of key concepts and the background of the research topic.

## 5. Background of the Research Topic and Key Concepts

The main issue expressed by many scholars about the news media and terrorism stems from the idea that the relationship is symbiotic. Scholars such as Papacharissi and Oliveira (2008, p. 53) highlight that because there is mutual benefit for both parties - the news media and terrorism - the relationship is difficult to dismantle. On the one hand, terrorism fits perfectly into media logic as terror attacks are considered to be newsworthy and offer news values such as soundbites, visuals, and drama. On the other, according to Cottle (2004, pp. 2-3), the media's role during times of conflict and violence is critical because it is the arena within which the conflict is waged and the channel within which discourses and debates, conflict images and information as well as criticisms and public engagement are all predominantly conveyed and convened. Thus, the news media's most critical role in society is exercised during times of conflict and violence.

Most importantly, during terror attacks, the news media plays the dual role of being a conflict arena, connecting the public, government, and terrorism, and determining what issues dominate and are important to the wider society. Through framing, saliency, and emphasis of particular terrorism content the media governs what flows to the public (Marin 2011, p. 255). In the case of the Westgate Mall attack, the Media Council of Kenya (2014) highlights that media houses were more focused on outdoing each other and breaking the story first, severely compromising the gate-keeping processes and regulation of information that flowed to audiences. The result of this was that the terrorists were given publicity and the terror attack became a "commodity of news" that focused specifically on drama and violence to attract audiences, which may have resulted in the amplification and intensification of the psychological impact of terrorism (Marin 2011, p. 255), while simultaneously dismantling confidence in the Kenyan intelligence and security forces.

### 5.1. Conflict as a “News Value,” Western Traditions and the African News Media

Despite the debates around the relationship between the media and terrorism, the main issue highlighted in academic research is that the coverage of terrorism in the news media is problematic globally because conflict is treated as a “news value.” According to Maslog, Lee and Kim (2006, p. 20), when conflict coverage is grounded in the idea of “conflict as a news value,” it results in coverage that offers a superficial narrative devoid of extensive historical perspective, background and/or context. In the Kenyan and wider African context, which is the underpinning of this research, the problem is perpetuated even further by the adoption of western traditions around mainstream journalism which, according to Ogenga (2012, p. 1), shapes broader societal structures that influence news production deeply, in the form of capitalism, commercialism, history and politics.

Additionally, these adopted traditional news values tend to steer the news industry towards news framing that is guided and attracted to dramatic, conflict-laden, and potentially tragic events (Marin 2011, p. 255), which have extreme consequences for African countries in their differing contexts. Subsequently, the news industry brings to the forefront content that creates a focus on the tug of war between the interests of the news media and the government, which Ogenga (2012, p. 2) argues steers the coverage towards a narrow obsession with violence and victory while overlooking potential solutions, contexts and fostering an understanding of the conflict. This, referred to as “war journalism,” which McGoldrick (2006, p. 2) loosely defines as “biased in favour of war”, tends to create more opportunities for conflict escalation (such as calls for military intervention) rather than finding more sustainable solutions to conflict and violence. This tends to stem from

historical, economic and political factors, impeding the development of African countries (Ogenga 2012, p. 1).

Moreover, the news framing of terrorism, especially in the Kenyan context, tends to prioritize and reflect more prominently the gruesome nature of terror attacks, deaths, and the violent outcomes against the incompetency of security forces and by default government response to terrorism. This type of news framing not only simplifies the problem of terrorism but also creates an “us versus them” rhetoric that spirals into more conflict, violence, and division within Kenyan society, stunting the development and cohesiveness of a diverse Kenyan society even further (Kisang 2014; Ogenga 2012; Omanga & Chepngetich-Omanga 2013). Ultimately, war journalism’s focus on violence and violent discourses tends to trivialize and distort conflict by offering surface-level coverage that stands in the way of resolving the conflict while fostering divisiveness (Lynch & Galtung 2010, pp. 14 - 22).

However, although many studies have shown that conflict reporting is primarily dominated by war journalism, Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Hanitzsch and Nagar (2016) underscore that there is always an opportunity for the news media to shift the narrative. Proponents of peace journalism (Aslam 2011; Galtung 2003; Hussain 2016; McGoldrick & Lynch 2006; Youngblood 2016) assert that the overwhelming emphasis on violence and war in the news media can and should be remedied by making a subtle shift towards “peace journalism”, which is aimed at steering traditional journalism towards focusing more on peace and people, to offer different perspectives to conflict that could lead to conflict transformation (Lynch & Galtung 2010, p. 3). This thesis supports the idea that there should be a shift in conflict coverage in the Kenyan context that steers the narrative towards balancing violent

discourses with bringing attention to people and peace, primarily to offer balanced coverage of conflict and in particular terrorism.

## 5.2. Definition of Key Concepts and Research Background

### I. Terrorism in Kenya

Terrorism has become a reality of Kenyan society and one of the main news items in the mainstream media over the last decade. According to Bradbury and Kleinman (2010, p. 27), Kenya is a prime target for terror attacks by the Somali Islamist group, Al-Shabaab, for several reasons, the most prominent being Kenya's proximity to Somalia and the deployment of Kenyan troops into Somalia. Because Kenya shares a border with Somalia, it continues to be impacted by the conflict in Somalia that has been ongoing since the 1990s. Al-Shabaab, a militant Islamist group that has established a strong presence on the other side of the Kenyan-Somali border, has managed to trickle its operations into Kenya by taking advantage of the presence and mismanagement of 400,000 Somali refugees who reside in refugee camps within Kenya. Through various avenues, the Islamist group has been able to target and infiltrate the Kenyan population in an attempt to spread extremism and recruit and radicalize Kenyans, Kenyan-Somalis and Somali refugees (Bradbury & Kleinman 2010, pp. 29-30).

Moreover, Kenya's decision to send troops into Somalia in 2011, in response to terrorism, the spill-over effects of the conflict in Somalia and the need to protect Kenyan borders (Bradbury & Kleinman 2010, p. 27), has created a ripple effect of consequences which includes retaliatory terror attacks that have increased in both impact and magnitude. The Islamist group rationalizes these terror attacks as retribution for injustices and damage

caused by the Kenya Defence Force (KDF) in Somalia (Atta-Asamoah 2015, p. 14), stating that,

Kenyan cities will run red with blood. [As] no amount of precaution or safety measures will be able to guarantee [Kenya's] safety, thwart another attack or prevent another bloodbath (Abdullahi 2015).

## II. What is Terrorism?

In order to consider terrorism within this thesis, it is first important to define the term, even though there is no consensus on a universal definition. Scholars and organizations have, over the years, developed a number of definitions that aim to clarify and distinguish what terrorism entails. For example, Leiser (1977) defines terrorism as,

...any organized set of acts of violence designed to create an atmosphere of despair or fear, to shake the faith of ordinary citizens in their government and its representatives, to destroy the structure of authority which normally stands for security, or to reinforce and perpetuate a governmental regime whose popular support is shaky. It is a policy of seemingly senseless, irrational, and arbitrary murder, assassination, sabotage, subversion, robbery, and other forms of violence, all committed with dedicated indifference to existing legal and moral codes or with claims to a special exemption from conventional social norms (Leiser 1977, p. 39).

Meisels (2006, p. 480), on the other hand, defines terrorism as, "...the intentional random murder of defenceless non-combatants, with the intent of instilling fear of mortal danger amidst a civilian population as a strategy designed to advance political ends."

However, many African states and organizations have settled on the definition provided by the UN Security Council (2004), outlining terrorism as,

...criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

This definition is used in this thesis due to the fact that, one, Kenya is a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and therefore works in cooperation with the UN charter and its peace and security principles (UN News 2020); and two, as mentioned previously, the Somali Islamist group Al-Shabaab is using terror attacks to compel the Kenyan government to withdraw its troops from Somalia. Also, several of the characteristics outlined in this definition, including the taking of hostages (Westgate Mall attack in 2013) and generating a state of terror, have been distinctive of terrorism in Kenya. Sporadic and unforgettable attacks such as the 2013 Westgate Mall attack (Onuoha 2013), the 2015 Garissa school attack (Bryden 2015) and the 2019 Riverside/Dusit attack (Bryden & Bahra 2019), are evidence of this, and are included and explored in greater detail in this thesis (Chapter 3 and Chapter 5).

### III. The Kenyan News Media and Terrorism: A Brief Overview

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this thesis is particularly concerned with the role of the Kenyan news media as the critical arena that links the government, the public and terrorism. Over the last decade, the relationship between the Kenyan news media and

terrorism has proven to be both ambiguous and complex. The complexity stems from Kenyan journalists grappling with how to effectively report on terror, due to its violent nature and the huge demand from audiences to stay updated, while distinguishing just how far they should and can take the coverage of terror attacks without running the risk of assisting the terrorists in advancing their agenda of spreading fear (Kiarie & Mogambi ; Kisang 2014; Mwinyihaj & Wanyama 2017). According to Bläsi (2004, p. 1), the news media generally has two choices when reporting on terror: one, to underreport, which can create a false sense of security while undermining the practice of journalism, or two, to “truthfully” report on terror, which could advance the terrorist agenda of spreading fear.

In the Kenyan context specifically, these two choices seem to be simultaneously the norm, perhaps due to the remnants of colonization that are still deeply embedded in the systemic structures and factors that influence the news media environment, as explored by Kisang (2014) and Ogenga (2012, 2019a). Additionally, the complexity of terrorism in the East African region, rooted in issues of sovereignty, economic and political ties and the spill-over effects of the conflict in Somalia, creates some ambiguity in the coverage of terrorism in the region, which has potentially catastrophic consequences that may stand in the way of the peaceful co-existence of different ethnic groups in Kenyan society and the wider East African region. According to Kisang (2014, p. 80), the way that the Kenyan news media chooses to frame and report on terror needs to change, as the potential to inflame passion and create tension between communities, based on ethnicity and religious differences, not only falls into the terrorist agenda of spreading fear but also hinders development if the region remains in conflict. Thus, the relationship that the Kenyan news media fosters with terrorism is not only critical but also has the potential to exacerbate the consequences of terrorism (Kisang 2014, p. 80).



Some scholars argue that a symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the news media is the main factor that steers terrorism coverage in the Kenyan context (Kisang 2014; Mutua 2013; Ogenga 2012; Omanga & Chepngetich-Omanga 2013). Meanwhile, others have ascribed the main problem as blurred role perceptions of the news media in times of conflict, especially when the main goal is the maximization of profits. Ogenga (2012, pp. 2 - 6) asserts that, for the Kenyan news media in particular, the coverage of terrorism is influenced heavily by the push and pull between its responsibilities to the nation in being a societal watchdog that protects national interests, and protection of the media system, which is dependent on profits being made to sustain the continued operations of the news media as a business. Furthermore, the adoption of western traditions in mainstream journalistic ideologies has been identified as a significant influence on news production, as broader societal structures are rooted and deeply embedded in commercialism and capitalism, which influences the press to construct stories to appease advertisers and political elites and to appeal to audiences over the preservation of peace (Ogenga 2012, pp. 2-6).

Other scholars, such as Obijiofor and Hanusch (2011, p. 1), assert that the complexity and sensitive nature of terrorism is the main reason for complicating the role of the news media, because the content and context of terrorism are hard to cover and handle as the “enemy” on the battlefield is “invisible” (Ogenga 2012, p. 12). Thus, the news media remains primarily focused on the visible effects of the conflict because these are easily accessible. McGoldrick and Lynch (2006, p. 3) argue that the consequence of reporting on violence without including context or background information is not only a distortion of the discussion but also a misrepresentation of the conflict, especially because the news media

shapes public opinion around issues of terrorism and strengthens the public's interpretation of what is happening around them (Ogenga 2012).

Despite the varying reasons, what is clear is that there is a consensus that the coverage of terrorism by the Kenyan news media is problematic. Based on this viewpoint, peace journalism has been identified as a solution by many scholars, including Aslam (2011); Kisang (2014); McGoldrick and Lynch (2006); Obijiofor and Hanusch (2011) and Ogenga (2012, 2019a). They argue that peace journalism not only offers a cohesive framework for the news media to appropriately handle and report on conflict and violence, but could also be beneficial in identifying the root causes of terrorism, influencing agenda setting, shaping and strengthening public opinion and interpretations of conflict, and ultimately aiding in the promotion of peace by making subtle shifts that include both violent and non-violent discourses equally. Proponents of peace journalism Galtung (2003) and McGoldrick and Lynch (2006) identify peace journalism as an alternative means of peacebuilding through the media, which Kisang (2014); Ogenga (2012) and Youngblood (2017), all agree would be beneficial to the Kenyan media. This thesis, therefore, begins from this juncture, with the aim of not only contributing to studies on peace journalism but also specifically within African contexts, an area that is not extensively explored.

#### IV. What is Peace Journalism?

When it comes to violence and conflict, Galtung (2003, p. 177) asserts that the news media focuses on two main perspectives, the high road (peace journalism) or the low road (war journalism). The high road tends to steer more towards conflict transformation, while the low road focuses on the conflict arena, demonstrating conflict as a battle between two

parties with one loser and one winner. Galtung (2003, p. 177) elucidates that, despite how gruesome conflict can be, there is always room for conflict transformation and human progress, which the news media has a responsibility to promote. Proponents of peace journalism (Galtung 2003; McGoldrick & Lynch 2006; Youngblood 2016) argue that including literacy of non-violence in everyday reporting, which peace journalism facilitates by introducing new types of knowledge such as players and issues, is necessary and cannot be overlooked, especially if the news media is exacerbating the problem. Therefore, a focus on peace and people is not a detour, but rather a subtle shift from traditional journalism that is necessary during conflict and violence.

Galtung (2003, pp. 177-178) asserts that peace journalism creates opportunities for journalists to include “peaceful approaches to correspondence,” which scholars such as Mwangi and Bwire (2013) and Onyebadi and Oyediji (2011) suggest is necessary for African contexts, because development in the region cannot occur without peace. Additionally, Fackler et al. (2011) and Mbeke (2008) assert that the Kenyan news media, in particular, has the responsibility to maintain peace as it is enshrined in law - article 33 of the Constitution of Kenya - by not publishing material that could aggravate conflict. This, and studies such as those carried out by scholars such as Ogenga (2019a), have created room for the exploration of ideas surrounding African peace journalism/hybrid peace journalism (HPJ), that speaks truth to local contexts by blending African cultural realities with the conceptualization of peace journalism, a dialogue to which this study aims to contribute.

Thus, this thesis aims to add to the studies on peace journalism in African and non-western contexts by looking at systemic factors and structures that influence how the Kenyan news

media reports on terror and their implications for the implementation of peace journalism, ultimately exploring the blending of African cultural realities with the concept of peace journalism through consideration of the complexities of the news production process, particularly the preconditions that influence conflict coverage, to identify whether the theory and practice of peace journalism can meet in these news media environments.

## 6. Chapter outlines

Chapter two explores and reviews the literature available on the conceptualization of peace journalism, by other scholars and applied to other studies. The chapter explores conflict news, as it pertains to the role of journalists as gatekeepers who tell stories on conflict through the media. The chapter also identifies the relationship between the media and conflict as problematic and heavily oriented towards war journalism. Drawing from the evolution of peace journalism as a concept, the chapter tackles the dualism of peace and war journalism, the prescriptive nature of modern-day journalism, the two schools of thought around peace journalism, its criticisms and its implementation in non-western media systems.

Chapter three highlights the complexities of the Kenyan news media and its history. It explores the development of the Kenyan news media and its shifting roles through different eras, that is the colonial and independence era, while highlighting the relationship between politics and the news media. Similarly, the chapter explores the influence of European mass media systems on the Kenyan media, while highlighting the social, economic, political and cultural factors that govern and influence the practice of journalism as it pertains to reporting on terror. The chapter also tackles the push and pull between the liberation of the

Kenyan news media and the remnants of colonization that are deeply embedded in the Kenyan media system, as it pertains to media freedoms and state control.

Chapter four discusses the research methodology, the research questions, the study design and units of analysis, the data collection process, the procedures and ethical assurances of the study, and the limitations in the methodology. Chapter five introduces and evaluates the findings of a textual analysis conducted on two daily Kenyan newspapers, to answer *RQ1: How does the Kenyan media report on terror?* It examines the coverage of terrorism in *The Standard* and *The Nation* on three terror attacks between 2013 and 2019, and identifies the dominant frames used in the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror.

Chapter 6 addresses the “why” question, highlighting why the Kenyan media represents terrorism in the way that it does. It explores systematic factors and structures that influence how the Kenyan media reports on terror, from the perspective of Kenyan journalists and editors. Chapter 7 merges all three research questions and assesses the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror. It brings together the framing of terrorism in the Kenyan news media, the systemic structures and factors that influence how the Kenyan news media reports on terror, from the perspective of editors and journalists, and assesses whether peace journalism’s theory and practice can meet in the Kenyan context. Chapter 8 then concludes the study, offering recommendations and highlights future research directions.

## Chapter 2: Changing Narratives: The Peace Journalism Approach

### 1. Introduction

This chapter reviews literature on the peace journalism approach, as it pertains to the relationship between the news media and terrorism, and explores the significant role that news frames play in constructing a reality within conflict reporting. It is divided into two parts. The first explores relationships between the news media and conflict, while highlighting the communicative power of the news media in conflict and violence. It addresses the debates around the need for an alternative way of reporting on conflict and violence: that is, peace journalism. The second part reviews literature on peace journalism, highlighting its definitions, conceptualisation, two divergent schools of thought and its critiques. The chapter concludes with its interpretation in non-western media systems, narrowing it down to the Kenyan experience, with the aim of building the foundation for this research topic.

This chapter also specifically highlights the development of peace journalism research in Africa with the overall aim of contributing to studies on African-centred journalism, specifically the development of “hybrid” peace journalism (Ogenga 2019a), which calls for the operationalization of peace journalism through news values derived from ancient African philosophies and cultural realities. It aims to do this by highlighting the need for more qualitative research on peace journalism, especially in Africa, where journalistic norms and values differ. Many scholars propose peace journalism as an alternative to current conflict reporting, particularly in Africa (Kisang 2014; Mwangi & Bwire 2013; Ogenga 2019a), but very few tackle the viability of peace journalism in differing contexts. This review aims to critically explore the core ideas of peace journalism, the news production process during conflict situations and the implications of these journalistic practices for the implementation of peace journalism.

Peace journalism has become a significant area of interest for many communications scholars since it originated in the 1960s, from a study by Galtung and Ruge (1965) in *The Structure of Foreign News*. In academic circles, interest in peace journalism has grown significantly through studies concerned particularly with over-reliance on conflict as a news value. These studies cover topics ranging from the evaluation of peace journalism, its key features and conceptualisations to the assessments of war and peace journalism news frames in the media (Gouse et al. 2019, p. 436). Additionally, in many of these studies, peace journalism is explored against the concept of war journalism, reflecting two opposite ends of a sliding scale when reporting on conflict and violence. On the one hand, war journalism, characterised as being problematic, overvalues violence as a response to conflict, while peace journalism, offered as an alternative, underscores conflict resolution while offering a peace-shaped understanding of conflict (Galtung 2003, p. 179).

Much of the scholarship on peace journalism is based on quantitative studies that seek to understand the key features and trends of peace and war journalism frames in the news media, linking to the “gatekeeping” process and the dissemination of conflict information (Gouse et al. 2019, pp. 436 - 438). While quantitative studies are useful, they do not fully account for some important components of peace journalism and its practice in different contexts. The next sections in this chapter review the critical debates around peace journalism’s theory and practice by exploring its definitions, its conceptualisation, its key principles and orientations as well as the critiques surrounding its theory and practice in traditional media systems.

## 2. The News Media, Conflict and War Journalism

Conflict reporting has long been a source of academic debate in communication circles, particularly around the communicative power of the news media during conflict and violence. It is suggested that the “gatekeeping” role of journalists during times of conflict not only links the perpetrators, the government and audiences, but also leads into the news media playing two roles (Cottle 2004, pp. 2-3): one, a public watchdog, and two, the main source of resources and information, guiding public opinion and agenda setting. Therefore, peace journalism scholars (Aslam 2011; McGoldrick & Lynch 2006; Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Hanitzsch & Nagar 2016) argue that the news media needs to recognise its influence and make journalistic choices that highlight peace processes and opportunities at the same level as violent discourses.

Many studies carried out on conflict reporting suggest that the news media, while highlighting the “reality” of conflict situations, focuses on the gruesome side of conflict and violence, which oversimplifies conflicts (Galtung 2003, p. 177) and excludes other human and conflict dimensions (Shinar 2007, p. 2). These studies posit that the communicative power of the media, coupled with a focus on the “war” aspects of conflict and violence, or “war journalism” as it is referred to by Lynch and Galtung (2010, pp. 6-16), results in a surface-level understanding of conflict. The consequence of this type of conflict reporting is a narrow obsession with violence, which trivialises and distorts the reality while creating inclusion and exclusion biases in societies. This type of conflict reporting also sensationalises violence, which promotes polarization and the escalation of violence even further, cementing the role of the media as a perpetrator of conflict (Lynch & Galtung 2010, p. 16).



Furthermore, in the case of terrorism, an ideological and gruesomely violent form of conflict, the role of the news media is even more powerful as it is also part of the conflict arena. Terrorists aim to attract media attention because they recognise the power the news media holds, as it links them, the perpetrators and their agenda, spreads fear and demolishes the power asymmetry, to the government and the audience they aim to reach (Marin 2011, p. 255). Moreover, the news media, as the space facilitating public debate during terror attacks, is representative of a wide array of voices, views and opinions that could lead into important discussions and open evaluations. The news media is not only a conveyer of information but is also instrumental in shaping and conditioning perceptions of terrorism and responses to it (Cottle 2004, pp. 3-7).

Where war journalism dominates the narrative in the news media, several issues arise, according to Lynch and Galtung (2010, pp. 6-14):

1. It distorts and trivialises conflict by narrowly and obsessively focusing on violence and victory;
2. It creates the illusion that there are only two parties involved in a conflict, one a winner and the other a loser, excluding other parties that may be involved and affected;
3. It polarises and escalates violence, calling for more hatred and violence in a bid to stop “them” and avenge the conflict; and
4. It fails to deliver all the facts pertaining to the root causes of conflict, which skews perceptions and ultimately affects resolution and transformation.

For many scholars, there is no debate that war journalism is problematic (Fahmy & Eakin 2014; Gouse et al. 2019; Lynch 2013; McGoldrick & Lynch 2006; Ross 2006). It locates the “smoking gun,” but fails to make transparent why it was fired in the first place (Lynch & Galtung 2010, p. 3). However, the main dilemma rests in the fact that war journalism and the idea of war resonates

with deep-seated news values, promoting its dominance in the news media space (Cottle 2004; Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Hanitzsch & Nagar 2016). War and violence provide spectacular scenes, drama and strong human-interest stories, highlighting heroism, suffering and tragedy, all of which create powerful narratives that appeal to journalists, journalistic values, norms and routines (Cottle 2004, p. 77).

The literature on war journalism and war reporting is extensive, and many studies demonstrate the dominance of war frames in conflict reporting (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Hanitzsch & Nagar 2016, pp. 151-152). This creates a space for peace researchers (Galtung 1998; Kempf 2007; Lynch 2013; Ottosen 2007; Shinar 2007) to present a prominent classification framework within peace research and journalism studies, distinguishing two modes of conflict reporting: war oriented or peace oriented. Characterised through the lens of news stories as narratives, using practical, empirical, and conceptual paradigms, peace journalism assesses the utility and applicability of war and peace frames in journalistic coverage (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Hanitzsch & Nagar 2016, p. 152). This stems from the idea, argued by communication and journalism scholars, that journalists are essentially storytellers in modern-day societies. Therefore, news coverage represents a form of narrative (Roach 1995; Tuchman 1978) that is materialized through framing.

In this study, news frames are generally understood as a coherent and evaluative interpretation of events embedded through patterns of selection, emphasis and inclusion of information (Entman 1991, 1993; Gamson 1989). It is understood that frames are at the core of every news story and provide selective interpretations for specific problems or situations (Entman 1993; Norris, Kern & Just 2003; Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Hanitzsch & Nagar 2016), which in conflict news coverage can offer various perspectives which researchers can use to classify conflict reporting under war and/or peace journalism orientations. Thus, framing in this study is defined as, “the central organising idea

for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration” (Tankard et al. 1991, p. 3). In particular, this research is more concerned with the power that news frames have, by “...select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and make[ing] them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman 1993, p. 52).

### 3. News Frames and Conflict News

Norris, Kern and Just (2003, p. 2) assert that in conflict situations, journalists tend to rely on familiar interpretations of events and news frames that they consider to be from credible sources to structure their storylines, make sense of facts, communicate dominant meanings and direct the focus of headlines. According to Galtung (2003) these familiar interpretations tend to steer news stories on either side of two competing frames - war journalism or peace journalism - in conflict reporting (Lee & Maslog 2005, p. 314). Moreover, these news frames represent social constructions of the world that are transformed into powerful and socially meaningful narratives shaped by news producers who can omit as well as manipulate information, such as recommendations, explanations, evaluations and problem definitions, which then influence and guide audiences to interpret events, the world around them and themselves through the lens of the information that they do receive (Entman 1993; Miller & Ross 2004).

A frame therefore suggests what is at issue during conflict situations by organising ideas around conflict (Gamson 1989, p. 157), while a news frame organizes “... the world both for journalists who report it and in some important degree, for [audiences] who rely on their reports” (Gitlin 1980,

p. 7). Thus, from a general perspective, news frames perform four specific functions according to (Entman 1993, p. 52):

1. Defining problems - by determining the costs and benefits, within common cultural values, while identifying what the causal agent is doing;
2. Diagnosing the causes – by identifying who and what is causing the problem;
3. Making moral judgements - by giving an evaluation of the effects of the problem and the cause of the problem; and
4. Suggesting remedies - by predicting the likely effects of the problem, while sometimes justifying and/or offering solutions for the problem.

According to Gamson (1989, p. 158), news frames not only organize information and facts about events in a cohesive manner, creating meaning, but also allow journalists to tell many different stories about the same events, based on the information that they provide, omit or emphasize. Thus, a frame analysis of news content is useful in conflict reporting as it draws attention to the inclusion and omission of certain facts over others, which helps identify how conflict may be perceived by both audiences and journalists.

The next section delves into the framing process, as it pertains to analysing news frames and interpreting storylines in the news media.

### I. The Framing Process and News Frame Analysis

Framing studies focus on how messages are constructed within texts. These studies are particularly concerned with the physical presentation, internal structure and meaning created through conflict reporting, which affects public perception. This is because information presented or omitted, particularly in news texts, in both overt and subtle ways, control cultural definitions presented to audiences and constructs reality (Miller & Ross 2004, pp. 245-246). According to Gamson (1989), social products such as newspapers, suggest underlying storylines to audiences through surrounding interpretive commentary, including symbolic devices, catch phrases and metaphors, all of which create contexts and relationships between facts and information and creates the rhetoric around conflict situations. Moreover, the practices, norms and structure of the news media also contribute to this rhetoric by creating limits and boundaries around conflict information, which steers storylines to favour some aspects over others. As a result, the news media tends to reinforce and reflect the elite group frame within which news organisations and individual journalists exist (Shoemaker & Reese 1996; Van Dijk 2015).

Additionally, journalists also depend on certain perspectives, interpretations and sources, which facilitates the prioritization of some news frames over others (Miller & Ross 2004, p. 247). This, coupled with easily retrievable and accessible information available to journalists, through certain groups, individuals and/or organizational processes, during conflict situations, contribute to shaping societal understandings of conflicts (Miller & Ross 2004; Scheufele 1999). Therefore, Gamson (1989, p. 158) asserts that it is important to analyse news frames rather than just identifying them in conflict reporting, because it incorporates both the message and the intent of the sender, as news reports tend to include “multiple” senders who contribute to the storyline. He suggests that this analysis is important because it goes beyond the reporters, who tend to play the

role of leading and closing suggested storylines, as the “senders” (sources) who contribute to the storyline, through quoted interviews and soundbites, are the ones who suggest news frames. Therefore, analysing, interpreting and understanding these news frames also reveals the goals and interests of certain parties and/or organisations, which plays a significant role in how conflict situations are understood, countered and disseminated to audiences (Gamson 1989, pp. 158-159).

Thus, this study uses news frame analysis to identify and assess how the Kenyan news media interprets terrorism, using war and peace journalism frames, specifically Hussain and Rehman’s (2015b) *conflict escalating* and *conflict de-escalating* model (see Appendix I). Hussain and Rehman (2015b) offer a non-western understanding of how conflict news frames are moulded, influencing the understanding and perception of conflict in these societies, which offers a baseline understanding of conflict reporting in the Kenyan context, through a close reading of texts (Miller & Ross 2004, pp. 245-246). Hussain and Rehman (2015a) operationalized Galtung’s (2003) war and peace journalism model (see Table 1 below), accommodating non-western perspectives, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, by outlining how cultural factors – narratives and societal dynamics – play a significant role in making certain news frames more prominent than others. Specifically, news frame analysis in this study is concerned with the interpretation of war and/or peace journalism frames in terrorism coverage in Kenya, highlighting how narratives around conflict and violence are centred on a simplified analysis and description of contexts, causes and origins of conflict (Shinar 2007, p. 2). On the other hand, it also aims to draw peace journalism parallels by focusing on the opportunities for conflict transformation, oriented around truthfulness, people and solutions (Galtung 2003, p. 178).

Through this classification, peace journalism is identified in this study as a news frame that allows journalists to show and construct a reality within conflict reporting that reflects all the angles of conflict. By introducing new types of knowledge, players, issues, goals, parties and conflict formations, peace journalism's aim is to foster a better understanding of conflict and violence in order to assist in depolarising rather than escalating conflict situations (Galtung 2003, p. 179). At the very least, peace journalism seeks to change "... the discourse within which [conflict] is thought, spoken of and acted upon, [which] is very powerful" (Galtung 2003, p. 179).

#### 4. Peace Journalism: Definitions, Principles, and Schools of thought

##### I. Two Competing Frames: War and Peace

As mentioned previously, peace journalism was first conceptualised by Johan Galtung in the 1960s. At its broadest scope, peace journalism proposes that conflict reporting creates opportunities for two competing news frames: war-oriented/violence journalism and peace-oriented/conflict journalism (Lee & Maslog 2005, p. 314). Peace journalism studies draw from the prevalence of war journalism in conflict reporting, offering an alternative way of reporting conflict that widens the perception of conflict situations. It aims to offer a more balanced narrative that includes both the "war" side of conflict and the "peace" initiatives in equal measure (Galtung 2003, pp. 177-178). Based on four key orientations, war journalism and peace journalism frames are illustrated as having broad and contrasting linguistic and practice orientations. These include:

Peace/conflict journalism	War/violence journalism
<p><i>I. Peace/Conflict-oriented</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Explore conflict formation; x parties, y goals, z issues; general “win-win” orientation</li> <li>• Open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture</li> <li>• Making conflicts transparent</li> <li>• Giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding</li> <li>• See conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict creativity</li> <li>• Humanization of all sides; more so the worse the weapons</li> <li>• Proactive: prevention before any violence/war occurs</li> <li>• Focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture)</li> </ul> <p><i>II. Truth-oriented</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expose untruths on all sides</li> <li>• Uncover all cover-ups</li> </ul> <p><i>III. People-oriented</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus on suffering all over; on women, aged, children, giving voice to the voiceless</li> <li>• Give name to all evil-doers</li> <li>• Focus on people peacemakers</li> </ul> <p><i>IV. Solution-oriented</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peace = non-violence + creativity</li> <li>• Highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more war</li> <li>• Focus on structure, culture, the peaceful society</li> <li>• Aftermath: resolution, re-construction, reconciliation</li> </ul>	<p><i>I. War/Violence-oriented</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus on conflict arena, two parties, one goal (win), war general zero-sum orientation</li> <li>• Closed space, closed time; causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone</li> <li>• Making wars opaque/secret</li> <li>• “Us-them” journalism, propaganda, voice, for “us”</li> <li>• See “them” as the problem, focus on who prevails in war</li> <li>• Dehumanization of “them”; more so the worse the weapon</li> <li>• Reactive: waiting for violence before reporting</li> <li>• Focus only on visible effect of violence (killed, wounded and material damage)</li> </ul> <p><i>II. Propaganda-oriented</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expose “their” untruths</li> <li>• Help “our” cover-ups/lies</li> </ul> <p><i>III. Elite-oriented</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus on “our” suffering; on able-bodied elite males, being their mouth-piece</li> <li>• Give name of their evil-doer</li> <li>• Focus on elite peacemakers</li> </ul> <p><i>IV. Victory-oriented</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peace = victory + ceasefire</li> <li>• Conceal peace-initiative, before victory is at hand</li> <li>• Focus on treaty, institution the controlled society</li> <li>• Leaving for another war, return if the old flares up</li> </ul>

Table 1 (Galtung 2003, p. 178)

In Table 1, Galtung (2003, p. 178 ) illustrates how conflict reporting is usually approached (war/violence journalism) and how it can be alternatively approached (peace/conflict journalism). Filling both approaches with operational content, the differences between war and peace journalism are put side by side and classified into four orientations. This explores the conflict itself and how



it is rationalized in conflict reporting, the truths or untruths that are at the core of conflict situations, the people involved or affected both directly and indirectly by the conflict and the aftermath of conflict situations. On the one hand, war journalism is reflected as conflict reporting that focuses on violence and the visible effects of conflict, demarcating enemy lines between “us” and “them” and creating ideas around a conflict arena. It also includes exposing truths or untruths that are in favour of “us,” while focusing on representing the voices of elites and emphasizing victory over conflict transformation.

Peace journalism, on other hand, is reflected as reporting that opens up the conflict and shows how it takes shape by including all the parties involved, exploring their goals, issues and the different narratives that explain what the conflict is about beyond the conflict arena. It identifies deeper roots of the conflict and how they could be linked to history and/or culture. It explores ideas that exist outside of one party imposing itself on the other and tackles violence and the invisible effects of conflict, such as the resulting trauma and hatred. It includes the voices of the voiceless alongside the voices that are normally prioritized in conflict reporting (the elite), as well as the voices of parties working towards preventing violence. Ultimately, it brings in different perspectives, visions, outcomes and methods, linking reconstruction and reconciliation initiatives with tough questions on both the peace initiatives and the possible deficits that may arise in conflict (Galtung 2003, p. 179). While explaining the core ideas of peace journalism, Galtung (2003, pp. 178-179) asserts that good conflict reporting supports conflict transformation by changing how violent discourses are spoken of and thought about. He proposes that this is achievable through making the processes associated with conflict transparent, introducing new types of knowledge and stepping away from the idea that the main action in conflict situations is limited to just the key players.

Since its initial conceptualisation, these core ideas of peace journalism have remained relatively intact. However, some studies have largely discarded the propaganda versus truth orientations (see. Table 1), narrowing the scope slightly (Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Hanitzsch & Nagar 2016, p. 153). Where previously propaganda and truth were seen as indicators of war or peace journalism, some studies have opted to operationalise these orientations when classifying news stories by replacing them with reliance and saliency of official and elite sources as indicators of each news frame. According to some studies, truth and propaganda are hard to measure and do not take into consideration levels of press freedom, therefore they are not considered to be clear indicators of war or peace journalism news frames, especially in times of conflict (Lee & Maslog 2005; Shinar 2007).

At the most basic level, proponents of peace journalism (Galtung 1998; McGoldrick & Lynch 2006; Shinar 2007) agree that peace journalism seeks to help societies understand why conflicts occur. It gives peace a chance through balanced, accurate and fair assessment of conflict situations. Proponents of peace journalism also assert that it does not limit the coverage of conflict to good news only. Instead it calls for journalists to truthfully report all the facts (Lynch & Galtung 2010, p. 3). Despite what the name suggests, peace journalism does not represent open advocacy for peace (Youngblood 2016, p. 4). It does, however, aim to contribute to peace keeping and peace making through conscientious reporting (McGoldrick & Lynch 2006; Shinar 2007) that is inclusive of critical self-awareness and contexts, with the aim of facilitating an understanding of conflict (Lynch 2014, p. 51). Peace journalism aims to bring positive change to conflict situations (Aslam 2011, p. 137) by broadening the space for working towards peaceful outcomes through media coverage (McGoldrick & Lynch 2006, p. 21). This is achieved by focusing on both transformation and the conflict itself in media coverage, by highlighting both the reality and threat of violence and

the root causes that are normally concealed and lead to a chain of retaliation (Lynch & Galtung 2010, pp. 2-3).

## II. Peace Journalism defined

There is no universal definition of peace journalism. However, based on the core ideas developed by Galtung (2003), several scholars have made attempts to define it. Lynch and McGoldrick (2005, p. 6) define peace journalism as,

When editors and reporters make choices – of what to report, and how to report it – that create opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict

Their definition builds further in later publications, outlining that,

Peace Journalism (PJ) uses conflict analysis and transformation to update the concept of balance, fairness, and accuracy in reporting. The PJ approach provides a new road map tracing the connection between journalists, their sources, the stories they cover and the consequences of reporting – the ethics of journalistic intervention. It opens up a literacy of non-violence and creativity as applied to the practical job of everyday reporting (McGoldrick & Lynch 2006, p. 5).

Shinar (2007), adds to peace journalism's definitions from the perspective of fairness and professional attitudes, describing it as,

a fairer way to cover conflict, relative to the usual coverage, and suggests possibilities to improve professional attitudes and performance; strengthen human, moral and ethical values in the media; widen scholarly and professional media horizons and better public service by the media (Shinar 2007, p. 2)

Other studies have opted to maintain Galtung's (2003) peace and war journalism model (see Table 1 above), some with the slight omissions mentioned above. Many studies, including this one, adopt Lynch and McGoldrick's (2005, p. 6) definition of peace journalism because it traces the links between conflict stories, their sources, journalists, word choices and framing as influencing factors in conflict reporting. All of these are factors that this study engages with. Moreover, from Galtung's (2003) conceptualisation of peace journalism, McGoldrick and Lynch (2006) have developed a more prescriptive conceptualisation of peace journalism, aimed towards creating a checklist for conflict journalists, interpreting the key principles of peace journalism and bridging the gap between theory and practice. This is explored in greater detail in the next section.

### III. Prescriptive Peace Journalism: 17 points, Language, Framing and Word Choice

Rooted in the use of language, framing and word choice, McGoldrick and Lynch (2006) present peace journalism's key principles in a 17-point checklist, outlining what peace journalists should avoid and do in the construction of news stories. These include (McGoldrick & Lynch 2006, p. 30):

1. AVOID portraying a conflict as consisting of only two parties contesting the same goal(s). The logical outcome is for one to win and the other to lose.

INSTEAD try to *DISAGGREGATE the two parties into many smaller groups, with many needs and interests, pursuing many goals*, opening up more creative potential for a range of outcomes. *And ask yourself*— who else is involved, and how?

2. AVOID accepting stark distinctions between 'self' and 'other'. These can be used to build the sense that another party is a 'threat' or 'beyond the pale' of civilized behavior. Both key justifications for violence.

INSTEAD *seek the 'other' in the 'self' and vice versa*. If a party is presenting itself as 'the goodies', ask questions about how different its behavior really is to that it ascribes to 'the baddies' – isn't it ashamed of itself?

3. AVOID treating a conflict as if it is only going on in the place and at the time that violence is occurring.

INSTEAD try to *trace the links and consequences for people in other places now and in the future*. Ask:

Who are all the people with a stake in the outcome?

What are they doing to influence the conflict?

Ask yourself what will happen if...?

What lessons will people draw from watching these events unfold as part of a global audience? How will they enter the calculations of parties to future conflicts near and far?

4. AVOID assessing the merits of a violent action or policy of violence in terms of its visible effects only.

INSTEAD *try to find ways of reporting on the invisible effects*, e.g. the long-term consequences of psychological damage and trauma, perhaps increasing the likelihood that those affected will be violent in future, either against other people or, as a group, against other groups or other countries.

5. AVOID letting parties define themselves by simply quoting their leaders' restatements of familiar demands or positions.

INSTEAD *enquire deeper into goals:*

How are people on the ground affected by the conflict in everyday life?

What do they want changed?

Is the position stated by their leaders the only way or the best way to achieve the changes they want?

This may help to empower parties to clarify their needs and interests and articulate their goals, making creative outcomes more likely.

6. AVOID concentrating always on what divides the parties, the differences between what they say they want.

INSTEAD try *asking questions which may reveal areas of common ground* and leading your report with answers which suggest that some goals, may be shared or at least compatible, after all.

7. AVOID only reporting the violent acts and describing ‘the horror’.

If you exclude everything else, you suggest that the only explanation for violence is previous violence (revenge); the only remedy, more violence (coercion/punishment).

INSTEAD *show how people have been blocked and frustrated* or deprived in everyday life as a way of explaining how the conditions for violence are being produced.

8. AVOID blaming someone for ‘starting it’.

INSTEAD *try looking at how shared problems and issues are leading to consequences which all the parties say they never intended.*

9. AVOID focusing exclusively on the suffering, fears and grievances of only one party.

This divides the parties into “villains” and “victims” and suggests that coercing or punishing the villains represents a solution.

INSTEAD *treat as equally newsworthy the suffering, fears and grievances of all sides.*

10. AVOID ‘victimizing’ language like “devastated”, “defenceless”, “pathetic”, “tragedy” which only tells us what has been done *to* and could be done *for* a group of people (by others).

This is dis-empowering and limits the options for change.

INSTEAD *report on what has been done and could be done by the people.*

Don’t just ask them how they feel; also ask them how they are coping and what do they think?

Can they suggest any solutions?

11. AVOID the imprecise use of emotive words to describe what has happened to people.

“Genocide” literally means the wiping-out of an entire people – in UN terminology today, the killing of more than half a million people.

“Tragedy” is a form of drama, originally Greek, in which someone’s fault or weakness ultimately proves his or her undoing.

“Assassination” is the murder of a head of state.

“Massacre” - the deliberate killing of people known to be unarmed and defenceless. Are we sure? Or do we not know? Might these people have died in battle?

“Systematic” e.g. raping or forcing people from their homes. Has it really been organized in a deliberate pattern, or have there been a number of unrelated, albeit extremely nasty, incidents?

INSTEAD *always be precise about what we know*. Do not minimize suffering but reserve the strongest language for the gravest situations or you will beggar the language and help to justify disproportionate responses which escalate the violence.

12. AVOID demonizing adjectives like “vicious”, “cruel”, “brutal”, “barbaric”.

These always describe one party’s view of what another party has done. To use them puts the journalist on that side and helps to justify an escalation of violence.

INSTEAD *report what you know about the wrongdoing* and give as much information as you can about the reliability of other people’s reports or descriptions of it. If it is still being investigated, say so, as a caution that the truth may not yet be known.

13. AVOID demonizing labels like “terrorist”, “extremist”, “fanatic”, “fundamentalist”.

These are always given by “us” to “them”. No one ever uses them to describe himself or herself and so for a journalist to use them is always to take sides. They mean the person is unreasonable, so it seems to make less sense to reason (negotiate) with them.



INSTEAD *try calling people by the names they give themselves*. Or be more precise in your descriptions, e.g., “bombers” or, for the attacks of September 11, 2001, “suicide hijackers”, are both less partisan and give more information than “terrorists”.

14. AVOID focusing exclusively on the human rights abuses, misdemeanors and wrongdoings of only one side.

INSTEAD try to name ALL wrongdoers and treat equally seriously allegations made by all sides in a conflict. Treating seriously does not mean taking at face value, but instead making equal efforts to establish whether any evidence exists to back them up, treating the victims with equal respect and the chances of finding and punishing the wrongdoers as being of equal importance.

15. AVOID making an opinion or claim seem like an established fact.

(Osama bin Laden, said to be responsible for the attack on New York...)

See also “thought to be”, “it’s being seen as” etc.

INSTEAD tell your readers or your audience who said what. (“Osama bin Laden, accused by America of ordering the attack on New York...”)

That way you avoid implicitly signing yourself and your news service up to the allegations made by one party in the conflict against another.

16. AVOID greeting the signing of documents by leaders, which bring about military victory or ceasefire, as necessarily creating peace.

INSTEAD try to report on the issues which remain, and which may still lead people to commit further acts of violence in the future.

*Ask- what is being done to strengthen the means on the ground to handle and resolve conflict non-violently, to address development or structural needs in the society and to create a culture of peace?*

17. AVOID waiting for leaders on ‘our’ side to suggest or offer solutions.

INSTEAD *pick up and explore peace initiatives wherever they come from.* Ask questions to politicians, for example, ideas put forward by grassroots organizations. Assess peace perspectives against what you know about the issues the parties are really trying to address, do not simply ignore them because they don’t coincide with established positions. Include images of a solution, however partial – they may help to stimulate dialogue.

The 17-point checklist tackles the use of language and word choice by discouraging the use of emotive words such as “tragedy” and “massacre” and instead suggesting that journalists reserve strong language for situations that are extremely grave. The checklist also discourages the use of demonising adjectives and labels, replacing words like “extremist” and “terrorist” with descriptions that are less partisan, such as “bombers.” Other elements tackled include refraining from reporting on conflict as a zero-sum game, with one winner and one loser; reporting about shared common ground between parties involved in the conflict; and resisting reporting claims as facts. Instead it encourages journalists to explore peace initiatives in their coverage; treat allegations from all sides

equally; and be precise about what is known (McGoldrick & Lynch 2006, pp. 30-33). The rationale behind the checklist stems from the idea that, as integral parts of a news story, language and framing give substance and meaning, and word choices focus on journalists as “gatekeepers” of information during conflict situations. Therefore, the construction of news stories, based on the “myriad” of facts from which journalists choose, is the responsibility of journalists who determine what “reality” they will report on (Youngblood 2016, pp. 5-6).

All in all, the 17 points developed by McGoldrick and Lynch (2006) extend Galtung’s (2003) peace journalism and war journalism orientations into more practical and prescriptive tools that journalists can use to improve their journalistic practice. The 17 points also emphasize the importance of the gate-keeping process as an integral part of either contracting or expanding the space available to work towards or imagine peaceful outcomes in a society. This draws from the idea that the inclusion or omission of certain information and facts may have the power to be anger-inducing, misleading or divisive if selected and/or worded carelessly, because journalists, their sources and their audiences are considered to be counterparts in a feedback loop of cause and effect (McGoldrick & Lynch 2006, pp. 21-22). In a bid to create even more clarity, Youngblood (2016, pp. 6-7) outlines that from this 17-point checklist the Centre for Global Peace Journalism has developed a 10-point list that summarizes and describes elements of peace journalism. These are:

### **Peace Journalism Elements**

1. PJ is proactive, examining the causes of conflict, and leading discussions about solutions.
2. PJ looks to unite parties, rather than divide them, and eschews oversimplified “us-them” and “good guy vs. bad guy” reporting.
3. Peace reporters reject official propaganda, and instead seek facts from all sources.
4. PJ is balanced, covering issues/suffering/peace proposals from all sides of a conflict.
5. PJ gives voice to the voiceless, instead of just reporting for and about elites and those in power.
6. Peace journalists provide depth and context, rather than just superficial and sensational “blow by blow” accounts of violence and conflict.
7. Peace journalists consider the consequences of their reporting.
8. Peace journalists carefully choose and analyse the words they use, understanding that carelessly selected words are often inflammatory.
9. Peace journalists thoughtfully select the images they use, understanding that they can misrepresent an event, exacerbate an already dire situation, and re-victimize those who have suffered.
10. Peace journalists offer counter-narratives that debunk media-created or perpetuated stereotypes, myths, and misperceptions.

*Table 1 (Youngblood 2016, pp. 6-7)*

These elements include all the things that peace journalism is and looks to do, such as to unite parties, give voice to the voiceless and provide depth and context. He also adds that both the 17 points and peace journalism elements were developed in response to irresponsible and sensational reporting, in order to encourage the value of peaceful responses while tackling difficult situations (Youngblood 2016, p. 7). Based on these early conceptualisations and practical tools, peace journalism took on a more prescriptive or normative approach, focusing mostly on its implementation and benefits (Galtung 1998, 2003; Lynch 2007; McGoldrick & Lynch 2006; Youngblood 2016).

The next section explores the orientations and schools of thought that have developed from the conceptualisation, core elements and practical tools around the core principles of peace journalism.

## 5. Peace Journalism: Orientations and Conceptualisation

### I. Peace Journalism: Two Schools of Thought

The core foundations, principles and practical tools set out for peace journalism primarily emerge from the works of Galtung (2003) and McGoldrick and Lynch (2006). However, as peace journalism has been explored and utilised in different studies and contexts, two divergent schools of thought, differing in intent and focus, have emerged. Hanitzsch (2007) and Ross (2006), in their analysis of how peace journalism is understood and utilised, have classified these two schools of thought as;

- i. The “interventionist” approach; and
- ii. The “good journalism” approach

#### a) The “interventionist” approach

Drawing mainly from the works of McGoldrick and Lynch (2006), and the core conceptualisation of peace journalism offered by Galtung (2003), the “interventionist” approach comprehends the role of the peace journalist as central to conflict reporting. The approach expects journalists to take on an active role in conflict resolution and transformation by using peace journalism as a mechanism that “actively promote[s] peace through means of public communication” (Hanitzsch 2007, p. 1). Therefore, the expectation is for journalists to embrace a more “activist-like” approach (Ross 2006) when reporting on conflict situations, by offering creative solutions and focusing on conflict formation and resolution (Galtung & Fischer 2013, p. 96). The dissemination of conflict coverage in this approach focuses on the gate-keeping process, through practitioners, that actively encourages resolution and advocacy (Aslam 2011, p. 121). At the core of this school thought is the idea that the media has an ethical duty in preventing, resolving or minimising the negative effects

of violence. Therefore, the news media has three roles to play, which are to “create reality, set examples and call for change” (Hanitzsch 2007, p. 3).

Some African scholars tackling peace journalism in African contexts (Adebayo 2015b; Mwangi & Bwire 2013; Ogenga 2019a; Onyebadi & Oyedeleji 2011) align with this school of thought, as African media systems have not only been historically set up to play supportive roles to the state, but are still expected to assist in countering the effects of colonialism existing in African societies (explored in greater detail in chapter 3). African media systems, despite ownership patterns, have always played the role of facilitating and promoting the cohesiveness of African societies, for, against or alongside the state, because of the divisions created by colonialism (Iraki 2010; Mak'Ochieng 1996; Ogola 2017). Therefore, when it comes to matters of national security, such as terrorism, the media is expected, by the state, to play an active role in promoting peace. In the Kenyan context in particular, scholars such as Onyebadi and Oyedeleji (2011, p. 215), in their assessment of conflict coverage in the Kenyan press, reflect these sentiments, arguing that journalists “...should be society’s moral witnesses, not ‘objective’ bystanders who watch and report on the collapse of humanity.” This sentiment, supported by Fackler et al. (2011) in a similar study in the Kenyan context, states that,

Peace journalism is the approach to the practice of the trade with an underlying philosophy to bring about the reduction of violence, especially when tensions flare between ethnicities, to moderate the politically stifling impasse, and to promote dialogue between antagonists where embedded suspicion threatens to disrupt already fragile communities (Fackler et al. 2011, p. 2).

Therefore, the “interventionist” approach positions the news media as a “powerful instrument that could be used for evil or for constructive social purposes” (Shoemaker & Reese 1996, p. 31). However, some scholars have criticized this conceptualisation of peace journalism, arguing that it over-emphasizes the agency of individual journalists and fails to recognise the diversity of journalistic practices (Hanitzsch 2007; Loyn 2007). Tackling the same notions in mediatized conflicts, Cottle (2004, p. 3) argues that journalism is far more complex and diverse than is presumed, as cultural forms of expression, political alignments and other institutional arrangements all contribute towards how journalism is practised. Therefore, the journalist cannot be central to conflict reporting, as the news media is not monolithic. These criticisms are explored in greater detail in section 5. II.

#### b) The “Good Journalism” Approach

Following some of the criticisms of the “interventionist” approach, the “good journalism” approach seems to be more widely accepted by scholars and media practitioners, due to its likeness to traditional “good journalism” practice (Lynch & Galtung 2010; McGoldrick & Lynch 2006; Peleg 2007). This conceptualisation of peace journalism meshes conflict analysis and responsibility with the tenets of “good journalism”: truthfulness, accuracy and balance (Hanitzsch 2007; Ross 2006). It calls on journalists to help audiences consider non-violence by altering their professional values and practices. Where the “interventionist” approach seeks to actively offer creative approaches to conflict resolution, the “good journalism” approach includes shifting how journalists present conflict, through better journalistic practice, in order to bring to the forefront “under-represented perspectives to provide deeper and broader information” (Ross 2006, p. 1). Rather than giving the journalist the responsibility to resolve conflict, this approach calls for the transformation of journalists themselves in order to provide a “...balanced and even-handed account [of conflict],

which encourages fairness” (Peleg 2007, p. 3). Therefore, the news media, as the arena of conflict, is perceived to be a space for conflicting parties to communicate, while offering opportunities and “prospects for resolution and reconciliation by changing the norms and habits of reporting...” (Peleg 2006, p. 1).

Also inspired by the 17 points developed by McGoldrick and Lynch (2006) (see Section 4. III), this practical conceptualisation of peace journalism is viewed as a “set of tools” that could help journalists critically consider the role that they play in conflict situations. In developing countries, such as Kenya, this conceptualisation of peace journalism has also gained traction in some academic circles because it provides clear and concise conflict reporting guidelines through its prescriptive nature (Kisang 2014; Mwangi & Bwire 2013; Ogenga 2012; Youngblood 2017). This traction results from the critiques made about the Kenyan news media having “...poor ethics and lacking journalistic work when reporting on terrorism” (Media Council of Kenya 2016, p. 1). Therefore, this approach to peace journalism is considered to be a useful approach to conflict reporting in the Kenyan news media system, despite peace journalism’s struggle to gain universal acceptance, because it provides structure and clarity for journalists in conflict situations (Hackett 2011; Mwangi & Bwire 2013; Onyebadi & Oyedeki 2011).

Moreover, the “good journalism” approach places “impact and consequences” in the foreground of conflict reporting within broadcasts and written press (McGoldrick & Lynch 2006, p. 242), without compromising contemporary journalism practice (Ross 2006, p. 12). According to Shoemaker and Reese (1996, p. 31), this approach to peace journalism is considered to be ideal, above the “interventionist” approach, because it incorporates diversity, promotes better journalistic practices and places accountability on journalism itself, while incorporating the core ideas of peace journalism. These core ideas, such as allowing all rival parties an opportunity to voice their



concerns and providing contexts and backgrounds that represent all sides involved in the conflict, are incorporated into the practice of journalism through media messaging and the production process (Shoemaker & Reese 1996, p. 31) and therefore do not compromise the tenets of “good journalism”. Through this lens, the best practices of journalism are improved upon alongside “...a means for ameliorating conflicts and opening up new opportunities for their peaceful resolution” (Hackett 2006, p. 2).

## II. Peace Journalism: The critiques

Outside of the two schools of thought, peace journalism as a concept does not go without its critiques. Both Hanitzsch (2007) and Loyn (2007) critique peace journalism based on two major viewpoints. They argue that peace journalism does not consider the structural constraints and individual agency of journalists, in conflict situations, and is inconsistent with the nature of journalism as it does not add anything new or better to journalism. Referring to peace journalism as “old wine in new bottles,” Hanitzsch (2007, p. 2) asserts that peace journalism seems unnecessary as recent media coverage already incorporates the basic tenets of peace journalism. Moreover, where peace journalism places responsibility on journalists, for example, under the “interventionist” approach, the lines between journalism and public relations become blurred, as the role of journalists should be to provide information and not become active participants in conflict (Hanitzsch 2007; Loyn 2007). Journalists run the risk of distorting their craft if the focus remains the pursuit of peace markers or passing of peace plans instead of serving their audiences. Emphasizing this point, Loyn (2007, pp. 1-3) asserts that “reporting and peace making are different roles”, therefore, if journalists jump the line towards public relations they will dissolve good reporting, which can only be preserved by adhering to balance, fairness and objectivity. The

consequence of this, according to Hanitzsch (2007) and Loyn (2007), is a lack of reliability and credibility of the news media (Kempf 2007, p. 2).

Furthermore, Hanitzsch (2007) and Loyn (2007) argue that the traditional tools of journalism are already not sufficient to guarantee good journalism, let alone promote “good” peace journalism. Therefore, the “good journalism” approach falls short by overlooking the fact that “reporters live in social contexts and share a language and certain assumptions with their audiences” (Kempf 2007, p. 3), hindering the accurate representation of reality. Thus, how are these traditional tools of journalism expected to meet peace journalism’s ambitious aims? Moreover, the individualism of peace journalism tends to overlook the structural conditions that exist within these contexts which shape and limit journalism, as factors such as the availability of sources, time constraints and editorial procedures all influence the work of journalists (Hanitzsch 2007, p. 5). According to Shoemaker and Reese (1996, p. 259) there are many constraints that journalists face both from within media organizations, such as media routines, and those that are external to media organizations, such as advertising, ownership and government control. All these constraints tend to limit the agency of journalists, as media owners “have final say” and advertisers can also “...delete or shape...content by specifically withdrawing advertising support from objectionable content” (Shoemaker & Reese 1996, p. 259).

However, proponents of peace journalism such as Peleg (2007, p. 2) argue that peace journalism is not redundant because it actually restores and echoes the traditional role of journalism by seeking, emphasizing and validating facts from a variety of sources, which leads to balanced reporting. Peleg (2007, p. 2) outlines that peace journalism stays true to “...the traditional role of journalism as the fourth estate: telling the story independently of other estates, or authorities, namely government, religion and business.” Therefore, as a concept it does more to restore good journalism

practice, such as promoting accuracy and fairness, in comparison to the contested concept of objectivity, which has done more to escalate narratives of reality that are biased (Peleg 2007, p. 2). Lynch (2014, p. 51) echoes this sentiment, highlighting that peace journalism seeks to disseminate content that is critical, independent, ethical and of interest to the public as it pertains to conflict situations. This allows audiences and readers to perceive, critique and focus on backgrounds, consequences and hidden causes of conflict that peace journalism brings to the foreground, which falls in line with the principles of “good journalism” (Lynch 2014, p. 51). Thus, the “good journalism” approach will not only command good journalistic practice, but also combines journalism with the external aim of peace. More specifically, the “good journalism” approach pushes journalists to reflect on how they interact with and meet certain facts, while considering how audiences are affected by the dissemination of “facts.” This he attributes to the combined understanding of conflict, practising critical self-awareness and providing contexts that peace journalism prescribes in conflict coverage (Lynch 2007, p. 3).

Moreover, peace journalism’s focus on the individual journalist making better choices is geared towards influencing change and promoting mindsets that are innovative, especially with regards to ethical practices of journalism. By ascribing to peace journalism, journalists would then be able to expand the orientation and make peace journalism a norm, toning down and mitigating the effects of internal and external structures (Peleg 2007, p. 4). The conceptualisation of peace journalism factors in journalistic settings and structural limitations, which is one of the main challenges to “good journalism” it aims to tackle, as these structural conditions should govern and not determine news content (Lynch & Galtung 2010, p. 27). Therefore, according to the proponents of peace journalism, the adherence to and diligent implementation of peace journalism principles not only steers the opportunity to improve and reform traditional journalistic practice, but also aims to

empower the individual journalist by influencing changes to the environmental circumstances which steer and tame their coverage (Lynch 2014; Lynch & Galtung 2010; Peleg 2007).

Thus, from a general point of view, the literature on peace journalism highlights that “the value of peace journalism lies in the possibility of it bringing a positive change in the media’s coverage of conflict situations and a better understanding to the people as to why they happen” (Aslam 2011, p. 137). Also, proponents of peace journalism (Aslam 2011; Galtung 2003; Lynch & McGoldrick 2007; Shinar 2007; Youngblood 2016) make clear that peace journalism is not restricted to the representation of “good news” only, a misconception that many people have when critiquing it. At its core, peace journalism is characterised as “fairer way of reporting on conflict” and a prerequisite for “good journalism.” Moreover, Shinar (2007, p. 2) points out that peace journalism’s move towards human and social awareness also forgoes the ratings culture that governs the news media, offers fairness and improved professional attitudes, performance, morals and ethical values, which have been severely compromised in traditional conflict reporting. Therefore, it can be seen that many of the critiques of peace journalism have been addressed by its proponents, who have made it clear that peace journalism’s main goal is to improve upon current journalistic practice by adding to it, rather than steering away from it.

However, one criticism that has eluded the proponents of peace journalism, which Hanitzsch (2007, p. 7) refers to as a consequence of a “mistitled” concept, is the fact that its title creates the assumption that peace journalism is limited to advocating for peace. Hoffmann (2012, p. v) refers to the name “peace journalism” as an unfortunate “choice of terms” because it doesn’t encompass the true essence of peace journalism, which is geared towards promoting balanced narratives. Nevertheless, despite the misconceptions around the title, peace journalism fills the need for better

conflict reporting, albeit conceptually, offering practical “tools” that can guide journalists during conflict situations.

The next section addresses the conceptual framework selected for this study and why the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan context is worth assessing.

### III. Peace Journalism: its Applicability to the Kenyan Context

Considering the two schools of thought and justifications for peace journalism highlighted above, this thesis draws on the conceptualisation of peace journalism as a mode of “good journalism.” This conceptualisation is relevant because the Kenyan news media landscape has been critiqued in several studies (Kiarie & Mogambi ; Kisang 2014; Mwinyihaj & Wanyama 2017; Oriare, Okello-Orlale & Ugangu 2010) for lacking good journalistic work, which includes integrity and ethical approaches to reporting on terror (Media Council of Kenya 2016, p. 1). Also, the Kenyan news media has been singled out for overlooking the historical, cultural and social contexts and explanations for terrorism, which fosters a symbiotic relationship between the news media and terrorism (Media Council of Kenya 2016, p. 1). Therefore, the promotion of good journalism practice is not only necessary in the Kenyan news media, but the external aim of promoting peace would potentially remedy the symbiosis between terrorism and the news media that is the current reality.

Moreover, as illustrated in the next chapter, the Kenyan news media is neither autonomous nor privy to media freedoms that would allow individual journalists to have significant agency over the news content disseminated to audiences, due to historical, political, institutional and economic undercurrents. Therefore, the journalist cannot be central to conflict reporting, as is the aim of the

“interventionist” approach. However, the “good journalism” approach to peace journalism is a better fit for the Kenyan news media because it focuses on changing mindsets, promoting “good journalism,” and mitigating the impact and consequences of structural conditions in conflict reporting and journalism itself, which accommodates the diversity of the Kenyan news media environment. Similarly, this study is concerned with the use of peace journalism as an avenue for providing contexts through storytelling while enhancing audiences’ perceptions and understanding of conflict through accuracy, balance and fairness. Similar to McGoldrick and Lynch’s (2006) definition of peace journalism, outlined in section 4.II, this study is concerned with the responsibility of journalists as gatekeepers, their role in the production of conflict coverage and the implications of systematic factors and structures on the news production process.

This thesis supports the view that journalists play a critical role in providing insight into conflict formation, which could contribute to conflict transformation (McGoldrick & Lynch 2006). It also recognizes that journalists have some agency within their work and are not entirely regulated by outside forces (Shoemaker & Reese 1996, p. 31). The element that this study aims to add to peace journalism studies is a non-western understanding of how organisational routines, social pressures and structural forces play an integral role in shaping how much agency journalists are able to exert (Bläsi 2004; Hanitzsch 2007), especially in African contexts. As Hanitzsch (2007) affirms, it is unlikely that journalists can alter those constraints alone. Therefore, in addition to using the definition above, this thesis recognizes the need to consider and address the gaps in the literature, especially with regards to African media systems, where issues of structure and agency within journalists’ working environments are often overlooked.

#### IV. Contributing to the Peace Journalism Conversations: Theory Versus Practice

One of the major critiques of peace journalism and its implementation is that the unpredictability of conflict situations may make it difficult for the theory to meet practice (Hanitzsch 2007; Loyn 2007; Youngblood 2016). While peace journalism aims to address many of the problems that result from the coverage of conflict, in particular the prioritization of violent discourses and violence in news coverage, it does not explicitly consider the influence of the news production process, the autonomy of the journalist and the structure and agency of media companies, especially with regards to conflict situations. Moreover, in African contexts the colonial legacy tends to linger systematically in institutions, society and more so in the news media space, affecting how conflict is perceived, the role of the media in conflict situations and the expectations on the media to serve both the state interests and the interests of audiences (Heath 1997; Ogola 2011).

This study aims to address this gap as it pertains to the implementation of peace journalism in the Kenyan news media by placing the majority of the focus on the viability of peace journalism, in light of the systemic factors and structures that influence conflict reporting in Kenya, in order to facilitate a balanced framing of conflict news. This study brings to the forefront the effects of the news production process and the complexity of different contexts, in this case Kenya, on the implementation of peace journalism, while contributing to research on whether peace journalism's theory and practice can meet. Based on the literature reviewed in this chapter, this study acknowledges peace journalism's recognition of opportunities to transform conflict (Galtung 2003, p. 177), while contributing to the narrative that the context within which the media system exists and its implications for the news production process should not be overlooked. This falls in line with the criticism by many western scholars, discussed in detail in the next section, that peace journalism's shortcomings primarily fall under three main headings: structure and agency, its

individualistic grounding, and its place within the news production process (Bläsi 2004; Hackett 2006; Hanitzsch 2004b; Loyn 2007).

The African context is a valuable inclusion in this assessment of peace journalism because many studies advocate for the implementation of peace journalism in Africa, due to its close proximity to conflicts. Moreover, while African media systems are built on western ideals, they also tend to offer complex systemic challenges to the practice of journalism because of colonial legacies (explored in Chapter 3). Therefore, some issues pertaining to the practicality of peace journalism are similar in both western and African contexts, such as the competition to break the story first, strict deadlines, issues of time during conflict situations and the idea that violence sells (Hackett 2006, p. 3), while others are completely foreign. In these contexts, similar to the observations made by Hackett (2006), peace journalism as a normative model still leaves many questions unanswered because of the assumption that the media has direct and powerful effects.

The next section explores the ideas around peace journalism in non-western contexts, in particular Kenya, and the main challenges that could potentially affect the implementation of peace journalism in Kenya.

#### V. Peace Journalism and Non-western Contexts: The Kenyan News Media

There have been several studies on peace journalism and non-western media systems (Aslam 2011; Hussain & Rehman 2015a; Kisang 2014; Ogenga 2019a) which have concluded that the adoption of western ideals within non-western media systems contributes to the entrenchment of war journalism in conflict reporting. Many of these studies also argue that peace journalism, as an alternative way of reporting on conflict, may serve developing countries better than developed countries due to their proximity to major conflicts, while other studies (Hussain 2019; Hussain &



Rehman 2015b; Ogenga 2019a) advocate for a hybrid version of peace journalism that is better suited to non-western contexts. Many studies of non-western media systems and peace journalism (Abdul-Nabi 2015; Kisang 2014; Mwangi & Bwire 2013; Ogenga 2012; Rawan & Hussain 2017) tend to take on more quantitative and prescriptive approaches, sometimes overlooking the news production process, especially around the autonomy of the news media as it relates to the systemic structures and factors built, shaped and still affected by the remnants of colonialism, which compromise media freedoms and autonomy.

Some scholars argue that the implementation of peace journalism is dependent on some level of media autonomy and freedom (Cottle 2004, pp. 76-84) as it looks to explore conflict truthfully and comprehensively, but this is severely compromised, especially in Kenya (Iraki 2010; Ogola 2011). Despite this, some scholars such as Kisang (2014), Ogenga (2019a) and Youngblood (2017) argue that peace journalism should be implemented in the Kenyan context because of the poor cohesion of diverse cultures which has manifested in an uncertain security and peace environment, especially due to terrorism and violent extremism in the East African region. Additionally, the obligatory political role set out for the Kenyan news media by the government (discussed in detail in Chapter 3) to participate and stand up for peace and to enhance development in the region through peace promotion (Ogenga 2012, p. 2), further supports the interest in peace journalism in the region.

While several of these studies centre their analysis on the commercial set-up of the Kenyan news media and the political and economic interests that steer news production (Adebayo 2015b; Kisang 2014; Mwangi & Bwire 2013), this study introduces a different narrative to the research by illustrating the effects of colonialism and its remnants on the news media environment, and ultimately the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan context. This study also aims to contribute to the research component of Ogenga's (2019a, p. 330) study on "hybrid" peace

journalism (HPJ), geared towards encouraging African-centred journalism and nuanced to the Kenyan context, and more specifically towards news stories on radicalisation and terrorism. Ogenga (2019a, p. 330) illuminates that while he considers peace journalism to be an appropriate frame for terrorism coverage in the Kenyan news media, it should be implemented in response to local dynamics and contexts. He argues that terrorism coverage in Africa is currently characterized by western sensationalism, which needs to be remedied by HPJ.

#### a) “Hybrid” Peace Journalism (HPJ)

“Hybrid” peace journalism (HPJ) is conceptualised based on Pan-African principles and ancient African cultural philosophies that encourage societal cohesion, peace, and development, through collective responsibility, encouraging humanity and unity. It emphasizes the idea that the media should not only stay true to local nuances and contexts but is also obligated to stand up and participate for peace, in order to encourage development in Africa (Ogenga 2019b, pp. 29-33). HPJ aims to encourage the re-conceptualization of the practice of journalism in Africa, by scholars, institutions and journalists, in order to move away from western conceptualisations of journalism that are institutionalised in mainstream journalism and are partly responsible for news and news values that encourage stereotypical inflammatory and sensationalist coverage of terrorism (Ogenga 2019b, pp. 23-27). It asks journalists to deliberately focus on peace when reporting on terror and specifically mention the word “peace” in conflict coverage. It also discourages the use of inflammatory labels such as “Somali terrorist,” which Ogenga asserts partly results from the training of African journalists (Ogenga 2019b, p. 23).

Ogenga (2019b) and Nyanjom (2012) both argue that African voices are missing when defining ideologies around the threats posed by terrorism, as the western media has always set the pace for global media frames on terrorism. This has created confusion about where African journalism begins and western journalism ends in African media spaces, creating a hindrance to how African affairs are approached. Moreover, African journalists tend to “operate in a world where everything has been pre-prescribed for them and their only duty is to put these [western journalistic principles] into practice without the opportunity to think or reinvent them” (Ogenga 2019b, p. 27). HPJ not only offers this opportunity, but also opens the space for dialogue and the conceptualisation of African centred journalism. Conceptually, HPJ is an Africanised version of Galtung and Ruge’s (1965) concept of peace journalism, “...which seeks to look at conflicts in Africa with African lenses and wisdom or ‘gnosis’ for peace and security to avoid the escalation of violent conflicts” (Ogenga 2019b, p. 29). Through core elements such as research, training and practice (RTP), HPJ reflects conceptual precision and the contextual differentiation of peace journalism using Pan-African methodologies and research, to answer questions on the implementation of peace journalism in conflict reporting within African contextual realities (Ogenga 2019b, p. 29)

It also encourages the training of African journalists by transforming media institutions and moving away from the commodification of news content, in order to create a younger generation of peace journalists who can change the trajectory of terrorism coverage. These trained journalists are then expected to apply the HPJ news values, harambee (collective responsibility), umoja (unity) and utu (humanity), in conflict coverage with the aim of contributing to the practice element of HPJ (Ogenga 2019b, p. 29). Based on the general understanding of HPJ, African-centred journalism and the encouragement of African solutions for African problems, this study does not extensively engage with the conceptualisation of HPJ. This is because it seeks to first understand the environment that the Kenyan news media exists and how it relates to the basic principles of peace

journalism, before exploring a hybrid version that is built on these basic principles. Instead, this study strives to contribute to the further development of HPJ's theory, through engagement with the broader research environment, in order to assist and add new perspectives to the refinement of the concept of "hybrid" peace journalism.

One way that this study aims to contribute to African-centred journalism studies and HPJ is through engaging with the main critiques of peace journalism, which tackle the news production process, agency and structure and the individualism of peace journalism, as explored and explained earlier in this chapter, within the Kenyan news media context. Because peace journalism is characteristically individualistic and shaped around the agency of individual reporters (Aslam 2011, p. 121), the Kenyan contexts offers a different perspective, as media freedom and individual agency are not equal across the board for many journalists and editors. Therefore, it is valuable to explore whether peace journalism creates a space for Kenyan journalists to produce richer and more comprehensive news stories on conflict.

Similarly, Hanitzsch's (2007, p. 5) critique of the "illusion" that peace journalism creates in conflict coverage, by alluding that changed behaviours and attitudes are all that journalists need, is tackled in this study, highlighting the varying structural constraints that affect the Kenyan news media while exploring the assumption that journalistic autonomy is available to all media practitioners. Moreover, this study assesses the context within which a conflict takes place as an important indicator of peace journalism's viability, which Bläsi (2004, p. 1) highlights as a necessary assessment for peace journalism to be practical and remain relevant, as there is a collision between peace journalism and the reality of the media system in question. Thus, by identifying the preconditions that shape the coverage of conflict, the direct effects of news production processes and the obstacles that journalists face in their daily work when covering conflict situations, this

study tackles peace journalism, its conceptualisation and implementation in African contexts, assessing whether theory can meet practice.

## 6. Conclusion

In conclusion, the literature on peace journalism mainly focuses on the prevalence of war journalism in conflict reporting with the aim of prescribing peace journalism as an alternative way of reporting. Many of the studies explored in this chapter rely on Galtung's (2003) model of two competing news frames as an indicator of news framing and prescribe the "tools" offered by McGoldrick and Lynch (2006) as the desired standard of conflict reporting. While there are differences in how peace journalism is perceived - the "interventionist" approach and the "good journalism" approach - the core orientations of peace journalism generally have remained the same since its conception. Many of the criticisms of peace journalism stem from its practicality within traditional media systems, as it may appear to be too ambitious in its endeavours. The main concerns refer to the lack of consideration of the news production process, while making assumptions about the autonomy and agency of individual journalists and media companies. Peace journalism has also been critiqued for overlooking the complexity of contexts and the interaction between traditional media systems and the contexts within which they exist. However, all of these critiques have been addressed by peace journalism proponents, who assert that peace journalism can improve traditional journalistic practices by promoting ethical and better journalistic standards, especially in conflict reporting.

Also, many of the studies on peace journalism focus on western contexts, with very little research into non-western media systems, despite it being suggested as an alternative way of conflict reporting within non-western contexts. In the Kenyan context, where peace journalism research is

still in its infancy, studies tend to advocate for its implementation based on Africa's proximity to major conflicts and the need to accelerate development through the promotion of peace. However, many of these studies seem to overlook the unique Kenyan context and the effects of colonialism on the practice of journalism, despite the heavy influence of western ideals on the media system and environment. The next chapter addresses some of these colonial remnants and their influences on the Kenyan media system and environment, with the aim of highlighting how peace journalism can be misappropriated if theory fails to meet practice.

This study therefore aims to illustrate the effects of colonialism on factors and structures such as legislation, media roles and media freedoms, how they impact the news production process, and what this means for the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan context. Steering slightly away from the usual assessment of many studies on peace journalism, focusing on elements such as ownership and the economic domain, this study aims to incorporate contextual complexities, such as colonial legacies and the relationship between politics and media, as these pertain to the coverage of national security issues. The aim of this is to bridge the gaps in peace journalism research while contributing to varied contexts within peace journalism research. Therefore, the contribution that this study aims to include in peace journalism research builds on the consideration of the news production process through the lens of historical legacies and its effects, an area that is overlooked but just as important in the implementation of peace journalism.

The next chapter situates the relationship between the Kenyan news media and terrorism, explores examples of how the Kenyan news media reports on terror, and illustrates the complexity of the Kenyan media system, rooted in its historical and political legacies, with the aim of facilitating an assessment of the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan context.

## Chapter 3: Terrorism and the Kenyan News Media: A Historical Overview

### 1. Introduction

This chapter aims to explain the complexity of the relationship between the Kenyan news media and terrorism, as well as the major constraints on the practice of journalism in Kenya as a result of its historical context. It does this by exploring the evolution and growth of the Kenyan news media system and environment, as well as identifying from previous studies factors and structures that drive and govern the news media industry in the Kenyan context. The chapter highlights the political, economic and historical legacies, particularly colonialism and its remnants, on Kenyan societal fabric and how these impact media freedoms and the industry in general. Furthermore, the chapter highlights and explores three major terror attacks within Kenyan borders between 2013 and 2019 to foster some understanding of the current journalism culture in Kenya as it pertains to conflict reporting.

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first explores the relationship between the Kenyan news media and terrorism, and discusses examples of the coverage of the three terror attacks that are the focus of this study. It also explores and explains some of the factors that tend to steer coverage of terrorism in the Kenyan experience, in order to highlight the obstacles that Kenyan journalists, editors and media companies face in conflict reporting. The second part gives a historical overview of the Kenyan news media system and environment, exploring the growth and evolution of the news media from the colonial era to now. This section highlights and links the repeated cycles of the Kenyan news media environment and system, the impact of different political phases and the resulting implications that compromise media freedoms and the practice of journalism in Kenya. This is necessary to explore as media freedoms tend to dictate how much autonomy the news media

holds, which in turn informs and affects the practice of journalism, the coverage of terrorism, and ultimately the viability of implementing peace journalism in the Kenyan context.

## 2. The Kenyan News Media and Terrorism: A Symbiosis?

### 2.1. War Journalism and the Kenyan News Media: A Brief Overview

As mentioned in Chapter 1, terrorism has been a primary source of insecurity in the East African region and particularly in Kenya (Media Council of Kenya 2014). As a result, the Kenyan news media plays a critical role as both the convener and the conveyer of discourses and debates surrounding the causes of terrorism and the efforts being made to curb terrorism (Cottle 2004, p. 3). Linking terrorism, the government and society, the Kenyan news media has become a critical arena that relays to the public conflict information and images. In many studies exploring the coverage of terrorism in the Kenyan news media, more critique than praise has been expressed, especially with regards to how the news media navigates and portrays the topic of terrorism (Burr 2017; Kiarie & Mogambi 2017; Kisang 2014; Mwinyihaj & Wanyama 2017; Ogenga 2012). In some studies the Kenyan news media is particularly critiqued for replicating gruesome terror and victim images, amplifying narratives of fear and violence and representing terrorism as a result of ethnic and religious differences (Kisang 2014, p. 79).

Kisang (2014, pp. 78-79) argues that the portrayal of these narratives is problematic because they stand in the way of cohesion of Kenyan society by widening the divisions that are already present in societal fabric due to the remnants of colonisation. This is the case because they solely peg terrorism as a religious and ethnically driven conflict. By replicating the gruesome and violent nature of terrorism, the coverage of terrorism in the Kenyan news media tends to amplify the terrorist agenda of spreading fear while dismantling the power structures in place. This type of



coverage, referred to as war journalism (Galtung 2003), is not only detrimental to the diverse Kenyan society that has lived in unity for decades despite differences, but also fails to acknowledge the strength of the news media as a source of information (Kisang 2014, p. 79). According to Galtung (2003) and McGoldrick and Lynch (2006), war journalism is problematic because it tends to overlook the role that the news media plays in edifying the public's interpretation of terrorism, the ideas around who is responsible and the influence it may have on agenda-setting and the potential solutions to curbing terrorism.

Moreover, Ogenga (2012, pp. 1-5) argues that the Kenyan news media operates within a war journalism framework because of systemic structures and factors that tend to steer the practice of journalism. Like many African media systems, the Kenyan news media is an entity that has been built on the cornerstone of mainstream western journalistic traditions such as objectivity, impartiality and the responsibility of being a 'gatekeeper', while relying on a market model that prioritizes viewership and profits. Thus, when it comes to violent and dramatic scenes which are considered to be newsworthy, such as terror attacks, the line is blurred between where the business and the professional realms should begin and end. Therefore, war journalism approaches tend to be embedded in the Kenyan news media system because they add to the commercial value of media companies (Cottle 2004, p. 76).

Additionally, the coverage of terrorism in the Kenyan context tends to indicate a disconnect between the roles and responsibilities of the news media and the demands of news production, which require a degree of objectivity and impartiality (Ogenga 2012, p. 1). Since the struggle for liberation, the Kenyan news media has been shaped to play specific roles in conjunction with government expectations (explored in greater detail in the next section). These expectations have been etched in the Kenyan news media system, and include the responsibility to protect national

security, to remain patriotic and to offer a level of understanding for audiences that maintains public order (Media Council of Kenya 2013). These government expectations and the broader societal structures that influence news production, resulting from the realities of capitalism and commercialism, create a tug of war between the survival of the media as a business and the professionalism of the Kenyan news media which tends to encourage war journalism.

With this in mind, the next section highlights in more detail the coverage of terrorism in the Kenyan news media by exploring three terror attacks between 2013 and 2019, to demonstrate the nature of journalism in Kenya as it pertains to conflict reporting.

## 2.2. Reporting on Terror: The Kenyan News Media and the Realities of Terrorism

An increase in the frequency and impact of major terrorist activities in Kenya began in 2011, when Kenya deployed troops into Somalia in a bid to secure its borders. However, between 2013 and 2019, Kenya witnessed three of its biggest terror attacks, garnering the attention of both international and local media. Throughout these three attacks the Kenyan news media shifted and altered how it covered terrorism based on the political climate, the legislative measures put in place and the level of critique from scholars, analysts and government entities. In a report written by the Media Council of Kenya (MCK) in conjunction with International Media Support (IMS) in 2016, the Kenyan news media was critiqued for reporting on terror in a manner that was considered to be problematic and lacking. The report identified several shortcomings of the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror, with the most significant being a lack of historical explanation and context, sensationalism, and leaving audiences with just one perspective positioned around violence and extremism (Media Council of Kenya 2016, p. 1).

Following the findings of this report and several other studies carried out by scholars, this next section explores the three terror attacks that have received the most media attention and criticism in order to demonstrate the realities of terrorism in Kenya and the perception of how the Kenyan news media reports on terror. These three terror attacks are:

1. The Westgate Mall attack, 2013;
2. The Garissa University College attack, 2015; and
3. The Riverside/Dusit attack, 2019

#### I. Westgate Mall Attack, 2013

The Westgate Mall attack occurred on the 21<sup>st</sup> of September 2013, at a popular Kenyan mall in the capital city of Nairobi. The attack, which attracted the attention of the media, initially as a robbery, lasted four days and resulted in the injury of 175 civilians and the death of 67 more (Onuoha 2013, p. 4). The attackers, whose exact numbers are still debated, raided the upmarket Westgate Mall at noon on a Saturday and remained there, killing some and holding others hostage. The attack continued until the fourth day, after the majority of hostages had been rescued and the mall brought down by explosives detonated by the Kenyan defence forces (Onuoha 2013, pp. 3-4). As outlined by Onuoha (2013, pp. 3-7), the Westgate Mall attack was not the first terror attack of its magnitude that Kenya had experienced, but it did receive more media attention than previous attacks due to the fact the majority of the victims were upper-class Kenyans and foreign nationals who frequented the mall.

Similarly, the confirmation of the attack by Al-Shabaab via Twitter gave the news media more newsworthy content to report on, resulting in a media frenzy both at the scene and through broadcasts (Onuoha 2013, p. 5). The first three days of the attack were met with confusion and

conflicting reports by the Kenyan news media, the authorities and the government (CNN 2013). The confusion, according to the Media Council of Kenya (2014, p. 24), was primarily due to the fact that the government and security forces did not set up an information-disseminating centre that could receive and provide accurate figures to the news media. This confusion and lack of cohesiveness was not only evident by the second day of the attack, when there was no consensus on the number of attackers inside the mall, but was also used by the terror group to highlight the shortcomings of the security and intelligence entities in Kenya. Based on conflicting information provided by some security personnel and victim accounts, the news media went ahead and reported on the presence of 10 to 15 gunmen, while Al-Shabaab's twitter accounts released 9 names of the alleged attackers in response (Onuoha 2013, p. 3). Likewise, more security loopholes became evident through media broadcasts, as the Kenyan President, in a press conference, stated that 5 terrorists had been killed by the Kenyan forces and 11 others were in custody, with suspected links to the terror attack (CNN 2013). To date, the actual number of attackers is still speculated on and unclear, with some sources claiming as few as 4 and others as many as 15 (CNN 2013).

Despite the debates around the number of attackers, what became evident during the Westgate Mall attack was that the Kenyan news media was unprepared and was not well trained to handle extremely violent content and traumatized victims. According to a report published by the Media Council of Kenya (2014, p. 23), the Kenyan news media lacked competence and skill and violated the council's media code of conduct when reporting on the attack. The report faulted the Kenyan news media for prioritizing competitive breaking news headlines and the irresponsible handling of victims in order to outdo each other, rather than maintaining safety protocols, both at the scene and through broadcasts and publications. The Kenyan news media, during and after the attack, failed to respect and preserve the dignity of victims by intruding on those who were grief-stricken and shocked and by using inflammatory catchwords and panicky headlines to get the attention of

audiences (Media Council of Kenya 2014, p. 23). When it came to the gathering and disseminating of information, it was evident that clear guidelines and instructions were not set out and the media code of conduct not adhered to (Media Council of Kenya 2014, p. 24).

Additionally, the Kenyan news media failed to do due diligence before the dissemination of information to audiences, quoting and broadcasting unverified information from a fake Twitter account believed to be associated with Al-Shabaab (Osman 2015). On social media as well, the Kenyan news media tweeted and reported on the deaths of popular personalities that had not been confirmed and later deleted the tweets. One media house in particular even went as far as calling a victim trapped in the building, live on air, to obtain information on what was happening inside the mall and where she was hiding, ultimately putting her safety at risk. Similarly, one of the biggest daily newspapers, the *Daily Nation*, altered and printed images of a bloody woman on their front page, under the guise of making it “work better for the layout” and to sell newspapers (Osman 2015).

All in all, the criticism of the coverage of the Westgate Mall attack from the government, security personnel, scholars, some journalists and analysts were not only legitimate, but also highlighted many shortcomings in the practice of journalism in the Kenyan news media. In particular, the lack of regulation, verification, investigation and analysis of the information gathered during and after the attack exposed huge shortcoming in the ‘gatekeeping’ process and preparedness of the Kenyan news media during a time of conflict and violence (Burr 2017; Gathara 2017; Kisang 2014; Media Council of Kenya 2014; Osman 2015).

## II. Garissa University College Attack, 2015

Following the mistakes made in the coverage of the Westgate Mall attack, the state took legal action against some journalists and media companies for misconduct and the mishandling of information gathered at the scene of the attack (Media Council of Kenya 2014). As a result, it was evident in the coverage of the Garissa University College attack in 2015 that journalists had begun to subscribe to self-censorship out of fear (Kiarie & Mogambi 2017; Osman 2015). The Garissa University College attack occurred on 2<sup>nd</sup> of April 2015, when four heavily armed Al-Shabaab militants stormed into the university in the northeastern region of Kenya. The attack had one of the highest death tolls - 147 university students and staff - that Kenya has experienced from terrorism, with 79 more injured and 500 managing to escape before the four attackers detonated their suicide vests (BBC 2015).

Similar to the Westgate Mall attack, the Kenyan news media fell short in investigating and analyzing the causes and real issues behind the attack (Kiarie & Mogambi 2017, p. 63). News reports on the Garissa school attack focused solely on figures given by the government, forfeiting any investigation, expert opinion, information or assessment outside this (Kiarie & Mogambi 2017, p. 63). According to an assessment carried out by Kiarie and Mogambi (2017, p. 63), the Kenyan news media seemed passive and instead took on the role of a government mouthpiece. Additionally, the news media's coverage of the Garissa University College attack reflected a lack of prioritization of terror attacks outside the capital city, as news agencies were unaware of and did not report on the attack for a couple of hours, despite the news spreading on both Facebook and Twitter (Osman 2015). Following confirmation of the attack, some media houses gave only brief reports, while bloggers seemed to do the heavy lifting, gathering sources, details and exclusive reports on what exactly was happening. International media houses such as Al Jazeera and the BBC also seemed to have more information and news highlights on the attack, via freelance Kenyan journalists

stationed in Garissa, while the Kenyan news media was silent and yet to break the news (Osman 2015).

According to Osman (2015), a Kenyan journalist, the Kenyan news media remained silent and overly cautious during the Garissa University College attack due to anti-terror laws that laid out consequences for media misconduct following a terror attack, passed after the Westgate Mall attack. In accordance, Kiarie and Mogambi (2017, p. 63) assert that the coverage of the Garissa University College attack remained limited to the month that the attack occurred, focusing primarily on the attack itself. Despite the fact that the clauses in the laws pertaining to the news media had been removed by the courts, journalists still feared criticism and refrained from reporting on the attack with due diligence (Osman 2015). The only upside that seemed to come from this fear was that the Kenyan news media was now pedantic about confirming and verifying information before disseminating it and seemed more composed when handling the information received on the attack (Odhiambo, Wasike & Kimokoti 2015; Osman 2015).

### III. Riverside/Dusit Attack, 2019

After the Garissa University College attack, Al-Shabaab seemed to ease their attacks on Kenyan soil until the 15<sup>th</sup> of January 2019 and the Riverside/Dusit attack. The attack, carried out by Al-Shabaab at the 14 Riverside Drive office complex where the luxury hotel Dusit D2 is located, lasted overnight, claiming 21 lives and injuring 28 people. The Riverside/Dusit attack garnered significant media attention, perhaps because it occurred in the upscale neighbourhood of Westlands in Nairobi and because it had been a while since Al-Shabaab had launched an attack on Kenyan soil (BBC 2019). Most of the coverage of the Riverside/Dusit attack revolved around the rescue and evacuation of about 700 people, mostly staff in the hotel and business complex. The security

forces responded fairly quickly after the siege began and all the terrorists were presumed dead. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility via Twitter (Bryden & Bahra 2019, p. 1).

The Riverside/Dusit attack distinguished itself from previous terror attacks in Kenya through the use of a suicide bomber, something that the group had only previously done in attacks in Djibouti and Uganda, ensuring maximum media attention. Moreover, it was evident that the attack aimed to create spectacular and dramatic newsworthy scenes, such as the explosion of the suicide bomber's vest near a restaurant in the complex, setting parked cars on fire, and the presence of attackers armed with rifles and hand grenades opening fire as they entered the complex and the office blocks. Additionally, the Riverside/Dusit attack distinguished itself as the first "martyrdom" operation that was led, planned and executed primarily by Kenyans not of Somali descent (Bryden & Bahra 2019, p. 1). While the attack occurred relatively recently (at the time of writing) and limited assessment has been done on its coverage in the news media, one of the narratives that dominated in the media was a statement issued by Al-Shabaab claiming to 'liberate' Muslim populations. According to Al-Shabaab, the Kenyan government had perpetrated "countless number of atrocities against the Muslim population" and so their main goal was to 'liberate' the "Muslim lands" of North-eastern Province and the coast, where the majority of the Kenyan Muslims reside, from "Kenyan occupation" (Bryden & Bahra 2019, p. 7).

According to Bryden and Bahra (2019, p. 9), the Riverside attack served two purposes for Al-Shabaab. One was to solidify its regional expansion and longstanding ambitions for Kenya, namely to create public insecurity and undermine the public's support for the Kenyan Defence Forces' presence in Somalia. The other was to attract attention from the Kenyan news media, because they failed to do so during the El-Adde attack, 3 years prior. According to Kriel and Duggan (2016b), the date of the Riverside/Dusit attack - January 15<sup>th</sup> - was probably not a coincidence, as it was the



same date that Al-Shabaab had raided a Kenyan military base in El-Adde, Somalia. On the 15<sup>th</sup> of January 2016, Al-Shabaab detonated a truck loaded with explosives at the military base in Somalia, killing an estimated 141 Kenyan soldiers. However, the attack did not garner much media attention or acknowledgement by the Kenyan government, despite it being the largest military defeat since the fight for independence in 1963 (Kriel and Duggan 2016).

Kriel and Duggan's (2016) assessment indicated that there has been no explanation or news on the El-Adde attack from the Kenyan news media even to date. Any information that was available to the public was through an Al-Shabaab video that was posted on YouTube and circulated via social media. However, some reports surrounding the death toll of the El-Adde attack have been circulating through foreign media, such as CNN, and the death toll remains a point of contention (Kriel & Duggan 2016a). Similar to the Garissa University College attack, the silence of the Kenyan news media during the El-Adde attack has been attributed to legislative measures taken by the Kenyan government, using a rarely enforced law that prohibits the distribution of images or information deemed to cause public fear and alarm or undermine security operations (Kriel & Duggan 2016a).

### 2.3. The Factors that Influence how the Kenyan News Media Reports on Terror

Based on the brief assessment of the three terror attacks in the previous section, it is evident that the Kenyan news media leans more towards war journalism, which many scholars attribute to the systemic factors and structures that tend to steer the coverage of terrorism in the Kenyan news media (Heath 1997; Helander 2010; Mukhongo 2015; Ogenga 2012). Systemic structures and factors such as legislation that encourage media control and censorship, corruption and patriotic role perceptions, tend to contribute significantly to the Kenyan news media's coverage of terrorism

through a war journalism lens. The next section explores these three factors - legislation, corruption and role perceptions - in order to create some understanding of why the Kenyan news media tends to lean towards reporting through a war journalism lens.

### I. Legislation

As explored earlier, during the Garissa University College attack and the El-Adde attack the government had a firm grip on the Kenyan news media through legislation. In the Kenyan context, legislation is used as a tool to control and monitor rather than protect and preserve media freedoms (Tomaselli 2003, p. 429). According to Tomaselli (2003, pp. 429-430), this use of legislation is not unique to Kenya but extends to the African context in general, as legal frameworks are used to discourage openness, a remnant of the colonial era. Thus, the African media system is set up and expected to first serve and support national interests and to interpret content from the perspectives of those in power. In many cases the African news media plays the role of a ‘guard dog’ rather than a ‘watchdog,’ presenting a huge challenge to the practice of journalism on the continent.

Furthermore, the development of institutions, political and societal structures all tend to have this notion of control systemically embedded in order to solidify the authority of those in power. Stemming from the colonial era, legislative control of the media was used to govern and control the indigenous population, which later transmuted into a tool for nation building and to encourage societal cohesion during the post-independence era. Legislative control during the post-independence era included monitoring the Kenyan news media in order to create a focus on nationalising broadcasting services, encourage a Kenyan identity, unite the nation, and promote political agendas, through content control and censorship, particularly of television broadcasts. The Kenya news media has therefore always been, albeit not on paper, a support structure and

mouthpiece for the government, coerced through oppressive and restrictive regulations (King'ara 2014; Mak'Ochieng 1996).

The consequence of this was that the Kenyan news media did not have a press law before 2009 that served its interests as an autonomous entity. Both media workers and organisations were left vulnerable to state intimidation, a factor that is still present in the Kenyan news environment, although more covertly. The introduction of the Constitution in 2010 seemed to bring some sense of hope as section 79a pertains to media freedoms. However, the Constitution remained subject to the provisions of the penal code, which gave the government power to clamp down on the media in the interests of public morality, public order and national security. This has made it easier for media freedoms to be compromised by the government, despite there being legislation that protects the media, especially concerning national security matters (Ogola 2011, p. 82).

Additionally, with the rise of terror threats in the East African region and in Kenya in particular, security laws and administrative procedures have become more stringent and trickle all the way down to media control. In many cases broadcasts are regulated under the guise of protecting national security, without any specificity concerning where the line between journalism and preserving national security starts and ends (Media Council of Kenya 2016, p. 1). The Kenyan government therefore still maintains some agency in monitoring and regulating the media, despite the specifications of the media laws. In some cases, this control is also maintained through harassment, as a way of curtailing freedom of speech, especially if any exposure of government ills and political agendas that tend to lie at the root of terrorism is the topic at hand (Iraki 2010, p. 146).

Moreover, the current regime has managed to systematically take away some of the independence that the Kenyan news media gained through the Constitution, by establishing new regulatory bodies and changing mandates that affect the structures of existing institutions. The government has maintained a strong position in supervising the media by using modified media laws (Media Council Act, 2013) that keep media regulation and control in the hands of the state (Lohner, Banjac & Neverla 2016, pp. 54-57). The effect of this is increased pressure on journalists from both the media owners and the government when attempting to cover sensitive or controversial events such as terror attacks. In addition, harassment, intimidation and threats from political elites are a norm for Kenyan journalists and media companies, which encourages them to steer clear of coverage that may ruffle feathers (Lohner, Banjac & Neverla 2016, pp. 59-60). As a consequence of censorship and control, journalists tend to resort to obviously newsworthy and visual elements, such as drama and violence, spectacular scenes and human-interest stories, and refrain from investigative reporting into the root causes of terrorism. This, according to Cottle (2004, pp. 74-80), not only distorts conflict and violence, but also manifests in half-truths which manipulate public opinion.

## II. Corruption

Adding to the censorship and control of the Kenyan news media, corruption has been identified as an avenue used by politicians and influential parties to conceal their misdemeanours, through media exploitation (Mudhai 2007, p. 30). According Mudhai (2007, p. 30), the Kenyan news media was initially designed to play the role of the fourth estate. This role includes serving as an “...agency of public discussion, in which rival ideas and interests compete with each other until, ideally the ‘truth’ or ‘common good’ prevails” (Hampton 2010, p. 4). However, as a result of endemic corruption in Kenya, and the prioritization of a pro-business approach in the Kenyan news media system, unethical and unprofessional journalism has become a norm (Mudhai 2007, p. 30).

According to Heath (1997, p. 31), key political players in Kenya and journalists tend to be immersed in patron-client networks, where “brown envelope journalism”, the practice of journalists accepting money from sources (Gathara 2017), tends to shape and constrain the kinds of information that reaches audiences (King'ara 2014, p. 73). Thus, a mix of profit-driven motives, endemic corruption and deviant journalistic behaviour hinder the role of the Kenyan news media (Mudhai 2007, pp. 30-34). The consequence of this when reporting on terrorism is a focus on newsworthy elements such as violence and drama, as the control and flow of other information that may reveal underlying issues or compromise the bases of power is juggled between the political elites, state control and the public's right to know (Cottle 2004, p. 77).

### III. Patriotic Roles and Perceptions when Reporting on Terror

Another reason for the Kenyan news media's unwillingness to engage in investigative reporting, despite its private ownership and the protection that the Kenyan Constitution may offer, is its patriotic role and perception. According to Altheide (2007, p. 299), the news media leaves many tough questions unanswered out of fear of being labelled or accused of being unpatriotic, a responsibility that has been pegged on the Kenyan news media since the independence era (Iraki 2010; Ogola 2011). As a result of this, the news media aims to reflect solidarity with the national identity, resorting to showing support over being critical (Altheide 2007, p. 299). This show of patriotism becomes even more evident during times of conflict and violence, as the role and core principles of modern journalism tend to be significantly challenged due to the unpredictable nature and significant costs of conflict. As a result, the media generally falls in line behind government (Cottle 2004, p. 80). This support of the state, coupled with entertainment values being prioritized for ratings, attracting audiences and increasing revenue for the media companies, results in more war journalism coverage, as the practice of journalism in general ends up being diluted if patriotism

is prioritized as a means of support (Cottle 2004, p. 83). During times of conflict and violence, the vulnerabilities and effects of the systemic structures and factors that influence how journalism is practised, especially in African contexts, becomes very apparent, because it is tied to colonial legacies and the role perceptions of the news media.

All things considered, the Kenyan media system seems to have more restrictions than it does opportunities to practise journalism to its full capacity. These restrictions, in the form of legislation, limited media freedom, censorship, skewed role perceptions and unsolicited control by those in powerful positions, have created a space for ambiguity when it comes to conflict reporting. The consequence of this is reflected in a lack of preparedness and professionalism when it comes to conflict coverage, as is evident in the reporting of the terror attacks discussed in section 3 of this chapter. However, many scholars who have studied conflict in Kenya and the African context advocate and prescribe peace journalism as a better way of equipping African journalists in conflict situations (see Chapter 2) (Fackler et al. 2011; Kisang 2014; Kosgei 2015; Ogenga 2012; Youngblood 2016).

Nonetheless, peace journalism, despite the debates surrounding its conceptualisation and practicality in any media system, remains a concept that was not created with the aim of specifically meeting the complexities of African media systems. While the aim of this thesis is to explore peace journalism's viability in the Kenyan context, it is only possible to assess its viability from a point of understanding how African media systems were developed, their unique capacities and the different roles that they have played and still play through different eras and political phases. Therefore, this last section aims to explore the historical background of the Kenyan media system in order to highlight its complexities, core principles, roles and ultimately its structural capacities to incorporate peace journalism.

### 3. The Historical Overview and Background of the Kenyan Media System

Like many African media systems, the complexity of the Kenyan news media system is attributed to the implementation of western news media ideals coupled with remnants of colonial experience. Over the years and through different political phases, the Kenyan news media has evolved and simultaneously remained the same, with profound effects on the news production process. Between the 1960s and present day, the Kenyan news media has developed technologically and economically, while progressively redefining itself against the economic, social and political backdrop of the country. Through different eras - colonial, independence and post-independence - the Kenyan news media has adjusted and remained intact while carving a space for itself despite ongoing political, economic and structural changes around it (Ogola 2011, pp. 78-80).

Additionally, the country's experiences with terrorism, especially from 2011 when the magnitude and severity of terrorism increased due to major attacks by Al-Shabaab, have had profound effects on the Kenyan news media environment and the news production process. First, the deployment of Kenyan troops into Somalia, Al-Shabaab's home country, in a bid to protect Kenyan borders not only changed the dynamic of terrorism within Kenya but also attracted more media attention. With Kenyan troops in Somalia, Al-Shabaab, in retaliation, increased the intensity of terror attacks within Kenya, which brought the impact and threat of terrorism on Kenyan society closer and with it the demand for more coverage (Lohner, Banjac & Neverla 2016, p. 48). Second, the spill-over effects of this new reality included political volatility as well as legislative measures as counterterrorism efforts. These measures not only altered the structural conditions of Kenya's political system but also the news media system and the coverage of terrorism. As mentioned in section 4 of this chapter, the Kenyan news media has been affected in various ways, but most

profoundly through replicating media restrictions from the colonial era which has impacted the possibilities of media freedoms and agency (Lohner, Banjac & Neverla 2016, p. 48). This is explored in detail in the rest of this section.

### I. The Colonial Era

Kenya's first contact with European 'systems' of mass media dates back to around 1885, during the scramble for Africa (Mukhongo 2015, p. 151). The scramble for Africa, when European colonial powers drew borders on a map and divided the continent into countries, made Kenya a British protectorate and later a British colony. The result of this was Kenya's first encounter with the western mass media in the form of missionary newspapers, targeted towards the Europeans residing in the country (Tomaselli 2003; Wachanga 2011). The newspapers, built on commercialism, not only served European interests but also relied heavily on foreign interest and profitability, remnants of which are present in the Kenyan mass media ecology today. (Heath 1997, pp. 31- 32)

Additionally, the inclusion of Indians from Asia in Kenyan societal fabric from 1901, as cheap labour brought in to complete the Kenya-Uganda railway line, resulted in an explosion and expansion of newspapers. This opportunity for expansion was facilitated by the demand for more newspapers representing different groups and their needs as the railway line increased the number of foreigners settling in the interior of Kenya (Mukhongo 2015, p. 60). The most significant of these newspapers included *The Standard* and *The Nation*, two daily newspapers that are still in circulation in Kenya and which are part of this study. Serving the needs of the Indian population, A.M Jeevanjee started *The Standard*, initially titled *The East African Standard*, in 1902 in the coastal region of Mombasa. It was later sold to two Englishmen who turned it into a daily paper and moved it to Nairobi, the capital city, where many of the Europeans resided (Faringer 1991, p.



10). After its move to the capital, *The Standard* became the major English-language publication, playing the role of a settler press targeted at colony-building, legitimizing colonialism and publicizing colonial interests (Iraki 2010, p. 143)

On the other hand, *The Daily Nation* created a space for itself as a voice against colonial subjugation and oppression, departing from the dominance of settler newspapers and the prioritization of their interests (Iraki 2010, p. 143). It was launched in 1958, alongside a Swahili language weekly newspaper, *Taifa* (no longer in operation). *The Daily Nation* and *Taifa* aimed to serve the needs of the indigenous Kenyan people as well as those who opposed colonial interests (including the Indians who were now part of the Kenyan societal fabric). Owned by Charles Hayes, an Englishman, *The Daily Nation* was later sold to Prince Karim Aga Khan, of Asian descent, who still partly owns it (Mukhongo 2015, p. 61).

The survival of *The Daily Nation*, despite it not serving the colonial government's interests during the colonial era, was attributed to commercialism. The Indians were now dominating commercial life in East Africa and created more opposition to colonial politics as society had become three-tiered, with the Europeans at the top of the political pyramid, followed by the Indians and then the Africans. This created a greater need for non-European publications, geared towards enhancing political engagement through the media, in order to critique discriminatory colonial policies and create room for the Indians who were settled in Kenya and taking over the printing presses and advertising revenues. While the Indians had economic interests with regards to curtailing colonialism, the Kenyan political activists were more focused on forming colonial liberation movements, which created the need for indigenous African press.

However, similar to the three-tier society dynamic, the indigenous African press took the lowest tier and started disappearing altogether (Faringer 1991; Kiarie 2004; Mukhongo 2015; Wachanga 2011). The demise of the indigenous African press was attributable to a combination of restrictions and governance by the colonial government, which used legal and regulatory frameworks and policies to serve its own economic and political interests (Faringer 1991; Mbeke 2008). Moreover, the Kenyan political activists lacked journalistic and management skills, which saw them rely on advertising revenue from the Europeans, who were hostile, and the Indians, who now owned the printing presses. This left the Kenyan indigenous society voiceless in the main mass media arena, which lingered on into the independence era, creating a vacuum that left room for the government to significantly dominate and influence the development of journalism in Kenya (Faringer 1991; Iraki 2010; Kiarie 2004; Makali 2003; Mukhongo 2015).

## II. The Independence Era

### i. Newspapers

By 1963, when Kenya gained its independence, the only newspapers that remained in circulation were *The Daily Nation*, *The Standard* and *Taifa Leo* (a Swahili newspaper that was later discontinued) (Iraki 2010, p. 144). According to Faringer (1991, p. 9), *The Standard* and *The Daily Nation* grew into news media that were ‘Africanised’ and controlled by the government despite the fact they were foreign and privately-owned, because of the influence of political elites (Bourgault 1995, p. 26). *The Standard* in particular aligned with pro-government thought and the commercial business interests of the British Lonrho group, which bought the newspaper in 1967 and had a number of business interests in Africa (Hornsby 2013, p. 114). The Lonrho group had investments in all the major areas of Kenya’s economy and established an alliance with the ruling class, creating room for control of *The Standard* newspaper through appointments to the board and managerial

positions in local subsidiaries (Heath 1997, p. 32). In return, the conglomerate financed its regional economic expansion through local managers who borrowed money and drew investment capital and resources for their own enterprises. Therefore, according to Heath (1997, p. 32), *The Standard* became an avenue for maintaining favourable conditions for international businesses, controlling public opinion in order to stall any opposition that could be unfavourable to Lonrho's business takeovers. Editorial control of the newspaper was placed in the hands of those who understood the objective (Heath 1997, p. 32).

Similarly, *The Nation* was held captive by the business interests of its owner, the Aga Khan, who wanted to protect the Ismaili community in Kenya and their business ventures. In order to do this, *The Nation* aligned with pro-government content to demonstrate its commitment to the progress of the country (Winsbury 2000, p. 252). For *The Nation* in particular, the government cemented its position both directly and indirectly by monopolizing the print market through state regulations and advertising revenue. The government became the largest advertiser in Kenya and used its power to censor content and maintain press control (Ogola 2011, pp. 78-81). Consequently, both *The Nation* and *The Standard* became, almost by default, an informal publicity arm of the state (Ogola 2011, p. 82). The government sought to maintain control and influence over the press because it recognised its might during the struggle for independence, when it was used to communicate and disseminate information. However, after independence the communicative power of the press quickly became an opportunity for propaganda, control and manipulation to keep those who assumed leadership positions in power. Through these early nationalists the tone for the practice of journalism in the Kenyan context was set and used to cement their positions in government. The Kenyan news media and politics are therefore very closely linked as control of the press impedes opportunities for opposition (Mukhongo 2015, pp. 64-65).

Conversely, as the Kenyan economy grew post-independence and the press as a business entity began to rely on other commercial interests, the government appeared to lose some of its influence and control (Mukhongo 2015, p. 65). The privately-owned press began to find ways around government control and censorship, which forced the state to set its sights on broadcast media. Since the Kenyan government did not have its own newspaper for political communication, the introduction of television and radio in Kenya in the 1960s presented an opportunity for complete control of the airwaves (Iraki 2010, p. 144). Thus the government sought a monopoly through The Voice of Kenya (VOK) radio and television stations, later renamed The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC). Under the guise of promoting the ‘Africanisation’ of the mass media and the developmental goals of the newly independent nation, the government, through content control, protected its interests and provided a perspective to audiences that was favourable to it (Iraki 2010; Mukhongo 2015).

## ii. Broadcast Media

Television was introduced to the British colonies in Africa in 1959, towards the end of the colonial era, for political purposes. However, the colonial government was reluctant to institute television because of its limited reach and lack of affordability for the majority African population. The colonial rulers did not use television to communicate or exercise their power to the extent that they did the press, as only the Asians and whites were able to afford television sets. Thus, television was designed, in colonial Africa, to embrace an “independent commercial set-up” in order to be financially self-reliant (King'ara 2014, p. 74). However, as Kenya attained self-rule and gained independence between 1961 and 1963, television was finally introduced to the wider society through the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) (Gathigi & Brown 2010, p. 108). KBC, initially set up using capital finances from commercial sources, was aimed at serving

developmental purposes while being shielded from the control of commercial interests. Moreover, legislation was put in place to ensure that KBC provided only entertainment, education and information on issues that were government approved. Starting off with limited broadcasts within the capital city of Nairobi, the Kenyan media now had more opportunities to expand into a new territory (King'ara 2014, p. 74).

However, within its first year of operation, KBC was forced to rely on government loans and supplementary budgets because it incurred huge losses. These losses resulting from costs incurred through government grants, maintaining annual licenses, receiver set fees and limited advertising revenue all contributed to KBC's failure to sustain itself independently (King'ara 2014; Newcomb 2014). Additionally, because television was being shielded from commercial interests, financial help from foreign countries was not considered a viable option in the same way as for the foreign-owned and financed Kenyan newspapers. Also, because Kenya had just gained independence, foreign help was avoided because of the fear that it could compromise national sovereignty. Thus the government nationalised the corporation in 1964 and renamed it the Voice of Kenya (VOK), which was changed back to KBC in 1989 and has remained so. The Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism (later the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting) took over broadcast media services, under VOK, cementing its role as “a trusted partner in nation-building” (King'ara 2014, p. 75).

Despite the fact that Kenya had gained independence, colonial strategies were still rife in the broadcast industry and wider Kenyan society, especially with regards to limiting autonomy (King'ara 2014, pp. 75-76). The Kenyan government controlled broadcast media to impede any oppositional interests, rigorously monitored Kenyan citizens and mobilised them towards the interests of the government, mimicking colonial strategies. In order to further the political agenda,

television became the mouthpiece for the Kenyan government (King'ara 2014; Mak'Ochieng 1996), solidifying the concept of government-controlled media in Kenya. As a result, VOK expressed clear loyalties to the government, prioritizing broadcasts aimed at supporting government interests, making control and censorship the norm in the industry (Mukhongo 2015, p. 62).

### III. Post-Independence Era

Between 1963, when Kenya gained independence, and the 1970s, Kenya's news media and most African news media were moulded by a developmental paradigm, later known as developmental journalism (Ogola 2011, p. 80). For at least three decades, post-independence African governments focused on prioritising economic, political and developmental issues through the news media, while ferociously promoting national unity and development. However, as economies failed to improve, most African leaders resorted to suppression and intolerance in political spheres by exerting their power through the news media in order to preserve their interests and retain power. Through the news media, African governments limited individual freedoms, prioritised collective economic development and abridged political and civil rights, using co-option and coercion (Ogola 2011, p. 80).

For Kenya in particular, control and censorship of the news media became even more stringent in the 1980s after an attempted coup in 1982, when Airforce rebels seized control of the airwaves for about eight hours. This set in motion changes to the development of the Kenyan news media, as it became apparent that the political sphere was still vulnerable to the influence of the broadcast media (Mukhongo 2015, p. 68). During this time, any remnants of free expression were impeded and communication channels and mainstream media were solidified as mouthpieces for the government (Mukhongo 2015, p. 68). Additionally, authoritarianism and military rule quickly became the norm in Kenyan society as the government responded to the attempted coup (Hornsby

2013, p. 2). The most significant changes after the attempted coup were realised in the news media space and geared towards deliberate ethnic exclusion within Kenyan society. During this period, suppression and self-censorship thrived, while a critical press and opposition were criminalised, making it easier for Kenya to remain a one-party state (Mbeke 2008; Nyamora 2007).

However, in the 1990s, following international and internal pressures, Kenya moved into a multiparty political system, which resulted in the liberalisation and privatisation of the media and communication sector. The media sector expanded rapidly, with radio and print media diversifying greatly, while television stations also began to rise in numbers. One television station turned into ten and radio stations and services evolved into 26. Additionally, between 1990 and 2004, more weekly and daily newspapers were introduced into the market (Ali 2010, p. 6), shifting the developmental focus of the news media towards a market model. With these changes came a new set of challenges, the most dominant being the competition for power, ownership and resources (Ogola 2011, p. 84). In spite of this, the government was not willing to be left behind as it saw opportunities to maintain some semblance of control by strengthening privacy and libel laws. Through these laws, the government was able to undermine and restrict private media and maintain its position as the main advertiser and source of revenue for these new media companies. Moreover, other sources of revenue were not easily accessible to these media companies due to the ailing economy, which not only compromised their independence but also introduced other constraints (Ogola 2011, p. 84). Furthermore, where government control could not be exercised to its full extent, intimidation and harassment towards private media companies were used. Similar to the political sphere, where opposition political leaders were being detained, some publications in favour of the opposition were banned and journalists detained and harassed by state security forces (Mbeke 2008; Mukhongo 2015).

Over the years, Kenya's media landscape has changed with every new regime that has taken over the country. Over time editorial autonomy has become possible, although in limited degrees, and sometimes extending all the way to The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), which supports the government of the day (Iraki 2010, p. 149). However, as journalists and media companies enjoy this autonomy, cases of assault and vandalising of media equipment by political elites have also become part of the norm, justified under the guise of preserving state security. In many cases where published information is considered unfavourable, intimidation and harassment follow. Deeply entrenched in colonialism and Kenya's political legacy, a culture of impunity, linked to political differences and tribal tensions, remains a major hindrance to media freedoms (Hornsby 2013; Mukhongo 2015).

Moreover, as conflicts within and outside Kenya, such as terrorism, have grown in magnitude and intensity, media freedoms have become the first point of regulation and control by the government, through new media and anti-terror laws. These laws are put in place to monitor the 'gatekeeping' process and the dissemination of conflict information, and sometimes stretch all the way to the banning of live broadcasts, under the guise of managing the conflict and/or violence. The government has on several occasions justified these media regulations through the criticisms presented by political elites, who single out the news media as a significant player in fuelling violence and conflict (Mukhongo 2015, pp. 73-74). Moreover, the mainstream news media is continually critiqued for disregarding professional and ethical standards when reporting on conflict, which has left room for media freedoms in Kenya to be limited. Thus, where media or anti-terror laws cannot be used to control, monitor and regulate the news media, harassment and intimidation by political elites, security forces and the state are used to maintain control and preserve the status quo (Mukhongo 2015; Wachanga 2011).



#### 4. Conclusion

In conclusion, Kenya's news media tends to have a cyclical progression which stems from its establishment in the colonial era. Through different historical and political phases, the major challenges that have faced the news media have tended to stem from the commercial interests of media owners and companies, the role that the news media is expected to play in society and for the government, and the level of media freedom available. As a result of this, conflict reporting has tended to remain deeply entrenched in war journalism, facilitating to varying degrees a symbiotic relationship between the Kenyan news media and terrorism. Where news values and commercial interests are not steering conflict coverage, legislation, corruption, impunity and political roles and perceptions are. Similarly, where autonomy and freedom of speech are considered too liberating, control, regulation, and restriction through laws and other pathways have stepped in. The major implications that these factors have had for conflict reporting is a lack of clear-cut boundaries, protection and specified roles in time of conflict. In many ways the Kenyan news media has been coerced into a tug of war between being a "watchdog" and/or a "guard dog," as the gatekeepers of conflict information tend to shift between the government, security officials and journalists. This has resulted in the coverage of terrorism predominantly reflecting war journalism, which tends to do more to escalate conflicts than assist in their resolution and transformation. With this in mind, this study aims to assess whether peace journalism, as an alternative way of reporting on terrorism, is viable in the Kenyan context.

The next chapter discusses the methodology used in this study, putting together the research questions and methodology used to assess the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan context, based on the contextual background illustrated in this chapter. It encompasses the core aims of peace journalism, the complexity of the Kenyan news media and environment and the realities of terrorism in the Kenyan context.

## Chapter 4: Methodology

### 1. Introduction

Given the criticism that the Kenyan news media favours war journalism, primarily due to its journalistic practices, illustrated in Chapter 3, this study embarked on understanding the specific nature of terrorism coverage in the Kenyan news media. To do this, it identified systemic factors and structures that influence the practice of journalism in the Kenyan news media environment, from the perspectives of journalists and editors, and assessed the viability of peace journalism as an alternative way of reporting on terror. As explored in Chapter 2, peace journalism has been proposed by many scholars to improve the best practices of existing journalism by articulating conflict and violence more conscientiously and responsibly in order to open new opportunities for peaceful resolution.

Previous studies on peace journalism in the Kenyan context have focused on the value of peace journalism and the ethical and professional complexities of the Kenyan news media. However, the implications of factors rooted in historical, economic, social and political domains for the practice of journalism as it relates to peace journalism remains an area that is lacking extensive study. Therefore, this study provides first-hand data on the complexities of covering terrorism in the Kenyan context, by including the voices of Kenyan journalists and editors, adding to the limited existing literature on peace journalism in non-western contexts and assessing its viability. It builds on the literature on peace journalism covered in Chapter 2 by carrying out an analysis of the coverage of terrorism in the Kenyan news media to confirm whether peace journalism is indeed a viable alternative in African contexts, as argued by previous research. Moreover, my position as a Kenyan

scholar based at an Australian university provides insight in contextualising the study, as my experience with and understanding of the Kenyan news media informed my data gathering methods and allowed me access to a research population that would have been reluctant to share their unfiltered outlook, expertise and knowledge with a non-Kenyan researcher. This was also beneficial for my data analysis because having an insider perspective not only introduced an informed understanding of the data, but also made it richer due to the familiarity with the context.

As suggested in Chapter 1, understanding the nature of terrorism and its coverage in Kenya was an essential objective of this study, as it assisted in the assessment of the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan news media. Additionally, understanding the influence and impact of systemic structures and factors on the practice of journalism in the Kenyan context was an integral part of this assessment. Considering this, the objectives of this study were addressed by three research questions. These were:

RQ1. How does the Kenyan news media report on terror?

RQ2. From the perspectives of journalists and editors, what systemic factors and structures influence how the Kenyan news media reports on terror? and

RQ 3: Is peace journalism a viable alternative for the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror?

By addressing these research questions, this study contributes to the studies on peace journalism in Kenya and the wider African context. This is an integral contribution to peace journalism studies as research in the area tends to be primarily focused on western and eastern contexts.

Moreover, the findings of this study aim to inform and influence media policies in Kenya in the future by advocating for the promoting of fairness, the preservation of media freedoms and the upholding of ethical and professional standards, while assisting in the promotion of peace when reporting on terror. This study also provides first-hand insights into the complexities of reporting on terrorism, from the perspectives of journalists and editors, giving voice to a public that seems to be lacking in many studies. More specifically, this research aims to contribute to scholarly studies being conducted on the African continent around the idea of developing African-centred journalism, particularly ‘hybrid peace journalism,’ which has been conceptualised and proposed by Ogenga (2019a) in his study on terror threats and African-centred journalism.

Based on these research questions and objectives, the rest of this chapter discusses the research methodology, the research framework, answering the research questions, the study design, units of analysis, the data collection process and procedures, ethical assurances and the challenges faced and overcome while conducting the study.

## 2. Research Methodologies

This study used an interpretive approach to answer the research questions. The main objectives were centred on understanding how the two main Kenyan newspapers (discussed in Chapter 3), *The Daily Nation* and *The Standard*, reported on terror by assessing the coverage of three major terror attacks between 2013 and 2019. The study also included face-to-face interviews with Kenyan journalists and editors, identifying systemic structures and factors that influence the practice of journalism and the framing of terrorism in the Kenyan news media. The objective of this was to obtain first-hand data on the coverage of

terrorism in the Kenyan context and to build on the textual analysis using the interview data, giving the study an empirical direction that had not previously been explored extensively in peace journalism studies in the African context.

To assess the viability of peace journalism in Kenya, this study highlights the significance of understanding the structural conditions and professional norms of the Kenyan news media system, the role perceptions of Kenyan journalists and editors, and the complexity of reporting on terror within the Kenyan news media environment. Therefore, two methods were used in the study. The first was a textual analysis of selected news stories from the two main newspapers in Kenya (due to their high readership and wide reach), *The Daily Nation* and *The Standard*, on three major terror attacks (explored in greater detail in Chapter 3). These terror attacks were:

- The Westgate Mall Attack, 2013
- The Garissa University College Attack, 2015; and;
- The Riverside Attack (also referred to as the Dusit attack), 2019;

The textual analysis addressed *RQ1. How does the Kenyan news media report on terror?* by identifying the most common news frames used when reporting on terror. The second method, semi-structured interviews with Kenyan journalists and editors, addressed *RQ2. From the perspective of journalists and editors, what systemic factors and structures influence how the Kenyan news media reports on terror?* The semi-structured interviews incorporated the voices of Kenyan journalists and editors, explaining the process of news gathering and production in Kenya, the challenges experienced while covering terrorism, and the role perceptions and perspectives of the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror.

The study focused solely on traditional media platforms print and television, as traditional platforms still play a significant role in Kenyan society. Despite technological advancements and the growth of new media globally and in Africa, the majority of Kenyans still rely on traditional media platforms as their primary source of information (Juma 2017). These platforms are also considered to be the most credible sources of information by majority of the Kenyan audience (Geopoll 2015, 2017). However, it is worth noting that out of all traditional media platforms, Kenyan radio stations have the largest audiences and widest reach, but they were not part of this study because of their primary focus on entertainment and vernacular broadcasting (the latter in the case of community radio stations) (Geopoll 2019). Therefore, based on their entertainment focus and language barriers, radio stations did not meet the selection criteria for this study.

It is worth noting that an online survey, intended for Kenyan journalists and editors, was originally proposed as part of the research project. This survey was approved by the University of Adelaide Human Research Ethics committee and distributed to potential participants, but the response rates were extremely low so little meaningful data was generated and the outcomes were not included in this thesis. Many of the journalists and editors who took part in the interviews attributed this low response rate to limited resources, a lack of time, and a preference for paper-based surveys, which the University of Adelaide Human Research Ethics committee discouraged due to safety reasons.

### 3. Research Framework

As discussed in chapter 2, news frames play a significant role in conflict coverage as they are at the core of every news story, streamlining, evaluating and producing coherent interpretations of events. Through processes of selection, emphasis and exclusion, journalists rely on news frames to structure their storylines, direct the focus of news content, make sense of facts and communicate dominant meanings to audiences (Norris, Kern & Just 2003, p. 2). Therefore, frame analysis, as a discursive approach, was used in this study to identify, explain and analyse war and peace journalism news frames. Goffman (1974) suggests that framing gives meaning to events and the perception of events, making this approach useful in assessing and categorizing the coverage of terrorism in the Kenyan context. Particularly concerned with how Kenyan journalists and editors disseminate certain news frames through media content on terrorism, this study uses framing to assess the coverage of terrorism through a news production lens. In this case, the study is concerned with the use of “frameworks” to label, recognize, situate and perceive events relating to terrorism in the news media, stemming from the process of selecting, organizing and producing stories to fit certain formats and criteria (Miller & Ross 2004, pp. 245-247).

This is informed by the idea that framing guides the process of news making and therefore is at the core of every news story, simplifying the evaluative and coherent interpretation of events through patterns of inclusion, emphasis and the selection of information (Norris, Kern & Just 2003, p. 2). Therefore, frame analysis was used in this study to investigate the patterns of peace and war journalism news frames, in order to understand the coverage of terrorism in news articles. This was done through the identification of framing patterns that

appear in news stories, in particular the saliency and selection of certain information in news content pertaining to the three terror attacks selected for this study.

#### 4. Answering the Research Questions

A qualitative approach was used in this study to understand the data collected by exploring connections between news frames and peace/war journalism. Semi-structured interviews were used to gather data reflecting the “why,” explaining the role of the population being studied, Kenyan editors and journalists, and their interaction with the information they encounter when reporting on terror. A textual analysis of two Kenyan newspapers was also conducted, contributing to explaining the “how” of conflict reporting, contextualizing and giving meaning to the interview data collected (Epkins 2010, p. 42). According to Ratnam (2014, pp. 28-29), journalists attach meaning to events based on how they label, perceive, recognise and situate the information gathered. Therefore, it is important to understand the links between the framing of terrorism and how journalists interact with the information to which they have access. This provides insight into reporting and journalistic practices as well as the perception of terror events being communicated to audiences.

Qualitative research has therefore been used in this study because it allows me, as a Kenyan researcher studying in Australia, to “enter” into the working world of the participants, see their perspectives and explore the transformation and formation of meaning (Corbin 2015, p. 5) in conflict reporting within a context that I am well acquainted with. According to Epkins (2010, p. 42), qualitative researchers are essentially story tellers who seek, question and analyse rich, vivid and contextualized accounts in order to explore and give meaning to a perceived situation. Qualitative research in this study therefore contributes to the development of empirical knowledge



by making informed discoveries and contributions to peace journalism studies in Kenya. This has been done by linking the concept of peace journalism to the process of a population, the Kenyan news media and the context.

Furthermore, qualitative research facilitates a better understanding of the broader implications of historical, political and social contexts for the research questions (Rubin & Rubin 2005, p. 3), and allows the interpretation and clarification of data collected (Berger 2016b). Where analysing quantitatively would have fallen short, assessing copious amounts of data without providing context, meaning and the complete picture, using a qualitative methodology proved more useful (Gitlin 1980) within the complex Kenyan context. This is because the Kenyan news media system, as mentioned in Chapter 3, tends to have many challenges, stemming from its establishment in the colonial era, its commercial interests and the influence of historical and political phases, that have impacted media freedoms significantly (Iraki 2010; Mukhongo 2015; Ogola 2011).

Therefore, qualitative research provides an opportunity to explore how the meaning of data collected is formed and transformed (Corbin 2015, p. 5), by incorporating the context and historical background of the Kenyan news media within the assessment of peace journalism, an area that has not been thoroughly researched in Kenya and the broader African context. This not only adds insight to the analysis but also enriches the findings of this research beyond what a quantitative methodology would achieve (Epkins 2010; Taylor & Lindlof 2002). To connect the research questions, the context and research methods, the fluid dynamic and evolving nature of qualitative research (Corbin 2015, p. 5) was best suited to explore and assess the viability of peace journalism in Kenya when reporting on

terror, as it links the research participants, their viewpoints and the reality of their working environment to the concept of peace journalism.

The next section outlines how the research questions were answered.

#### 4.1. Textual Analysis

A textual analysis was conducted to answer *RQ1: How does the Kenyan news media report on terror?* According to McKee (2003, p. 1), textual analysis is, “... a way for researchers to gather information about how other human beings make sense of the world. It is a methodology – a data-gathering process.” A textual analysis was used in this study due to its interpretive nature, particularly its focus on critically examining texts and seeking to establish meaning. Also, a textual analysis was valuable due to its focus on larger cultural and historical contexts, allowing for educated guesses on how people make sense of the world around them (McKee 2003, p. 1). In this study, cultural, historical, and political contexts play a significant role in how terrorism is interpreted, both in the Kenyan and broader African contexts; thus a textual analysis was best suited to answering the “how” component of this study based on the uniqueness of the Kenyan news media.

A textual analysis offers a more comprehensive approach to research in comparison to a content analysis because of its interpretive nature. First emerging in the 1960s, textual analysis allows for the examination of all aspects of a text, including visuals, omissions, and stylistic language, which places it as a “superlative” alternative to content analysis (Lester-Roushanzamir & Raman 1999, p. 702). It offers a wider methodology to explain phenomena beyond quantitative classification, making it useful in this study as it allows for the unique Kenyan news media environment to be

explored and interpreted in depth. In this study, a textual analysis was conducted with the assistance of framing analysis to detect news frames (David et al. 2011, p. 330).

Using framing analysis in this research builds a baseline of understanding about the perception of terrorism in the Kenyan news media by identifying peace and war journalism frames that influence audiences to understand the world around them (Miller & Ross 2004, pp. 245-246). Framing analysis classifies, interprets and analyses preferred descriptions and storylines depicted by the Kenyan news media on the three terror attacks selected for this study. This facilitates an understanding of how the Kenyan news media, through emphasis, organisation and selection of content, shapes and influences understandings of terrorism through information collected and presented to audiences (McQuail 1972; Miller & Ross 2004). Framing analysis also incorporates “culturally resonant” meanings that are embedded in news content that audiences understand and interpret (Entman 1993; Goffman 1974), by identifying the dominant culture that produces the text and simplifying the data collected. This helps in identifying problem areas which can then be remedied in the larger context of the study (Miller & Ross 2004, p. 246).

In more detail, the textual analysis in this study closely examined how Kenyan journalists and news organizations chose to portray terrorism to the Kenyan public, by identifying, categorizing, and interpreting the news frames that emerged from a close reading of the two main Kenyan newspapers selected for this study. Using pre-existing frames from previous research by Hussain and Rehman (2015b) on conflict reporting in non-western media systems, the textual analysis focused on two prevalent frames - conflict escalation and conflict de-escalation (Figure 1) - that were developed, influenced and inspired by Galtung’s (2003) war and peace journalism model. The conflict escalation and de-escalation model was selected for this study due to the inclusion of influences that steer news production in non-western media systems during conflict situations, such

as *politicization, securitization, otherization, incompatibility* and *sensationalism*. These subframes are explored in greater detail in the next section of this chapter. The textual analysis interpreted the conflict reporting findings in three steps, as illustrated by Ratnam (2014, p. 31). These were:

1. Identifying prevalent frames in conflict reporting;
2. Categorizing the texts based on the frames identified and subframes that emerge;
3. Interpreting and comparing the results based on the subframes identified.

#### I. Analysis of Conflict Escalating/ Conflict De-escalating Reporting

According to Lynch (2013, p. 66), contextual factors tend to change the nature of peace journalism. Thus, a context-specific model of peace and war journalism framing is most useful in analysing content in the news media, and for debate around the viability of peace journalism in specific contexts. Hussain and Rehman (2015b, p. 5) set out to create a *conflict escalation* and *conflict de-escalation* model specifically for non-western media systems, because peace journalism scholarship is highly westernized. According to Hussain (2019, p. 4), non-western societies tend to have media systems that are heavily influenced by local economic, political and national systems as well as socio-cultural aspects that are significantly different from western systems. Thus, to adequately assess a non-western media system such as that of Kenya, western journalistic scholarship needs to be fine-tuned to accommodate the specific context (Hussain 2019, p. 4). The *conflict escalation* and *conflict de-escalation* model was better suited for this study than the war and peace journalism model designed by Galtung (2003) because of its applicability to the intricacies of non-western media systems.

Additionally, despite the benefits and wide use of Galtung's (2003) model, the conflict escalating and de-escalating model was selected due to its relevance to ethno-political conflict, a major characteristic of terrorism in Kenya. The utilization of the *conflict escalation and de-escalation* model as the textual analysis criteria in this study explores and includes three elements that are the backbone of this study:

- The unique Kenyan context and media system;
- War and peace journalism in non-western contexts; and
- The framing of terrorism in news content.

Accordingly, the textual analysis unearths the news sources on which media practitioners rely, the use of language to convey certain news frames, and the perceptions of terrorism in the Kenyan context. It also focuses on the omission and inclusion of information in news stories on terrorism to facilitate analysis of how and why terrorism is presented the way that it is in the Kenyan news media and the systemic factors and structures that shape this interpretation. The textual analysis explores the coverage of three major terror events - the Riverside/Dusit attack, the Garissa College University attack, and the Westgate Mall attack - while highlighting whether newspapers engaged in *conflict escalating* or *conflict de-escalating reporting* in their coverage.

The *conflict escalation* and *conflict de-escalation* model created by Hussain and Rehman (2015b, p. 5) for non-western media contexts and based on Galtung's (2003) war and peace journalism typology, contains 10 dichotomous categories (subframes). These categories represent indicators of the two ends of *conflict escalating reporting* and/or *conflict de-escalating reporting* (also see Table 1). These are;

1. *Politicization/De-politicization*
2. *Securitization/Humanization*

3. *Otherization/We'ness*
4. *Incompatibility /Compatibility*
5. *Sensationalism /Responsibility*

a) *Politicization / De-politicization*

Indicators of *politicization* included any content in the news articles that discussed political, sectarian or ethnic affiliations. In the Kenyan context, this included emphasis on ethnicity or religious backgrounds of parties involved in the terror attack or the portrayal of terrorism as a result of ethnic and/or religious differences within society. Additionally, the prioritization of political wranglings and victims belonging to a political group or those considered to be the political elite in news content fell within this subframe. The subframe was particularly concerned with the prominence of political dynamics over other news stories relating to terrorism. Other indicators included a focus on conflicting political scenarios, statements and controversies that could influence societal division along political, ethnic and/or sectarian lines, related to terrorism. This was particularly important because ethnicity and sectarianism are a significant part of Kenya's political culture, stemming from the colonial and post-colonial eras, as they tend to accompany party politics (Mazrui 1993, pp. 192-193) and have been further escalated by terrorism. Therefore, the main characteristic this subframe identified was whether other non-political aspects of terrorism, such as trauma and experiences of victims, were sidelined while political aspects were made more salient. The omission of non-political aspects in conflict reporting is considered to steer coverage towards conflict-escalating reporting, as it favours divisive news content over a balanced and full account of the conflict itself (Hussain & Rehman 2015a, p. 5).

On the other hand, the *de-politicization* subframe characterized *conflict de-escalating reporting* by focusing on both non-political and political aspects of conflict equally. Specifically, indicators of this subframe included news content that shed light on the economic, cultural and social costs of conflict, while steering clear of sensational tones, conspiracies or political manipulations. Moreover, this subframe encompassed well thought-out arguments that scrutinized the agendas and interests of conflicting parties, including political elites, while also highlighting how different sectarian and ethnic groups can peacefully co-exist despite the conflict. The goal of this type of coverage is to report on the conflict itself without promoting divisions in the societal fabric (Hussain & Rehman 2015a, p. 5).

#### b) Securitization / Humanization

Conflict coverage under the *securitization* subframe included news content that focused on “us versus them” narratives (Galtung 2003; McGoldrick & Lynch 2006), specifically highlighting military occupations, dangers and threats relating to security matters and measures. Indicators of this subframe included giving the limelight to the elite, army personnel and police force, while centring conflict coverage on patriotism, independence, territorial integrity, national sovereignty, national security and conspiracies related to security issues. Ultimately, the subframe identified with loss, in terms of social values, culture and the system, as well as military success over the adversary, which steers coverage towards *conflict escalating reporting* (Hussain & Rehman 2015a, p. 5).

Conversely, the *humanization* subframe encompasses the human aspects of conflict. Specifically, indicators of this subframe included the prioritization of the trials and tribulations of ordinary people, their experiences and individual suffering in news content. It focused on whether

vulnerable groups such as children and women were being given a voice and whether terrorism was being discussed from the perspectives of ordinary people. Moreover, news content relating to social institutions and local culture losses, alongside supporting the steps towards recovery after the conflict, were considered to be indicators of *humanization* (Hussain & Rehman 2015a, p. 5).

#### c) Otherization / We'ness

The *otherization* subframe was identified through indicators such as the news media taking sides when covering the conflict and representing the adversary as an 'other' or alien to the rest of the society and/or culture and therefore dangerous. Specifically, indicators of this subframe included identifying whether the media discourse on conflict was dominated by bias and whether only one side of the story was being told. More importantly, the subframe was concerned with the message being portrayed in conflict coverage, the promotion of collective fears and the 'othering' of those considered to represent the conflicting party. This bias and 'othering' is promoted by highlighting the 'bad deeds' of the aggressor and presenting a united front, as a 'nation,' against 'them' (Hussain & Rehman 2015a, p. 5).

Alternatively, the *we'ness* subframe illustrated *conflict de-escalating reporting* through indicators such as the equal treatment of conflicting parties in the news coverage and avoidance of 'us versus them' notions. Other indicators included calls for resolution while highlighting and sharing the grievances of all parties involved. This subframe reflects coverage that explains violence from a wider context and shares concerns of segregated elements while showing sympathy for the people affected by the conflict. Ultimately, indicators of this subframe include the avoidance of negative attributes in news coverage while treating the conflict itself as the problem (Hussain & Rehman 2015a, p. 5).



#### d) Incompatibility / Compatibility

The *incompatibility* subframe was identified through indicators such as the depiction of the conflict as a tug-of-war where parties involved had incompatible interests. This subframe creates the idea that there is no room for compromise in the conflict, the situation is doomed and that because conflicting parties cannot come to a single agreement, the future will be worse. Therefore, the news coverage under this subframe reflects conflict escalating reporting, because conflicting parties are presented as having opposing views that will create a zero-sum orientation as each party seeks to prevail over the other (Hussain & Rehman 2015a, p. 5).

Contrastingly, the *compatibility* subframe focuses on the similarities and commonalities between conflicting parties and their interests that are highlighted and presented in news content. This subframe is more concerned with whether the news media explores reconciliation as an option in its conflict coverage. Indicators of this subframe include whether news coverage creates room for the idea that conflicting parties can come together and dialogue. These ideas are created by emphasizing unity, through exploring the shared interests, culture and history of conflicting parties. Therefore, this subframe reflects news content that contextualizes conflict, exposes the mistakes of both sides equally and highlights that there is room for rapprochement (Hussain & Rehman 2015a, p. 5).

#### e) Sensationalism / Responsibility

Coverage that represented the conflict in a sensationalized and dramatized manner fell under the *sensationalism* subframe. Specifically, indicators of this subframe included the saliency of hostile and drama-filled coverage, as well as the representation of unfolding events as mysterious, unprecedented and historic. Other indicators of the *sensationalism* subframe included predictions

of the future as ominous, violent and less inclined to reach peaceful resolution. This type of coverage also challenged and ridiculed opposing parties, as major discourses included in the coverage are antagonist arguments and counter-arguments. (Hussain & Rehman 2015a, p. 5).

The *responsibility* subframe, on the other hand, identified coverage that reflected some sense of responsibility to society by reporters when covering the conflict. Indicators included the exploration of opportunities for peace, balanced coverage of the pros and cons of the conflict, reporting that was devoid of sensationalism, and the presence of cautionary perspectives when telling and re-telling about the damage incurred to society. Ultimately, the subframe echoed coverage encouraging peaceful resolution by presenting the root causes, backgrounds and context of the conflict instead of just focusing on the unfolding outcomes (Hussain & Rehman 2015a, p. 5).

## I. Units of analysis

The textual analysis was carried out on individual news articles selected from the two most popular Kenyan newspapers, *The Daily Nation* and *The Standard*. The newspapers were selected for this study due to their popularity and reach, as they are available in all 8 Kenyan provinces and have the highest readership. *The Daily Nation* is estimated to have 4,379,400 readers/day, while *The Standard* is estimated to have 2,223,500 (Geopoll 2015).

### i. Conflict Stages

Digital copies of the newspapers were only available for purchase via each newspaper's archive library in Kenya, upon request via e-mail. Thus, after singling out specific dates, based on four conflict stages of the three terror attacks selected for this study, newspapers were requested and

purchased. To limit the criteria to national news articles and to save costs, only the first 11 pages, the ‘National News’ section of the newspapers, were requested and used in this study. The specific dates for the newspapers were selected based on four conflict stages outlined after a quick review of how long the Kenyan press reports on terror. The review, mostly done on each newspaper’s website (national news section), identified a pattern where coverage was heavy within the first month of the terror attack, died down, and then picked up again a year after the attack, in memory of the attack. Thus these conflict stages were;

- The Breaking News Phase (one day after the terror attack);
- The Aftermath Phase (two weeks after the terror attack);
- The Follow-up Phase (four weeks after the terror attack); and
- The Re-visit Phase (one year after the terror attack)

More specifically, the dates were;

- **Westgate Mall Attack (21<sup>st</sup> September 2013)**

22<sup>nd</sup> September 2013; 5<sup>th</sup> October 2013; 19<sup>th</sup> October 2013; and 21<sup>st</sup> September 2014.

- **The Garissa College University Attack (2<sup>nd</sup> April 2015)**

3<sup>rd</sup> April 2015; 16<sup>th</sup> April 2015; 30<sup>th</sup> April 2015; and 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2016.

- **The Riverside/Dusit Attack (15<sup>th</sup> January 2019)**

16<sup>th</sup> January 2019; 29<sup>th</sup> January 2019; and 12<sup>th</sup> February 2019. (The re-visit phase is not included as the attack had not reached its one-year anniversary at the time of writing)

These dates were selected to represent the specific conflict stages because the focus of conflict coverage tends to change and shift as the conflict progresses. According to Bläsi (2004, p. 6), when assessing news media reports on violent conflict it is important to capture the shift in editorial demands and preconditions for news production which tend to take shape as the conflict progresses.

Thus, incorporating specific dates in this study creates more opportunity for a balanced and in-depth investigation, accounts for opportunities that favour the implementation of solutions-oriented conflict coverage, and explores more than just the immediate effects of conflict. This, he argues, will provide a more insightful, richer, and more accurate picture when assessing how the news media reports on terror (Bläsi 2004, p. 6).

If the prerequisites of news production tend to vary in different conflict stages, this may also have implications for the practice of peace journalism. Therefore, it is important to take into consideration these implications in any research on peace journalism, to identify their consequences on the practice of peace journalism and how they influence news stories (Bläsi 2004, p. 7). According to Bläsi (2004, p. 7), these influences are noticeable throughout the entire chain of news production, news publication and news reception. Therefore, they should not be excluded when assessing war and peace journalism news frames, as they affect the possibilities of investigation and information gathering, as well as the attention of editorial staff and ultimately public opinion.

## ii. Specific Newspaper Articles

After narrowing down the specific dates for each terror attack, a total of 117 newspaper articles, covering the three terror attacks, were selected across both newspapers. The news articles were reviewed and a general frame analysis of all the articles was conducted, using the conflict escalating and conflict de-escalating model. This was done to get a general feel of what the coverage of each conflict stage looked like. From there, the news stories were narrowed down to a total of 22 articles, based on the specific dates selected for this study, the content of the article (specific coverage on the terror attack), and the length. The in-depth textual analysis was carried out on the longest news article in each newspaper on each specific date outlined in this study, as longer articles tend to be

more prominent and more likely to engage a greater proportion of the audience. Also, longer articles provide opportunities for a more comprehensive analysis and a more robust assessment of how the Kenyan news media frames terrorism at different conflict stages. The different conflict stages were included in the analysis to recognize and accommodate the fact that the coverage of violent conflict tends to vary during different conflict stages (Bläsi 2004; Kempf 2003). The analysis focused specifically on the content of each article in terms of how it accorded with the main objective of the study: *How does the Kenyan media report on terror?* However, the analysis did not include images, cartoons or editorial pieces. These other elements, even though they can also be part of textual analysis, were excluded to narrow the scope of the research, as the assessment criteria selected for this study, the conflict escalating and conflict de-escalating model (Table 1), does not make provisions for them.

In summary, the in-depth textual analysis was conducted on 22 articles, representing 3 terror attacks, 2 newspapers and 4 different conflict stages, except the most recent attack, the Riverside/Dusit attack, which at the time of this study had not reached the one-year mark (Re-visit phase).

#### 4.2. Semi-structured Interviews

To accurately answer *RQ2. From the perspective of journalists and editors, what systemic factors and structures influence how the Kenyan news media reports on terror?* I conducted semi-structured interviews with Kenyan editors and journalists. Semi-structured interviews were selected for this study as they offer both structure and flexibility (McIntosh & Morse 2015, p. 1). This was an important element in this study as the participants work in different media companies, experience different ownership patterns and have conflict reporting experiences that differ.

Therefore, by incorporating semi-structured interviews, asking the same questions in the same order, this study would be able to maintain a specific area of inquiry while creating space for clarification and the opportunity to explore in greater detail the diversity of participant responses. Also, in the analysis phase of this study, the semi-structured interview data would be easier to compare systematically while still incorporating a level of detail, which would not be possible with unstructured interviews or closed-ended interviews (McIntosh & Morse 2015, pp. 1-2).

Also, I sought to explore a unique public - Kenyan editors and journalists - for two reasons: first, to include their perspective in the assessment of peace journalism's viability within the Kenyan context, and second, because many studies on peace journalism in the African context tend to lack the perspectives of the people who are responsible for and actively engaged with reporting on terror. Therefore, it was essential to include this public in this study to understand, from their perspective, the factors that influence how they practise journalism and how that translates into how they report and frame news stories on terror. Including their perspective in this study not only enriches the overall data, but also helps to facilitate a more informed understanding of how and whether peace journalism can be implemented in the Kenyan context. Additionally, the interview data supplements the textual analysis findings and helps address RQ3, which tackles the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan context through an assessment of the systemic factors and structures that influence the practice of journalism in Kenya and the impact these have on the implementation of peace journalism.

A total of six face-to-face interviews were conducted in Kenya, and all but one was recorded and later transcribed after receiving consent from the participants. In the case of the one interview where consent was not given for the recording, notes were taken. The Kenyan journalists and editors selected for the semi-structured interviews had first-hand experience in conflict reporting,

with the majority of them having covered at least one of the three terror attacks discussed in this study. The interviews focused on the gate-keeping process and the influence of Kenya's media structure and agency when reporting on matters of national security, such as terrorism. The interviews also included the role perception of both editors and journalists in peace promotion and their ideas surrounding how and whether the news media should utilize peace journalism when reporting on terror. Recruiting individuals with firsthand knowledge and experience relevant to the research questions ensured the data collected was rich, an attribute that Rubin and Rubin (2011, p. 2) assert elevates the findings of research.

Incorporating both journalists and editors in this study enhanced the textual analysis findings, as news articles are rarely produced by an individual. Thus, it linked the role of news production and the content of the news articles (Bell 1991, p. 33), an integral underpinning of this study. The interviews, considered to be the most fundamental and widely used research technique (Berger 2016b), were conducted face-to-face, allowing participants to express their views and expound on any ambiguous answers, mitigating any inarticulacy. The face-to-face interview data also included social cues and nonverbal information. Elements such as facial expression and body language added to and encouraged meaningful conversation with the respondents, encouraging more thoughtful responses and insight from participants where responses were brief and needed probing further (Irvine, Drew & Sainsbury 2013, p. 2).

Areas of confusion and discomfort, which were few, were easily addressed through an alternate line of inquiry and visual contact, which led to more detail in the data collected. Similarly, areas of interest that stood out in the semi-structured interviews were explored further (Irvine, Drew & Sainsbury 2013, p. 2). This capacity to follow lines of questioning raised during the interviews is a key benefit of using semi-structured interviewing.

### i. Population and Sample

In order to gather an appropriate amount of data, the study relied on purposive sampling for the semi-structured interviews. As stated by Ritchie, Lewis and Elam (2013, p. 144), purposive sampling relies on the selection of participants based on criteria that are purpose-driven. The participants selected for this study were chosen based on the objectives of the study and their specialization in conflict reporting. Participants were also selected based on the media company that they worked for, the traditional media platform (TV and print) they represented, and their area of specialization, such as news department and conflict reporting. The participants included Kenyan journalists and editors from four popular, well established, and operational Kenyan media companies. The media companies were selected based on the viewership of their broadcast stations, the readership of their publications, ownership (state or privately-owned), and nationwide reach (pressreference 2017). These media companies were;

*Those with both TV and Print;*

1. Nation Media Group (The Daily Nation and NTV)
2. The Standard Group (The Standard and KTN)

*Those with TV alone;*

3. Royal Media Service (Citizen TV)
4. Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC)

From these four media companies, representation of traditional media platforms was;

- 2 daily newspapers – *The Daily Nation* and *The Standard*
- 4 broadcast TV stations – NTV, KTN, KBC, and Citizen TV

By adopting purposive sampling, this study ensured all the participants were suitable, by using a criterion of inclusion and exclusion, ensuring that their contribution to the study was based on knowledgeable experience and expertise within conflict reporting. Purposive sampling also



ensured that the data collected in this study fit the criteria for the study (Ritchie, Lewis & Elam 2013).

## ii. Criteria of Inclusion and Exclusion

In more detail, the criteria of inclusion and exclusion for the media companies where participants were selected included whether the company has print and/or broadcast news components, is still in operation, uses English – one of the national languages in Kenya - as the main language of communication and has nationwide coverage. Additionally, the criteria of inclusion for the participants selected for this study were that journalists and editors be;

- Over 18 years of age
- Registered and accredited by the Media Council of Kenya
- Employed by one of the four main registered media establishments selected for this study. These were KBC, Royal Media Services, Nation Media Group, and Standard Media Group
- Employed in print or broadcast news media, within the four main registered media establishments selected for this study and as mentioned above
- Use English as the primary language of communication in their broadcasts and articles
- Working for a local traditional news media platform in a state-owned or privately-owned media company selected for this study
- Responsible for the dissemination and preparation of news stories, that is, fulltime reporters, writers, columnists, and other news people
- Employed as journalists/editors during at least one of the terror attacks

Correspondingly, the criteria for exclusion included editors and journalists who were;

- Working for vernacular and community- based media
- Working for radio stations (excluding those who work for more than one type of media)

- Freelancers and/or bloggers
- Working for new media platforms
- Working for specialized print and broadcast media, such as magazines within print media or content geared towards a specific market or demographic.

### iii. Interview Questions

The interviews began with introductory questions on the interviewee's job description, their responsibilities in their current roles, their area of specialization and years of experience. The interviews then proceeded to the main questions, which were the same for both the editors and the journalists. The interview questions were divided into two sections, the first addressing the factors that influence how the Kenyan media reports on terror and the second focusing on peace journalism.

The main aim of the interviews was to seek out views on how the Kenyan news media reports on terror, the factors that influence how the Kenyan news media reports on terror, and whether these factors affect the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan context when reporting on terror. The aim of the interviews was to include in the study the voices and perspective of Kenyan editors and journalists, as news workers are not always included in peace journalism studies, especially in the African continent. The interviews aimed to do this by exploring and encouraging the viewpoints, perspectives and experiences of Kenyan journalists and editors, rather than provoking closed answers. Follow-up questions, probes, and prompts were utilized in support of the main interview questions. While the main interview questions addressed the key points of this research question, the follow-up question prompts and probes were used to encourage further explanations of ideas and responses.

In this study, the interview data was handled in several stages. The interviews were first transcribed, and then the data was identified, categorized, and classified based on the themes that emerged. The themes were coded and interpreted, and this coding and interpretation is discussed in greater detail in chapter 6. The data revealed participant role perceptions when reporting on terror, the news production process, ideas around peace journalism, and factors that influence the framing of terrorism in the Kenyan news media. All of these helped in answering *RQ1*, *RQ2*, and *RQ3*, by converting raw interview data into interpretations that are evidence-based (Rubin & Rubin 2005; 2011).

## 5. Procedure and Ethical Assurances

The study was carried out with safety and privacy as the priority. I travelled to Kenya to conduct the interviews and made sure that all ethical standards were met. I interacted and briefed the participants face-to-face about the scope, nature, and objectives of the study. This was further enhanced by consent forms, which covered issues of privacy and confidentiality, that the participants read, ticked off their preferences, and signed before the interviews were conducted. There were no red flags raised with regards to privacy and confidentiality, and all participants except one wanted to be identified as themselves in the reporting of the data and gave approval for that on the consent forms. Whatever information the participants provided was shared openly and offered willingly. Interviewees were accepting and trusting of both the student researcher and institution represented, The University of Adelaide.

Approval from the University of Adelaide Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), approval number H-2017-222, was given and clearly stated in the participant information sheets and consent forms. These forms were utilized to recruit and inform participants about the nature of the research;

how the data would be collected; what was required of them as participants; and to request permission to record the semi-structured interviews. The forms were explained and handed out before the interviews which proceeded once the forms were signed. As a researcher, I was also responsible for conducting myself in a considerate manner and put procedures in place to counter any risks in the primary data collection phase. I also conducted risk assessments before and during the interview process and made sure that all the face-to-face interviews were conducted in Nairobi in public spaces that both the participants and I were familiar with. I also made sure that all interviewees were willing participants and made it clear that we could stop the interview at any point if they were uncomfortable.

Due to the nature of the research topic, confidentiality of the participants' identities was paramount, even though only one participant wanted to remain anonymous. Despite most of the participants' willingness to be identified, I chose not to refer to any of them by their real names in this study, because terrorism is generally a sensitive topic and media freedom in Kenya is still a grey area that is constantly changing (see chapter 3). Some participants did share that they have previously received threats while covering sensitive information around terrorism, therefore the decision to give them anonymity in this study was made based on the experiences that they shared. Hence, participants were identified using pseudonyms, that were assigned randomly and used throughout in the reporting data, and the media house they work/worked for. Specific details on whether they worked for the TV stations or newspapers were not mentioned, to protect their identities. As outlined in this chapter, the research process followed the research ethics regulations specified by The University of Adelaide for this study.

## 6. Challenges Faced in the Study

Many of the challenges faced and overcome in this study stemmed from financial and logistical issues. One of the main objectives of the study was to include the voices of Kenyan journalists and editors in the assessment of the viability of peace journalism in non-western contexts, so interacting with them face-to-face was imperative. Therefore, data collection was carried out in Kenya and online, in the case of purchasing archived newspaper articles, with very limited funding and access. Financial and time constraints resulted in the inclusion of a limited number of participants, as traveling to Kenya was not only expensive but could not be done more than once or extended to interview more participants. Despite reaching out to a significant number of Kenyan journalists and editors, face-to-face interviews were only conducted with participants who were willing and available during the data collection period. Moreover, recruiting individuals with first-hand experience in conflict reporting, due to their extensive knowledge and experience (Rubin & Rubin 2005), proved to be more difficult than expected due to the limited number of Kenyan journalists in conflict desks. In many media companies in Kenya, the conflict desk had only one journalist, who played the role of both editor and journalist, limiting the diversity of data available. While the data was rich, there was limited capacity to interview large numbers of journalists.

Also, many of the journalists I had initially contacted while still in Australia were moving between different media houses during the data collection time-period, which made it difficult to get hold of them for interviews, as some were moving across cities. As a result, I did not get the chance to interview as many journalists and editors as I had initially hoped. However, this did not adversely affect the data gathered as the interviews were detailed and provided sufficient information for this study.

Conducting the textual analysis also presented some challenges, in terms of access to the archived newspapers and limited finances. Unfortunately, many of the older newspapers were not available online, either through academic channels or newspaper e-mobile platforms. Newspapers could only be accessed by request through each newspaper archive library. Moreover, getting consistent communication from the archive libraries proved to be difficult as emails would sometimes go unanswered and I would have to make phone calls from Australia to Kenya to get their attention. Also, copies of the newspapers were exorbitantly priced, with each page being charged separately and costing more than the cover price of the actual newspaper. There was also an added library fee to access the newspapers. Therefore, because of the financial burden and the lack of opportunity to peruse the newspapers before purchase, only newspaper pages from particular dates could be used and the study had to be limited to the first 11 pages of the newspapers, that is, the ‘National News’ section of the newspaper. This did not detract from the quality of the data as the relevant stories on terrorism in Kenya come from these specific pages, as the rest of the newspaper sections are for world news, business news, lifestyle and sports. The logistical problems did not reduce the overall value of the study.

## 7. Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the methodology used to address the research questions in this study. The study aims to contribute to peace journalism studies by utilizing qualitative research methods to assess the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan context, as there is a heavy reliance on quantitative research methods in many peace journalism studies. Therefore, it incorporated the voices of those who have first-hand experience with conflict reporting, such as Kenyan journalists and editors, who can introduce a different perspective to the complexities of reporting on terror in African contexts. Additionally, this study seeks to add empirical value to peace journalism studies

by including the experiences and perspectives of Kenyan editors and journalists in the assessment of the viability of the concept of peace journalism in African contexts. Supplementing the textual analysis and including practitioner voices in an assessment of what influences the coverage of terrorism in the Kenyan context will help to facilitate a better understanding of peace journalism in the African context, and its possibilities for implementation.

## Chapter 5: The Kenyan News Media and Reporting on Terror

### 1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, the overall research design and an outline of the analytical framework employed to address the research questions were illustrated and discussed. This chapter introduces and evaluates the findings of the textual analysis with the aim of answering *RQ1: How does the Kenyan news media report on terror?* As explained in Chapter 4, this study does this by examining the coverage of terrorism in two daily Kenyan newspapers, *The Standard* and *The Nation* (both the *Daily Nation* and the Weekend editions), selected due to their popularity and reach. The textual analysis explores the dominant frames used in the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror, using Hussain and Rehman's (2015b) *conflict escalation* and *conflict de-escalation* reporting model (see Appendix 1). Using this model, this chapter identifies and categorizes the framing of news content on terrorism during four conflict stages in three major terror attacks that occurred in Kenya between 2013 and 2019.

These terror attacks were:

- The Westgate Mall attack, 2013;
- The Garissa University College attack, 2015, and;
- The Riverside/Dusit attack, 2019.

Hussain and Rehman's (2015b) model is operationalized from Galtung's (2003) war and peace journalism framework and concept, but offers an inclusive approach for non-western perspectives. Using this model, the study identifies 10 prevalent subframes (explored in detail in Chapter 4), as indicators of war and peace journalism news frames (that is, *conflict escalating reporting* and *conflict de-escalating reporting*). Within these subframes, different interpretations of the terror



attacks are explored, including opportunities for the encouragement of peaceful resolution and the dominating news sources and actors. The subframes also show the saliency and omission of information, including contexts, and included word choice and language as indicators. The subframes explicated by Hussain and Rehman (2015b) also include other factors that are relevant to this study, such as the prioritization of:

- Political interests, from the perspective of how the media is utilized by and for the political elite;
- Financial interests, from the perspective of conflict as a “news value” in order to attract larger audiences and facilitate the business interests of media companies; and
- Professional interests, from the perspective of journalistic principles and ethics

The study specifically focuses on the coverage of the three terror attacks, due to their magnitude and extensive media coverage, through four conflict stages. These are:

- Phase I: Breaking news (day after the terror attack)
- Phase II: Aftermath (2 weeks after the terror attack)
- Phase III: Follow-up (1 month after the terror attack)
- Phase IV: Re-visit (1 year after the terror attack)

A total of 117 articles were found in both newspapers across all three terror attacks. From *The Nation* 57 news articles were found, while *The Standard* had 58 news articles. Through all four conflict stages, the Westgate Mall attack, which occurred on 21<sup>st</sup> September 2013, generated 28 articles in *The Standard* and 31 in *The Nation*. The second terror attack, the Garissa University College attack, which occurred on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of April 2015, generated 15 news articles from *The Standard* and 21 news articles from *The Nation*. The last terror attack, the Riverside/Dusit attack, generated 15 news articles from *The Standard* and seven from *The Nation*, the lower numbers

resulting from the exclusion of the last conflict stage, as the terror attack had not reached its one-year mark at the time of writing. *The Nation* published more articles during the Westgate Mall attack but had the least overall coverage on terrorism in comparison to *The Standard* during both the Garissa University College attack and the Riverside/Dusit attack.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, both *The Daily Nation* and *The Standard* are foreign owned, by the Aga Khan and the Lonrho Group respectively. Historically, *The Standard* aligned with the colonial powers and the government after independence, while *The Nation* was in support of the opposition during the colonial era and shifted its focus to pro-government content, due to the Aga Khan's business interests, post-independence (Heath 1997; Ogola 2011). However, with economic expansion and new revenue options, some level of autonomy is now available to both media companies, despite the stronghold of the government through state regulations and advertising revenue, as the government is a major advertiser. Additionally, in both newspapers the political elite or those close to them hold managerial and board member positions, which has created an informal relationship with the state for both newspapers. Therefore, both focus on hard news but tend to shift between balanced and unbalanced reporting, depending on the issues at hand and the amount of autonomy they have, which sometimes makes them appear as an informal publicity arm of the state (Heath 1997; Mukhongo 2015; Ogola 2011)

A brief analysis of all the articles was carried out to identify the overall tone of coverage at each conflict stage in order to determine the general framing of each terror attack. However, it is worth noting that the 'Riverside attack,' also known as the 'Dusit attack,' is only covered through three conflict stages because it is the most recent attack on Kenyan soil and was yet to be re-visited (one year after the attack) by the Kenyan media at the time of writing. From the 117 articles, the news stories on the terror attacks were then narrowed down to 22 articles, based on conflict stage

(specific dates outlined in chapter 4) and longest length, for a closer reading and in-depth textual analysis. From this in-depth analysis, the dominant news frames and subframes, derived from the *conflict escalating* and *conflict de-escalating reporting* model (Appendix 1) were identified, categorized, and then analysed.

The next section discusses the textual analysis findings in more detail.

## 2. The Westgate Mall Attack, 2013

### 2.1. The Nation

#### I. Phase I: Breaking News

##### a) Overall Tone of Coverage

In the breaking news phase, 15 articles were published by *The Nation*, reflecting a general tone of *conflict escalating reporting*. Most of the coverage was focused on descriptions of the terror attack, the rescue missions and the gruesome scenes that were visible during the attack. The *securitization* subframe dominated the general coverage from the collective news articles, relying on the police force, army, and security personnel as news sources. The word choices in most of the articles reflected a sense of patriotism, with several references to the “Kenyan spirit” and a “galvanized nation.” This first day of coverage was predominantly focused on the visible elements of the attack, with specific references to the rescue missions and the weapons used by both the “foreign forces” that were present and the Kenyan security detail. Much of the emphasis in the articles was on the weapons used - AK47s, grenades and helicopters - for the rescue mission. *Sensationalism* was also a major subframe present in the coverage, reflecting strong negative and dramatic descriptions of the attack, such as “Mall Massacre,” utilised also as the title on the cover page. Other news articles had titles such as, “Terrorists turn day of peace into day of pain” and “...Worst attack since 1998”

In this conflict stage, the contexts and root causes of the terror attack were not mentioned in any of the articles. However, critique within the *securitization* subframe was made with reference to the security personnel appearing as though they were “caught off-guard,” an indication that there were intelligence and security lapses, which the news media implied by mentioning that the terror attack was initially assumed to be a robbery. Many of the news articles also hinted at ethnic and religious differences, an indicator of the *otherization* subframe, when describing the events of the attack, “... Hooded men asked them [victims] to read a message in Arabic and those who could not read the message were allegedly killed on the spot.”

Coverage intimated socio-economic differences when describing victims, also an indicator of the *otherization* subframe, “...images captured showed that most of those killed were Kenyans of Asian origin and foreigners...Westgate mall is frequented by wealthy Nairobian and expatriates.” Other subframes present in the overall coverage of the Westgate Mall attack included *incompatibility*, with two parties, Kenya and Al-Shabaab, having antagonistic interests. Also, the attack was presented as a revenge mission for the military intervention by Kenyan troops in Somalia. At a smaller scale, the *humanization* subframe, which falls under the *conflict de-escalating reporting* news frame, was present in a few articles, where victim perspectives and suffering were highlighted. However, the perspectives of ordinary people, outside of a journalist and a few witnesses to the attack, were missing from the overall coverage. Indicating *politicization*, although minimal in comparison to the rest of the subframes, many of the narratives in the articles focused on the President, the presence of his sister in the mall, political statements, and political actors as the main sources of information.

Overall, the general coverage of the Westgate Mall attack during phase I reflected *conflict escalating reporting*, with the major subframes being;

- *Securitization*;
- *Otherization*;
- *Incompatibility*; and
- *Sensationalism*

#### b) In-depth Textual Analysis

From the 15 articles published in phase I, the longest article covering the topic of terrorism, titled “Worst attack since August 1998”, was selected for the in-depth textual analysis. Like many of the articles published on the same day, all five subframes reflecting *conflict escalating reporting* were present. Except for *humanization*, all four *conflict de-escalating* reporting subframes were absent. These were:

- *De-politicization*;
- *We’ness*;
- *Compatibility*; and
- *Responsibility*

Similar to the general coverage in the breaking news phase, *securitization* was the most dominant subframe. Indicators of *securitization* included the number of casualties, descriptions of the gruesome and violent scenes, and the presence of security personnel. Describing the day’s events, the article articulates,

A machine gun and grenade assault on one of Nairobi’s biggest malls left dozens dead and injured scores of others in the worst terrorist attack in the country since the 1998 bombing of the US Embassy... Witnesses said the attackers were armed with AK-47 rifles and wore

ammunition belts. They were also armed with grenades and carried a substance thought to be acid.

Moreover, the language used and word choices in the article indicated the *securitization* subframe, characterising “a chaotic response by the police,” who used teargas cannisters “...to flush out the attackers, choking people trapped inside and leaving some of them unconscious.”

Also present in the article was the *otherization* subframe, indicated by several references made to Muslims who were able to recite “Muslim prayers” being spared, despite the article also mentioning that the “attackers” were “shooting indiscriminately.” The article describes the scene as,

The hooded gunmen and a woman stormed the mall around noon and opened fire on shoppers and workers at close range. Only those who identified themselves as Muslims and were able to recite Muslim prayers were spared, according to witnesses.

In several instances the article also mentions the ethnicity of the attackers, which suggests “otherness,” a narrative that has been perpetuated in the Kenyan context as religion, tribe and ethnicity are a great dividing factor in the society. The article states, “They looked like Somalis. They were young and slender. They chanted Allahu Akbar (God is Great) as they entered the building...” An indication of the *politicization* subframe was also evident in the article, but only as far as mentioning victims who were political elites or affiliated with a political leader. In many instances, the article referred to the President’s family, stating that, “President Uhuru Kenyatta’s son, Jomo, was among shoppers at the mall before the attack began and was hurriedly rushed to safety.”

Through language and word choice, the *sensationalism* subframe was also present and indicated through the description of the attack as, “dramatic,” “violent” and “ominous.” Descriptions of the scenes also included, “... the bodies of those killed...strewn all over the mall area,” with references to the attack being a “massacre” and “chaotic.” However, as much as the descriptions of the attack were vivid and dramatic, the author of the article remained largely detached, quoting witnesses and using international media outlets such as, the “Al Jazeera TV channel” as sources. Similarly, social media accounts were heavily relied on as news sources, with Twitter being used as a conduit for critique of the security lapses that were evident during the terror attack. For example,

A new twitter account claiming to be that of the terror group, which is similar to the one that had been suspended, also supported the mall attack. The operator of the account, even posted a picture of a Kenya Defence Forces officer, taken from behind, standing outside the mall, a clear indication that whoever tweeted could have been in Nairobi.

While there were some indicators of the *humanization* subframe, these were minimal in comparison to the *conflict escalating reporting* subframes mentioned above. Some victim accounts and individual suffering were highlighted, particularly the experiences of celebrities and vulnerable groups such as, “...children [who] were among those shot in cold blood by the attackers.” However, both the *otherization* and *incompatibility* subframes dominated the narrative through news sources who included witnesses and security personnel. Through witness accounts, ethnic and religious differences, as well as the antagonistic interests of the conflicting parties, were emphasized, indicating *conflict escalating reporting*. For example,

A driver who operates at the mall, Mr. Jackson Kyalo, said one of the attackers stepped on his head as he asked people if they were Muslims. “He said they had come to seek revenge as our government had allegedly said Al-Shabaab and Muslims should be killed. I survived through God’s mercy,” Mr. Kyalo said.

Another example was,

Another witness, Mr. Abdul Jamal, said the attackers appeared to be of Somali origin and repeatedly shouted that they were exacting revenge for Kenya's military campaign in Somalia that began in October 2011 after a spate of attacks by Al-Shabaab inside Kenyan borders.

Although the article did attempt to give some context to the conflict, the *incompatibility* subframe was still dominant, as conflicting parties were presented as having antagonistic interests. In this case, the efforts of the Kenyan military in curbing terrorism were highlighted, but the encouragement for peaceful resolution was not present in the article. For example, the article states that,

The group [Al-Shabaab] has been on the back foot in Somalia for the last three years and lost control of key cities like Mogadishu and Kismayu following a two-pronged assault led by African Union troops from Kenya, Uganda, and Burundi. But the militants have retained the capacity to strike within and outside Somalia's borders. If the Shabaab are confirmed to be the attackers, it will mean that the effort to tackle the militants has been far from successful.

Instead, the article focused on critiquing the security personnel and suggesting that the scenario may get worse, through the voices of victims and witnesses interviewed, highlighting further the *incompatibility* subframe, the article explained,

Those interviewed accused security personnel of taking very long to show up, while those who did were poorly armed. "Some came with pistols while the attackers were heavily armed. They feared entering the building until some reinforcements was brought," a survivor said.



To conclude this section, the article explored the terror attack primarily through external voices and reflected *conflict escalating reporting* through the *securitization*, *otherization*, *politicization* and *sensationalism* subframes and included only minimal indicators of the *humanization* sub frame.

## II. Phase II: Aftermath

### a) Overall Tone of Coverage

During the Aftermath phase of the Westgate Mall attack, four articles were published, with two of the articles focused solely on the extra-judicial killing of a Muslim cleric and the violence that ensued from protesting youth because of his death. The overall subframes that emerged from these articles included:

- *Otherization*;
- *Securitization*; and
- *Sensationalism*

Similar to phase I, the articles focused on casualties, descriptions of the “chaos” from the protesting youth, the security forces and displayed religious differences. Indicators of the *sensationalism* subframe were evident through word choices such as “revenge attack,” “chaos” and “slain fiery preacher,” which dominated the narrative in the articles. Another article, with the title “Urban warfare calls for more than just gunpower – Shava,” largely exhibited the *securitization* subframe, recounting, detailing, and critiquing the military response during the Westgate Mall attack from the perspective of a former military commander.

## b) In-depth Textual Analysis

The article selected for the in-depth textual analysis, showed both the *securitization* and *sensationalism* subframes. Primarily highlighting incompetence by the security detail and command structures during the rescue mission, the article more prominently reflected *conflict escalating reporting*. Moreover, several subframes were visibly absent from the coverage, including:

- *Politicization/De-politicization*;
- *Humanization*;
- *Otherization/We'ness*; and
- *Incompatibility/Compatibility*

The article largely focused on army personnel as the main source of information, highlighting their experiences, critiquing them, and exploring their experiences of the day's events. Also, issues relating to preserving national security and security were the main topics in the article, particularly the lapses in the rescue operations during the attack. The article's subtitle described the Westgate Mall attack as an, "Anatomy of a blunder: Broken command structure, poor screening of hostages and outright incompetence [which] may have handed terrorist's upper hand." Other descriptions included, "... an unfortunate display of planning and execution lapses by security forces that almost turned tragi-comic." Indicators of the *sensationalism* subframe were also present in the article, where reporting was dramatized and unfolding events were presented as unprecedented. For example,

...the biggest lapse of the operation, for which the country could yet pay another bloody price in the future, was the handling of people coming out of the building. Even Kenyans not schooled in security matters were aghast at testimonies of terrified survivors, lamenting how

they pointed out attackers who had changed clothes to police and were now mingling with them – only for the officers to order them: “Get out! Get out!”

Moreover, the article concluded by suggesting that more violence and an ominous future were inevitable, indictive of the *sensationalism* subframe. This is evident in the excerpt below,

The horrific reality is that we now have terrorists among us, probably planning another atrocity...Given the current status of our security, a determined terrorist will simply laugh them off and proceed to unleash mayhem on innocents.

### III. Phase III: Follow-up

#### a) Overall Tone of Coverage

In the follow-up phase of the Westgate Mall attack, only two news articles were published relating to terrorism. The first article in minimal degrees focused on the *otherization* subframe, identifying one of the suspected terrorists in the Westgate Mall attack as a Norwegian citizen of “Somali origin.” However, the article was entirely based on a BBC report that had been previously published, in reference to CCTV footage of the attack that had been publicly released. The article was significantly shorter in comparison to the previous conflict stages and did not speak much on the details of the Westgate Mall attack, beyond the one attacker. This was a clear indicator of the regression of coverage that happens in the Kenyan news media once the initial shock of the attack dissipates.

#### b) In-depth Textual Analysis

However, the longest of the two articles published in this conflict phase steered slightly away from this regression, and highlighted two *conflict escalating reporting* subframes, that is,

- *Securitization*; and
- *Sensationalism*.

Also highlighting the CCTV camera footage from the Westgate Mall attack that was now publicly available, the article focused on looting carried out by the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), evident in the footage during the rescue mission. Thus, the article reflected the *securitization* subframe, giving limelight to the army and security personnel. Speaking on the looting, the article mentions that,

... in the footage, about six armed soldiers in full military fatigue are also seen entering the cubicle, thought to be an M-Pesa outlet, near the supermarket's entry. They are seen ransacking the shop and then leaving, with one putting something in his pocket. Once again it was not clear what was taken from the cubicle.

Additionally, the article highlighted discrepancies in the information provided by the government and security personnel regarding the number of attackers. Using word choices such as “shooting spree” and asking questions about the government information on the attack, the article was indicative of both the *sensationalism* and *securitization* subframes. Describing the footage, the article states,

The video clip shows events a day after the terrorists, said to have been about 10 to 15, stormed the mall and went on a shooting spree. However, the footage previously seen by *The Nation* only showed four attackers, leaving questions on the whereabouts of the others.

All in all, the coverage in this phase highlighted *conflict escalating reporting*, through both the *sensationalism* and *securitization* subframes and by excluding the *conflict de-escalating* reporting subframes that could have contextualised and explored further the “why” of the terror attack.

#### IV. Phase IV: Re-visit

##### a) Overall Tone of Coverage

In the re-visit phase of the Westgate Mall attack, *The Nation* published a total of 10 articles pertaining to terrorism. The most dominant subframes that emerged in the coverage were *sensationalism* and *securitization*, both indicators of *conflict escalating* reporting. The articles tackled a range of topics pertaining to the Westgate Mall attack, including “Unmasking the faces of the Westgate killers,” “events surrounding the terror attack,” “families holding memorials,” the “commission of inquiry that never was” and “Traders hoping to be paid for losses.” Other subframes that emerged from the coverage one year after the attack included *humanization*, where the trials and tribulations of ordinary people were covered. Indicators of the *politicization* subframe were also present, with victims belonging to or affiliated with political groups given substantial coverage through political statements and the highlighting of political wrangling. The overall coverage of the re-visit stage was not only extensive but also explored a range of news angles that were not visible in the previous conflict stages.

##### b) In-depth Textual Analysis

The main article selected for textual analysis exhibited the *politicization*, *securitization*, and *responsibility* subframes in various degrees. However, the main subframe dominating the narrative was *securitization*, evident through the article’s title, “After attack, military influence has increased.” The article’s main narrative was centred on the tug of war between the role of the military and the police force during domestic security issues, in this case the Westgate Mall attack rescue mission. An example of this is explored in the article,

...the military barged in to forcefully take over, and badly bungled a mission that the GSU and other units already had under control... it was already clear that the rescue mission had been badly jeopardized by inter-agency infighting. The bungled military operation might also have been what led to the Westgate siege that could have ended on day one stretching out for four long days, and eventually leading to inexplicable demolition of the mall by suspected anti-tank weapons

Also, indicative of the *securitization* subframe, the article focused on military deployment and the threats, dangers, and occupations that the military have encountered while in Somalia, highlighting elements of patriotism and sovereignty as it pertains to Kenya's experience with terrorism. For example,

Kenyans, generally, have been supportive of military deployment in such areas where the Kenya Police Service and its specialized units, including the paramilitary General Service Unit, the Anti-Stock Theft Unit, and the Border Patrol and Rapid Deployment Units of the Administration Police, have often been unable to cope.

Other indicators of the *politicization* and *otherization* subframes were also present in the article, where political elites and their statements were given majority of the coverage. Highlighting ethnic biases, through statements made by political elites, the article reflected the "othering" of Somali refugees, who were assumed to be dangerous. For example,

Mr Duale accused the committee of doing shoddy work and coming up with nonsensical or unworkable recommendations. He was particularly irked by the recommendation that all refugee camps hosting Somalis be shut down and the occupants repatriated back to their country in light of information that the Westgate attack was planned in the camps that had become havens for Al-Shabaab cells.

Therefore, the article steers more towards *conflict escalating* reporting, as the main subframes present include *securitization*, *otherization* and *politicization*, while *conflict de-escalating* reporting subframes such as *humanization*, *compatibility* and *we'ness* were absent from the coverage. However, what was evident with *The Nation's* coverage is that they did not steer far from exploring any narrative or contexts that are not visible or easily accessible. For example, most of the news sources were victims, security personnel or political statements, which leaves some questions as to why other sources, such as security experts, were not consulted to contextualise or explore the root causes of the attack. All in All, *The Daily Nation's* coverage also demonstrates a pattern in the coverage. At phase I, the coverage in terms of number of articles is at its highest, then progressively declines in phase II and III and then picks up again in phase IV.

## 2.2. The Standard

### I. Phase I: Breaking News

#### a) Overall Tone of Coverage

At the breaking news phase, *The Standard* published 10 articles on the Westgate Mall attack, with a special section in the first seven pages of the newspaper. Articles were centred on casualties and violent discourses, with titles such as “Day of Terror” and “30 people killed, and 60 others injured in... day of terror in city mall”. Indicative of the *sensationalism* subframe, the language and word choices in the coverage describe the day's events as “chilling” and a retaliation, as Al-Shabaab had come to “teach them [Kenyans] a lesson.” Moreover, the *securitization* subframe was significantly visible, noting that the “...Attackers used grenade, assault rifles and explosives to blow up vehicles outside the mall, killing shoppers outside the building.”

The overall tone and framing of the 10 articles published during the breaking news phase reflected *conflict escalating reporting*, with subframes such as *sensationalism*, *politicization*, *otherization*, *securitization*, and *incompatibility* steering the narrative. However, the two most dominant subframes present in the coverage of the Westgate Mall attack by *The Standard* were *politicization* and *securitization*.

Similar to the coverage of the Westgate Mall attack in *The Nation*, the *conflict de-escalating reporting* sub-frame, *humanization*, was present in most of the narratives but not to a significant extent in the majority of the articles. Instead, the attack was explored through descriptions of the artillery and machines used, victim accounts of the events inside the mall, and statements by the attackers to the victims. Referring to the attack as a revenge mission, much of the coverage in *The Standard* focused on foreign nationals, highlighted socio-economic differences and tended to overlook ordinary people who were also victims of the terror attack. Social media was also relied on as a source of information, highlighting Al-Shabaab's reference to the attack as the "Westgate Spectacle," through a Twitter account believed to belong to the group. Referring to this, the article states, "The Al- Shabaab militant group tweeted that it was responsible for what it called the 'Westgate Spectacle'." This was indicative of the *incompatibility* subframe, highlighting how the antagonistic parties having diametrically opposed values in the conflict.

Additionally, the majority of the articles published in this breaking news phase focused on the *securitization* subframe, where the perspectives of police officers and the military were prioritized over those of ordinary people. However, similar to *The Nation's* coverage, the *securitization* subframe was exposed through critique of the security lapses. The difference between the two newspapers was that *The Standard* did not rely on external voices to express their criticism. For example, the author states that,



The gang seemed to be well coordinated after they grabbed a police communication gadget from one of the officers. This gave them an advantage as they could monitor police operations from outside.

Distinct from *The Nation's* description of the terrorists, *The Standard* referred to them as “attackers,” “gang” or “suspects,” indicative of *conflict de-escalating reporting*. However, *The Standard* seemed to also act as a mouthpiece for the security personnel, publishing some articles that were exclusively about their experiences. These articles with titles such as, “Two officers killed, more injured” and “Lenku: State will bring suspects to book,” focused on giving voice to the army personnel and police officers, a characteristic of the *securitization* subframe. Similarly, one article focused solely on the president’s speech/national address and messages from world leaders, a characteristic of the *politicization* sub-frame. The article titled, “Uhuru: We will pursue and defeat terrorists,” highlighted elements of patriotism, indicative of the *we’ness* subframe, making clear that the newspaper was choosing patriotism over detachment.

Additionally, social media remained a key source of information, extending all the way to an article titled, “Kenyans take to Facebook, Twitter to appeal for calm.” The article focused solely on quotes from the social media accounts of local celebrities, politicians and international media. Also tackled in the article were warnings to the public to refrain from spreading fake information and compromising the safety of hostages in the mall through social media posts. The *otherization* sub-frame was significantly present in the narratives in *The Standard*, particularly in reference to ethnicity, where victims were quoted making statements such as, “A Somali guy shot at me.” The line of questioning in the article also leaned towards this narrative, through statements such as, “So does the identity of the Somali gun-man lead to a possibility of the attack having been master-minded by Al Shabaab?”

All in all, the overall tone of coverage of the Westgate Mall attack in this conflict stage reflected *conflict escalating* reporting. However, what was interesting in *The Standard* in comparison to *The Nation* 's coverage was that they appeared to be acting as a mouthpiece for the government and security personnel.

#### b) In-depth Textual Analysis

The article selected for the textual analysis, titled, “We have come to revenge, gunmen told victims before they opened fire,” introduces the terrorists as, “gun-trotting criminals” and “gun-wielding criminals.” The choice of words used in the article was indicative of the most dominant subframe that was present, *sensationalism*, also reflected in statements such as,

In one of the most daring act of public execution, gun-trotting criminals struck at Westgate, Nairobi’s most lavish shopping mall and arbitrarily shot at shoppers before holding others hostage for hours... The incident happened at around 11am on Saturday and witness accounts pointed to an act of terror... They described the Saturday attack as brutal, merciless, and barbaric as the gun-wielding criminals sprayed bullets on innocent Kenyans at various shopping units within the mall.

Contrastingly, the article also exhibited the *humanization* subframe, where individual suffering and the experiences of ordinary people were highlighted and given substantial coverage, although in this phase, individual experiences were mostly centred on eyewitness and victim accounts. Most of the victims interviewed narrated what they saw and experienced during the terror attack.

Similar to *The Nation*, the *otherization* subframe was also resounding, particularly with reference to religion and ethnicity, where victims were quoted severally referring to Muslims being spared

during the attack, for example, “Kyalo said he then heard them yell: ‘If you are a Muslim get out first,’ as the merciless gang sprayed bullets towards those they suspected were not their sympathisers.” The article also makes a point of mentioning the ethnicity of the majority of the victims, describing the hospital notice boards as “conspicuous with names of people with Indian origin.”

Moreover, the *incompatibility* subframe was evident in *The Standard*, where it is suggested that the attack was a revenge mission carried out by “Muslims,”

...one of the survivors, said he overheard the gang say: “We have come to revenge” before he heard gunshots rent the air. “They dressed like Muslims and wore Taqiya (cap) and said that they were out to execute a mission before they shot at everyone and injured me on the leg,” he said at the MP Shah hospital.

Another subframe present in the coverage of the Westgate Mall attack by *The Standard* was *politicization*, where a significant amount of reference was made to the President and voices affiliated with him, such as his advisor. The article also focused on political statements by a former presidential candidate who “faulted the government for ‘forgetting too soon’,” in reference to the 1998 American embassy bombing in Nairobi. While there were some elements of *securitization*, indicated by the mentions of security personnel, the army and police who were at the scene, this was not significant in comparison to *The Nation*. The most dominant subframe in *The Standard*’s coverage seemed to be *sensationalism*, indicated by the language and word choices used to describe the terrorists and the day’s events. The *otherization* subframe came a close second, pointing out religious and ethnic differences from the perspectives of both victims and attackers. However, absent in the coverage of the Westgate Mall attack in this conflict stage were subframes such as

*de-politicization, we'ness, compatibility and responsibility*. Therefore, the overall coverage reflected *conflict escalating reporting*.

## II. Phase II: Aftermath

### a) Overall Tone of Coverage

Similar to *The Nation*, *The Standard's* coverage during the aftermath phase focused on the extra-judicial killing of a Muslim cleric believed to be radicalizing Kenyan youth, and the protests that followed. From the 11 articles published, and except for one *conflict de-escalating reporting* subframe, *humanization*, the overall tone of coverage highlighted *conflict escalating reporting*. The subframes evident in the coverage included:

- *Securitization*;
- *Otherization*;
- *Sensationalism*;

Articles published in this conflict stage highlighted a range of perspectives, but mostly focused on religious tensions surrounding terrorism. Some articles gave voice to Muslim human rights defenders condemning extra-judicial killings and the radicalization of Muslim youth. However, while the articles did introduce new voices, that of human rights defenders, the language and word choices seemed to paint a different picture and indicated the *sensationalism* subframe. Referring to the protesting youth as, “militant supporters of slain Muslim cleric” and “rioters” responsible for “... a church burned... after Friday prayers,” the coverage was indicative of the *otherization* subframe.

Similarly, the overall coverage of the day relied on security personnel and officers as sources of information, a characteristic of the *securitization* sub-frame. In tackling topics such as the thefts carried out by the Kenyan military during the Westgate Mall attack, an investigative probe into the

attack, identification of the “attackers” and the conflict between the police and the military during the rescue mission, the overall coverage of the day pointed towards *conflict escalating reporting*, with a specific focus on the *securitization* sub-frame.

#### b) In-depth Textual Analysis

The longest article published in the Aftermath phase, titled, “Kenya ponders terror attack as reports say insurgents now revive their EA cells,” highlighted *conflict escalating reporting*. Despite the article referencing reports from research institutes and international research organizations, such as the UN Monitoring Group on Terrorism and Extremism, Institute of International Relations and the African Centre for Security and Strategic Studies, the narrative presented terrorism from one perspective and did not encourage or promote rapprochement. The article narrated the internal tensions that repress terror groups in East Africa, showing an effort made to include different contexts and the root causes of terrorism in Kenya and East Africa and indicating, at a minimum level, the *responsibility* subframe.

The article highlighted different streams of thought but excluded *conflict de-escalating reporting* subframes such as *de-politicization*, *humanization*, *we’ness*, *compatibility* and *responsibility*. The *politicization* subframe was also missing in the coverage, and obvious *sensationalism*, through language and word choice, was at a minimum. Nonetheless, the article suggested that the future could be more violent and ominous, an indicator of the *sensationalism* subframe. The article articulates,

Al-Shabaab, the Islamist militant group that claimed responsibility for the Westgate mall attack may have succeeded in eliciting the kind of response it needed to mobilize sympathizers in and outside Somalia... more chilling, a United Nations’ agency reports that

Al-Shabaab's financier and ideological prop has been rebuilding its cells in East Africa prior to the attack.

The *securitization* subframe was also prominent in discussion of threats, dangers and military occupations. Reviewing Al-Shabaab's support within and outside Somalia, the revival of Al-Qaeda linked cells in East Africa, and the implications that these threats have for the sustainability of the terror group, the article indicated the *incompatibility* subframe, as it highlighted the consequences that may result in opposing interests and retaliation by the Kenyan government. Some indicators of the *politicization* subframe also featured in the article, where the consequences for aggrieved parties, in this case Somali refugees residing in Kenya, were discussed, as a result of debates by Kenyan MPs. Adding the *otherization* subframe to the narrative, analyst opinions were included in support of the closure of refugee camps and the relocation of refugees back to Somalia, as,

The MPs accuse refugees of supplying the personnel and logistics that enabled the extremists to penetrate Kenyan security as it took to achieve its objective of eliciting reprisal response against perceived Al-Shabaab's and Al-Qaeda sympathizers in Kenya, the analysts say.

Another example included,

The calls for crackdown on Somali aliens to root out sympathizers works in favour of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda as it is likely to 'herd' the refugees together with Al-Shabaab, according to Hutton.

Also,

The MPs accuse refugees of supplying the personnel and logistics that enabled the extremists to penetrate Kenyan security as it took to achieve its objective of eliciting reprisal

response against perceived Al-Shabaab's and Al-Qaeda sympathizers in Kenya, the analysts say.

### III. Phase III: Follow-up

In the follow-up phase of the Westgate Mall attack, I received the day's newspaper from the archive library with 2 different cover pages. The first had no mention of terrorism or the Westgate Mall attack, while the second one was titled, "Westgate: The Truth," which led into special coverage on pages 4, 5, 6 and 7. The rest of the newspaper did not have any duplicate pages and pages 6 and 7 only had images of the scene. The duplicate cover page may have been a version that was pulled from the shelves because of the criticism of the press during coverage of the attack. This seems likely, because the *Sunday Nation* had been criticized heavily by the government, the public and security agencies for publishing an altered image of a victim on their cover page during the breaking news phase of the same attack. Judging from the title, it could be that *The Standard* was trying to avoid any backlash, thus changing the initial cover page.

#### a) In-depth Textual Analysis

The longest article, titled, "Unmasking Westgate: How terrorist attack was executed," appeared on pages 4 and 5, discussing the CCTV footage that had been released from the mall and interviews with "impeccable security sources". The main subframe explicable identifiable in the article was *sensationalism*, as the descriptions of the day's events were dramatized. Also, the article identified all the terrorists believed to be involved in the attack, their ethnic backgrounds and how they executed their plans. The article stated that it would be highlighting the "cover-ups" by the government, stating that,

After studying exclusive footage unseen before, interviewing various witnesses, and getting access to confidential information at the heart of the investigations, Standard on Saturday

brings you the first true account, which in itself contradicts almost everything that the government has been telling the public.

While the statement above may seem introduce different perspectives to the coverage of the Westgate Mall attack, the article did not fit most of the subframes outlined by Hussain and Rehman (2015b) except for *sensationalism*, *securitization* and *otherization*. Indicative of the *securitization* subframe, the article focused significantly on the failures of security and government institutions, the characteristics of the terrorists and singled out a residential area in Nairobi that is home to many ethnic Somalis, an indication of the *otherization* subframe. For example,

Our story begins in the dusty streets of little Mogadishu, Eastleigh. Months before the attack, the attackers were able to obtain the map of the Westgate Mall building. According to details in a report leaked to The Standard on Standard from the team of investigators, the attackers identified a place so ideal for their operation that even if you located them, extraction would be a difficult task to undertake - Eastleigh's 6th and 3rd streets.

Also, indicating the *securitization* subframe,

The plot took shape, spy agencies and counterterrorism officials warned about threats in various places including malls. However, connecting the dots proved a big challenge to security agencies that last dealt with a terror attack in 1998 and 2002.



#### IV. Phase IV: Re-visit

##### a) Overall Tone of Coverage

In the re-visit phase of the Westgate Mall attack, 3 articles were published in *The Standard*. The overall tone of coverage on this day centred on *securitization*, highlighting and giving limelight to security personnel and security issues related to terrorism and the Westgate Mall attack. The articles also focused on the number of casualties, the heroes of the day, descriptions of the day's events and,

... Claims that security agencies failed to respond appropriately to the terror attack [and] there were gaps in the intelligence system, and poor coordination among the various security arms during the last year's attack....

Considering that it was one year after the terror attack, it was surprising that the *humanization* subframe was absent, leaving out the trials and tribulations of ordinary people. Instead, *sensationalism* tended to be prominent in the descriptions recounting the day's events, for example,

The sound of gunfire was deafening. The stench of human flesh and blood filled the air. Duty had called but there was imminent danger. No doubt, the most obvious price for answering this call of duty would be death by the bullet.

Overall, the general coverage of the day reflected *conflict escalating reporting*, with the most prominent subframes being *sensationalism* and *securitization*.

## b) In-depth Textual Analysis

The article selected for the textual analysis also favoured *conflict escalating reporting*, focusing more on the President's address to the nation after the attack. The main sources of information in the article were political elites and security experts, indicative of the *securitization* subframe. The article also included a security expert from the Institute of Security Studies, who provided more context and background information on terrorism, adding an element of the *responsibility* subframe to the narrative. However, the majority of the article focused on the political debates around whether an inquiry was necessary after the Westgate attack, exhibiting both pro government and opposition narratives, indicative of the *politicization* sub-frame.

Through language that displayed patriotism, the article indicated the *securitization* subframe, which was highlighted through statements such as,

In standing with victims of the attack, Kenyans did not disappoint. They donated more blood than was required. They raised more than Sh. 60 million in aid of victims of the attack. They pitched tent outside the mall and set up free mobile food kiosks to provide food and refreshment to the rescue team. Kenyans were solidly united in caring and giving.

Other indicators of *conflict escalating reporting* were also present, as statements made by the President were highlighted severally, with a message to the perpetrators that the 'whole nation is against them,' an indicator of the *otherization* subframe,

... The president was categorical that everything would be done to bring perpetrators of the heinous attack and their collaborators to book. "Let me make it clear. We shall hunt down the perpetrators wherever they run to. We shall get them. We shall punish them for this heinous crime."

In more detail, indicators of the *responsibility* subframe, representative of *conflict de-escalating reporting*, added contexts, backgrounds and root causes of terrorism into the narrative, creating some encouragement towards peaceful resolutions. This was evident through statements such as,

For Peter Aling'o of Institute for Security Studies, the commission is no longer relevant in view of the time that has lapsed and in view of what he calls "the bigger picture." "The answers over Westgate are to be found in the context of the bigger problem of security and terrorism in the country. They are to be found through addressing to root causes. Issues like historical injustices, dealing with minority issues, corruption, unemployment, inequality and land," Aling'o said.

Overall, *The Standard's* coverage of the Westgate Mall attack in all four conflict stages reflected *conflict escalating reporting*, with subframes such as *securitization* and *sensationalism* being the most prominent. From the articles selected for this study, *The Standard* had significantly less coverage of the attack in comparison to *The Nation*. The majority of this coverage focused on the political elite and securitization, while the *humanization* subframe, representative of ordinary people and their experiences, was visibly absent. *The Standard* also appeared to align its coverage with patriotism, despite the inclusion of some context, focusing primarily on the security personnel, police and military and their experiences alongside dramatized descriptions of the attack itself. The number of articles published on the attack reduced over the different conflict stages, with more articles published during the first two conflict stages, then significantly reducing during the last two.

### 3. The Garissa University College Attack, 2015

#### 3.1. The Nation

##### I. Phase I: Breaking News

###### a) Overall Tone of Coverage

The overall tone of the 10 articles published on this day leaned more towards *conflict escalating reporting*. The main subframes that were present in the coverage included *politicization*, where articles focused on and highlighted the President's sentiments alongside those of the main opposition party leader. Political wrangling and political statements made up most of the news. Also present in the overall coverage on the day was the *securitization* subframe, which focused on the threats, dangers and military occupations related to terrorism, while giving limelight to the police, army personnel and security forces.

Indicators of the *otherization* subframe were present in most of the narratives, highlighting religious and ethnic differences while telling the conflict story from just one perspective. The articles also highlighted the "bad deeds" of aggressors, mentioning that Al-Shabaab was "gloating" about casualties, while giving dramatized and sensationalized accounts of the terror attack, an indicator of the *sensationalism* subframe. Overall, the coverage of the Garissa University College attack at the breaking news phase focused mainly on the number of casualties, with headlines such as, "147 people Killed in cold blooded University terror attack" and *sensationalism* through repetition and the replication of older terror events, such as the Westgate Mall attack. Other subframes also present included *incompatibility*, where the antagonistic interests of the state and the terror group were highlighted, using the President's statements as the main source of information.

## b) In-depth Textual Analysis

The longest article published at the breaking news phase, titled, “147 killed in cold-blooded raid on campus”, focused mainly on the number of casualties while giving limelight to security personnel. The most dominant subframe evident in the article was *securitization*, which specifically focused on highlighting the discrepancies around the number of casualties. The article claims that the number of casualties identified in the official tally provided by the government and security personnel was inaccurate. Alongside these discrepancies, the article highlighted suspicious shooting after the siege was declared over, which the government later referred to as “mopping up” in case any attackers were left behind. The article raised many questions about how the Kenyan government was responding to the Garissa University College attack, an indication that the press, in this case *The Nation*, was fulfilling its watchdog function.

However, the article also focused on recounting the past, making several references to the Westgate Mall attack while describing the Garissa University College attack through a *securitization* lens. Describing the day’s events, the article stated that, “yesterday afternoon, special forces arrived with tanks and other armoured vehicles to try and put to an end an attack that mimics the Westgate siege in 2013.” Also dominant within this narrative was sensationalism, as the attack was dramatically described as,

Just like in the Westgate atrocity, the terrorists were armed with guns and grenades and gained entry by killing the officers at the gate and confronting others inside. And just like in Westgate, there was no quick resolution to the siege, with the Al-Shabaab believed to have taken some students hostage. Explosions and gunshots could be heard from inside the college late in the afternoon, eight hours after the attack began. Witnesses said the terrorists announced their raid with loud explosions, possibly by throwing grenades, followed by continuous gunfire.

*The Nation's* coverage of the Garissa University College attack moved between two roles, the first playing the watchdog function, showing the discrepancies between the number of casualties, and the second focusing on news values, through the dramatization of events. Overall, the article reflected *conflict escalating reporting*, as *conflict de-escalating reporting* sub-frames such as *de-politicization*, *humanization*, *we'ness*, *compatibility* and *responsibility* were absent from the coverage.

## II. Phase II: Aftermath

### a) Overall Tone of Coverage

In the aftermath phase, 6 articles were published in *The Nation*. These covered a range of topics including the radicalization of youth, a concert set up to eulogize terror victims, the war on terror and the origins of the perpetrators of the attack. The overall tone of the articles reflected both *conflict escalating* and *conflict de-escalating reporting* news frames. The most dominant subframes present in the coverage were *we'ness*, highlighting grievances of officials from the Muslims for Human Rights, who had been summoned for interrogation by the Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU) and The National Intelligence Service (NIS), and *securitization*, primarily discussing the threats and dangers of terrorism while giving the police force and security personnel maximum coverage as the main sources of information.

### b) In-depth Textual Analysis

The article selected for the in-depth textual analysis, titled, "Clerics, leaders give conditions on amnesty order," focused on exploring terrorism as a problem that not only requires resolution, but also involves treating conflicting parties equally. Indicative of the *we'ness* subframe, the article gave voice to religious leaders, both Christian and Muslim, and political leaders from the Coastal

region of Kenya, where majority of the youth were being radicalized. The article highlighted some solutions being implemented by the state to curb radicalization, such as amnesty for radicalized youth, while presenting the opinions of religious and political leaders. Indicating both the *politicization* and *we'ness* subframes, the article stated,

Muslim and political leaders from Mombasa, led by Governor Hassan Joho, yesterday welcomed the 10-day amnesty that the government has given radicalized youths to surrender and be re-integrated into their communities. However, they asked the Cabinet secretary for the interior, Gen (Rtd) Joseph Nkaissery, to give a clear plan on how this will be done. Christian Church leaders, in turn, asked the government to set conditions under which youths who denounce radical Islam will be pardoned.

Moreover, the article exhibited minimal indicators of the *incompatibility and compatibility subframes* when highlighting the differences in opinion between the two parties, noting both the commonalities and differences in viewpoints with regards to amnesty as a solution. However, while the article presented unity and dialogue as it pertains to terrorism, wider contexts and root causes were missing from the narratives. The article divulged the views of different parties but did not contextualize the conflict or encourage rapprochement. Indicators of the *securitization* subframe were also present, where the majority of the sources of information included security personnel and political elites. One element that was visibly absent from the coverage was the perspectives and/or experiences of ordinary people. Despite this, the article highlighted both *conflict escalating* and *conflict de-escalating reporting* news frames equally.

### III. Phase III: Follow-up

#### a) Overall Tone of Coverage

In the follow-up phase of the Garissa University College attack, the number of publications reduced significantly, as only 3 articles were published on terrorism. The dominant subframes that were present in the coverage included *humanization*, highlighting the plight of a father searching for his daughter four weeks after the attack, and *securitization*, mostly highlighting the threats of terrorism while giving the elite maximum coverage over ordinary people. Overall, the coverage of the day explored little beyond the deployment of security officials to the North-eastern region of Kenya, where the Garissa attack occurred, and examples of victim experiences. It is worth noting that the coverage of the attack was minimal because of where the attack occurred - Garissa is a few hours away from the capital city where many journalists and media companies are located.

#### b) In-depth Textual Analysis

The article selected for the in-depth analysis, titled, “Terror suspects held illegally, court told,” highlighted a story on a Senate staffer who was suspected to be an Al-Shabaab linkman. Looking at his experience as a terror suspect, the article showed the *humanization* subframe, highlighting how,

Mr. Ahmed was arrested following “intelligence” reports that he might be a spy working for Al-Shabaab in planning an attack on parliament. “He was placed in police custody on Sunday, April 20, after he presented himself to Pangani Police Station in Nairobi upon being summoned in a phone call,” his lawyer said. He said police “sneaked in” an application in the suspect’s absence.



The article focused solely on the suspect's detainment and the "...Violation of the Constitution and the Prevention of Terrorism Act," based on the way he was handled by the state. Absent from the coverage were sub-frames such as *politicization/de-politicization*, *securitization*, *incompatibility/compatibility* and *sensationalism/responsibility*. By including his experiences, the article added a different voice to the terrorism narrative, as well as fulfilling some level of the media's watchdog function. Thus, the article predominantly reflected *conflict de-escalating reporting*.

#### IV. Phase IV: Re-visit

##### a) Overall Tone of Coverage

In the re-visit phase of the Garissa University College attack, *The Nation* published 2 articles pertaining to terrorism. The shorter of these reflected the *securitization* and *sensationalism subframes*, discussing issues related to the future while predicting that Kenya will remain unsafe, and focusing on the casualties, threats and security issues,

Exactly one year ago today, armed gunmen from the Al-Shabaab terror group attacked Garissa University College and killed 148 people, 142 of them students. As Kenya remembers the massacre today, a lot has changed in public college. Security has been improved in most of them. Garissa, which has re-opened, set up a police station on campus. However, experts warn that the danger of terror on campuses in the country remain since the Somalia-based terror group has not yet been vanquished.

##### b) In-depth Textual Analysis

On the other hand, the article selected for the in-depth analysis, titled, "Bosire: Refusal to stand was protest against insecurity," discussed terrorism from a general point of view and not specific to the Garissa University College attack. The article predominantly exhibited two subframes, *politicization* and *securitization*, where political elites and security personnel were given maximum

coverage. The article discussed statements by an opposition political leader during the burial of a Kenyan soldier, and highlighted issues related to terrorism and the withholding of information by the government. For example,

Kitutu Masaba MP Timothy Bosire said he was pained because he had taken part in the burial of nine soldiers who died in Somalia “yet the circumstance in which they were killed is shrouded in secrecy... it was my way of expressing dissatisfaction to a presidency that is not listening or accommodative,” Mr. Bosire said in a phone interview.”

Also, indicative of the *politicization* subframe,

He said President Uhuru Kenyatta should not take lightly the protests in parliament on Thursday, which resulted in the ejection of six MPs from the House. “The President should have taken kindly my protests because I represent people who feel that he has not handled security matters properly,” the MP said. “Kenyans are told to stand and honour the soldiers. Honour who? We do not even know the number killed. It is a global practice to list people who are honoured.”

The article highlighted the emerging conflicting political scenario, based on controversies linked to terrorism and the information surrounding terror events. Focusing mostly on the opposition party, the article reflected *conflict escalating reporting*, with a dominant focus on the *politicization* subframe.

The Garissa University College attack did not receive as much coverage as the Westgate Mall attack. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this was mostly because of the criticism that the Kenyan press received during the Westgate Mall attack, the introduction of terror laws that touched on media freedoms and the distance of Garissa county from the capital city, where the major media

houses are located. While the coverage was minimal, the press reflected more *conflict de-escalating* reporting, perhaps because much of the information on the attack was not easily available or verified. Therefore, they relied on the accounts of ordinary people, evident through the *humanization* subframe in the coverage, their experiences and perspectives, which is the focus of most of the *conflict de-escalating* reporting subframes.

### 3.2. The Standard

#### I. Phase I: Breaking News

##### a) Overall Tone of Coverage

In the breaking news phase, *The Standard* published 7 articles pertaining to the Garissa University College attack and terrorism in general. The overall tone of the articles included both the *securitization* and *humanization* subframes, which dominated the narrative. In comparison to the articles selected from *The Nation*, *The Standard's* coverage was more descriptive, detailing the events of the attack from the beginning, where the terrorists “started firing indiscriminately” in a mosque within the university before moving to other areas. Indicating the *we’ness* subframe, the articles avoided notions of “us versus them,” while including some wider contexts and explaining the violence that results from terrorism.

Moreover, the articles also included historical aspects, highlighting how Al-Shabaab came to be and why the university was a target. This narrative was explored extensively in articles titled, “Islamists targeted college long before Shabaab was formed” and “Terrorist’s long history of rage against Kenya.” In the latter article, some grievances about extra-judicial killings, land occupation and some aspects of Somalia’s history, clan dynamics and clashes were explored, although not in detail. However, these contexts and different perspectives were indicative of the *compatibility*

subframe, which highlighted *conflict de-escalating reporting*. Articles also exhibited the *incompatibility* subframe, highlighting the tug-of-war between the different interests of Kenya and Somalia, through analysts as sources of information.

Conversely, limited in the day's coverage were subframes such as *sensationalism*, which was surprisingly minimal, outside of recounting the death toll several times, and *otherization*, which was also minimal, as there were attempts to include other perspectives to the conflict story. The *de-politicization*, *compatibility* and *responsibility* subframes were also either minimal or absent, because there was no encouragement for peaceful resolution, and neither was the context explained beyond the formation of the Islamist group, all indicators of the *responsibility* subframe. Overall, the general coverage of the day included both *conflict escalating reporting* and *conflict de-escalating reporting* to varying degrees.

#### b) In-depth Textual Analysis

The article selected for the in-depth textual analysis, titled, “Kenya Unbowed: 147 killed in terrorist attack on University”, reflected *conflict escalating reporting* subframes such as *securitization*, *humanization* and *sensationalism*. Descriptions of the day's events highlighted the *sensationalism* subframe, through language and word choice, with the use of words such as “slaughter,” “carnage” and “bloodiest.” Additionally, the article said that,

The bursts of gunfire woke up some of the students who were still asleep and sent others, who were in prayer sessions, scampering for safety. They then proceeded to two hostels shooting at anyone on sight before moving to the third hostel where they held hostages. Bodies of the victims whose lives were brutally cut short by bullets were strewn on the floor.

Another subframe of *conflict escalating reporting* visible in the article was *securitization*, where security personnel and the elite were given the limelight and maximum coverage. For example, most of the coverage highlighted the number of casualties and the role of the security forces,

Authorities said four terrorists who participated in the dawn attack for which the Somalia militant group Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility were killed by security forces...The CS said security forces had rescued more than 500 victims. Those rescued were taken to a military camp for screening and one was only released after producing college identification or after being identified by colleagues.

However, significantly different to the rest of the coverage, the article also included one *conflict de-escalating reporting* subframe, *humanization*, where the experiences of the students were also included. For example,

Shocked students narrated how they jumped out of the windows while others scaled the perimeter wall. Some were too terrified to speak as they fought back tears. “I saw my two colleagues falling down. I thought I had been shot too but how I managed to escape through the window is still shocking me,” said a student who only gave his name as Vinny.

Overall, the coverage favoured *conflict escalating reporting*, as *conflict de-escalating reporting* subframes such as *politicization/de-politicization*, *compatibility*, *we’ness* and *responsibility* were absent. Similar to the Westgate Mall attack and differing from *The Nation*, *The Standard* relied significantly on information provided by the government and security personnel, which steered the coverage more towards focusing on casualties.

## II. Phase II: Aftermath

### a) Overall Tone of Coverage

During the aftermath phase, *The Standard* published 5 articles pertaining to the Garissa University college attack and terrorism in general. Similar to *The Nation*, the articles focused on the wave of radicalization that was happening in the Coastal region of Kenya and the debates by religious leaders on how it should be handled. The most dominant subframes that emerged from the general coverage in this phase included *politicization*, while briefly touching on *otherization*, where political statements and wrangling were highlighted. The coverage centred on the role that political leaders should play in combating extremism and religious tensions in the region. For example, the article highlights that,

The governor accused an unnamed politician of planting religious tension in the county claiming the MP has been moving from one church to another inciting Christians against his administration.

Additionally, indicators of the *we'ness* subframe were present in the majority of the coverage, where religious tensions and biases were the focus of some articles, but from the perspective of giving equal opportunity to different religious leaders to voice their opinions. Similarly, other articles expressed the *securitization* subframe, giving security personnel the limelight and discussing the radicalization of youth as a security issue that needed to be dealt with. Indicators of the *incompatibility* subframe were also featured in one article where discussions on building a separation wall between Kenya and Somalia were explored, highlighting the tug-of-war in which the interests of the two states were incompatible. Likewise, the *otherization* subframe was present in some articles where “us versus them” narratives dominated the news stories based on religious differences and the radicalization of youth.

Overall, the general coverage on this day favoured *conflict escalating reporting*, as the majority of the subframes identified were indicators of this news frame. Aside from the *we'ness* subframe, indicators of *conflict de-escalating reporting* such as *de-politicization*, *humanization*, *compatibility*, and *responsibility* were visibly absent from the day's coverage.

#### b) In-depth Textual Analysis

The article selected for the in-depth analysis, titled, “Leaders divided over call to pull KDF out of Somalia,” favoured *conflict escalating reporting* subframes such as *politicization*, *securitization* and *sensationalism*. The main sources of information were the political elite, debating whether Kenyan troops should be withdrawn from Somalia to curb terrorism within Kenyan borders. The article focused on the views of politicians, the opposition versus the president and his supporters; the former wanting troops to exit and the latter wanting them to remain in order to protect the borders. The article primarily reflected the conflicting political scenario in Kenya, an indicator of the *politicization* subframe.

Some elements of the *sensationalism subframe* intertwined with the *securitization* and *politicization* subframes were also present through language and word choice, where words such as “massacre” and “cowardice” were used to describe the act of terror. Additionally, indicators of the *incompatibility* subframe were present in the coverage, highlighting, through the President's speech, that compromises were not possible as each party was determined to prevail over the other. For example,

... “I guarantee Kenyans that my administration shall respond in the severest ways possible to the Garissa attack, and any other threat to us,” President Kenyatta said on April 4 in an

address after the attack on Garissa University College in which he asked Kenyans not to fall for the false narratives propagated by terrorists.

Additionally, the coverage focused on the perspectives and opinions of political elites, who highlighted some root causes of terrorism although more indicative of the *sensationalism* subframe. For example,

But Opposition leaders insisted attacks on Kenyans are due to Kenya's involvement in Somalia. "We demand withdrawal of Kenya's military from Somalia with speed. The rain started beating us when we insisted on sending troops to Somalia. This is not a safe country anymore," said Wiper leader Kalonzo Musyoka.

Also,

..."Some of these things are brewed from Kenya and it is going to be difficult to help fight terrorism if Al-Shabaab is being brewed within the Kenyan borders," said Nominated MP Oburu Oginga, adding that construction of a wall between Kenya and Somalia is "pure corruption".

Other opinions included,

... "A withdrawal will be seen as a sign of cowardice and provoke further attacks inside our territory. But the government must beef up security along the border to forestall further incursions," said Isiolo Governor Godana Doyo

Overall, the article reflected *conflict escalating reporting*, where the *politicization* subframe gave two different perspectives with regards to Kenyan troops staying in Somalia and focusing on the conflicting political scenario. Absent in the coverage were the perspectives of ordinary people, as issues of security relating to terrorism and political statements seemed to be the only news. The conflict story was told from one perspective, where contexts, background information and root



causes, apart from the presence of Kenyan troops in Somalia, were lacking. Similarly, issues of *incompatibility*, while present, were presented only from the perspective of the political arena. Other parties to the conflict were not mentioned and their perspectives were not explored.

### III. Phase III: Follow-up

Reminiscent of *The Nation*, *The Standard* had minimal coverage of terrorism in the follow-up phase, publishing only 2 articles. One covered the “state of the economy,” based on the effects of terrorism and travel advisories on the tourism and agricultural sectors, while the longer one addressed security lapses based on terrorism, from the perspective of senators. The longer article, titled, “Senators angered by security lapses,” reflected *conflict escalating reporting*, with the most prominent subframes being *securitization*, *politicization* and *incompatibility*. Like *The Nation*, the article discussed the senate staffer arrested for “...helping Al-Shabaab to launch an attack on the facility.”

Highlighting indicators of the *politicization* and *otherization* subframes, the media focused on political statements and controversies around religion, ethnicity, and the idea that “Somalis” do not belong in particular spaces in Kenya, as they are perceived to be dangerous. The article highlights this through statements such as,

The senators criticized the way security teams have handled intelligence report. Kakamega Senator Boni Khalwale... accused PSC commissioners Adnan Keynan (Eldas MP) and Abdulahi Ali of recruiting a “disproportionate number of Somali youths to work in parliament in the last few years,” an issue which he says raises suspicion.

Also,

“...It is very worrying that somebody who has been one of us for 10 years can be linked to Al-Shabaab. We should learn from our past,” said Daniel Karaba (Kirinyaga). Hassan Omar (Mombasa), however, cautioned his colleagues against profiling Muslims and their leaders as terrorist on the basis of religion.

Overall, the article reflected *conflict escalating reporting*, highlighting the reliance of *The Standard* on political statements and information that is easily accessible through the political elite. It also highlighted the focus on ethnic differences in the Kenyan context, a narrative that is indicative of how terrorism is viewed in Kenya.

#### IV. Phase IV: Re-visit

During the re-visit phase, only 1 article was published pertaining to terrorism in *The Standard*. The article, titled, ‘Aden Duale: Garissa attack was a scene from hell,’ predominantly reflected *conflict escalating reporting*, through the *sensationalism*, *politicization* and *securitization* subframes. In the article, the Garissa University College attack is covered in memoriam, through dramatized descriptions and statements made by a political leader. That is,

Horrific scenes after the guns fell silent at the Garissa University College still give National Assembly Leader of Majority Aden Duale nightmares one year later. “It was a scene from hell which will haunt me for the rest of my life,” says Duale.

Indicative of the *politicization* subframe, the coverage also centred on the experience of political leaders and their families, highlighting that,

He particularly remembers a female student related to Water Cabinet Secretary Eugene

Wamalwa who called to inform him that the college was under attack and she needed help... “She kept calling me from morning until about 1pm. I think that is when she lost her life. It was so sad that we did not manage to save the lives of those students,” says Duale.

The *securitization* subframe was also present in the coverage, where terrorism was discussed in terms of security, territorial integrity, sovereignty and the deployment of security personnel. For example,

Following the attack on the university, the government has deployed more than 2,000 soldiers along the Kenya-Somalia border. The police have also been supplied with armoured multipurpose vehicles to boost their surveillance

Also,

...But speaking to *The Standard* on Saturday, Saleh downplayed his impact and instead attributed recent security achievements to the cordial relationship among security officers and residents. Security officers, he says, have adopted intelligence-led policing, with the public fully involved in collecting and collating information on the movement of Al-Shabaab operatives.

Overall, the article focused on *politicization*, giving only the perspective of one political leader, while also highlighting the *securitization* subframe. Similar to its Westgate Mall coverage, *The Standard* aligned its coverage with the state and did not include other perspectives or voices. Therefore, it is evident that *The Standard* primarily relies on information that is easily accessible, through political statements or provided by the government and security forces.

#### 4. The Riverside/Dusit Attack, 2019

##### 4.1. The Nation

##### I. Phase I: Breaking News

###### a) Overall Tone of Coverage

From *The Nation*, 5 articles were found in the breaking news phase, covering a range of topics, including the presence of Kenyan troops in Somalia, victim accounts of the attack, casualties, and the government response to the terror attack. Several subframes emerged from the overall coverage of the day, including *securitization*, *humanization*, *incompatibility* and *sensationalism*. However, visibly absent from the coverage were *conflict de-escalating reporting* subframes such as *we'ness*, *compatibility* and *responsibility*, all of which include indicators that encourage and create opportunities for peaceful resolution.

###### b) In-depth Textual Analysis

The article selected for the textual analysis, titled, 'Inside terror complex, hope springs eternal as heroes rise to the occasion,' had minimal indicators of the *politicization* subframe. While the article did not mention any political wrangling related to the attack, victims affiliated with political leaders were prioritized, such as the daughter of a politician who was still trapped in the building. For example,

“My daughter is in there. We have been communicating since 3pm, and she has told me she had to hide in one of the rooms in her office,” Dr Khalwale told *The Nation* at 5pm. At 7.40pm, the senator tweeted that he was still at the scene, waiting for his daughter. The two had been in constant communication, with the former senator joining curious onlookers as well as the press team in observing the rescued, hoping that one of them was his daughter.

Also, much of the article featured the *humanization* subframe, an indicator of *conflict de-escalating reporting*, where one victim in particular, “Nancy,” was the focus of the article,

Nancy, whose full name we will not reveal yet, to protect her identity, was inside the 14 Riverside Drive complex that houses the five-star DusitD2 hotel and several offices when a loud explosion tore through her office a few minutes past 3pm yesterday. Terrified, she ran to a safe corner and hid, and thus began the longest wait of her life. Outside, masked gunmen had overrun a security barrier, thrown grenades at guards, stormed a restaurant and shot at patrons. The complex, one of the poshest addresses in Nairobi, had become a war zone, and Nancy was caught up in the combat.

However, not visible in the article were the root causes of the attack or any contextual or background information, outside the rehashing of previous terror attacks. Some controversies based on the information provided or withheld by the government on a previous attack, where Kenyan soldiers were ambushed and killed, were mentioned, introducing the *securitization* subframe into the narrative;

Tuesday’s attack came three years to the date after the El Adde attack in Somalia in which over 100 KDF soldiers were killed. Soldiers targeted by the January 15, 2016 dawn attack were from the 5th and 9th battalions of the KDF, and although the government never announced the number of casualties, former Somalia president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud put the figure at 200 while speaking in an interview, only to backtrack on the figure shortly afterwards, saying he had been misquoted.

Indicators of the *securitization* subframe were elevated a notch higher by repetitively mentioning all the military and security measures being taken, which reflected more *conflict escalating reporting*. For example,

Officers from the Gigiri Police Division were deployed to the scene as Gigiri OCPD Richard Muguai requested reinforcement from other police stations and the specialised units. A team drawn from the Directorate of Criminal Investigations units — including the Flying Squad, the Bomb and Hazardous Disposal Unit, and the Special Crime Prevention Unit — made its way into the suites, followed by other units. A few minutes later, they were joined by the elite Recce Squad from the General Service Unit..., adding that the battle installations were on guard to flush out the criminals hiding in the building.

The article also had indicators of *sensationalism*, as reporting was dramatized and sensationalized through the language and word choices used to describe the day's events. For example,

After an hour of explosions and automatic rifle gunfire, an eerie silence enveloped the complex...As they approached the hotel lobby, one of the cars parked outside exploded. Then hell broke loose. The assailants then hurled a grenade at Secret Garden, a restaurant within the mixed-use development. They gained entry to the establishment through its kitchen door and opened fire as they made their way into the dining area...

While much of the coverage in the article points towards *conflict escalating reporting*, there were some indicators of *conflict de-escalating reporting*, which included the *de-politicization* subframe. These included non-political aspects of the conflict such as affiliations like religiosity, ethnicity and politics, all of which seemed to be avoided. Instead, the assailants were referred to as “three armed men” and not described based on their ethnicity or religion, a significant difference in coverage in comparison to the Westgate Mall and Garissa University College attacks. For example,

Three armed men stepped out and ordered the guards to open the barrier. The guards, instead, scampered. Left to their own devices and with their target just a few meters away, the attackers opened the barrier and drove in.

However, the rehashing of previous terror attacks was still significantly present in the article, highlighting that,

Unlike during the Westgate Mall attack of 2013, the multi-agency operation yesterday appeared well coordinated... On January 27, 2017, terrorists attacked the KDF camp in Kolbiyow, approximately 18 kilometres from the Kenyan border. Kenyan soldiers fiercely fought back, but tens of them are said to have died in the raid, which came just three days after Kenyan troops captured Badhaadhe town.

While there were some indicators of the *humanization* subframe, *securitization* seemed to be more prevalent at the end of the article, favouring more *conflict escalating reporting* through descriptions of the threats and dangers that occurred prior to the Riverside attack;

... And in January 2018, Al-Shabaab militants destroyed two police vehicles in Nyongoro, Lamu County, where at least three police officers and one civilian were killed. The police Land Cruisers were ambushed while escorting buses from Lamu to Mombasa.

Additionally, references to the Westgate Mall attack and the court rulings around suspects were repetitively highlighted, perhaps to facilitate some context and background information as to why the terror attack may have occurred, which pushed the overall coverage of the Riverside/Dusit attack more towards *conflict escalating reporting*.

## II. Phase II: Aftermath

Articles written during the aftermath conflict stage tended to be much shorter, less detailed, and more difficult to find in the ‘Hard News’ section of the newspaper. From *The Nation*, only 2 articles were published during this phase, detailing how Al-Shabaab makes money and discussing suspects linked to the Riverside/Dusit attack. The overall coverage of the day focused mainly on the *securitization* subframe, where the suspects were discussed from a national security angle, detailing their detention and the charges against them.

The article selected for the in-depth analysis, titled, ‘Shabaab’s new efficient ways of making money,’ highlighted several *conflict escalating reporting* subframes, including *securitization* as the most dominant. The article discussed details of the diverse and systematic ways that Al-Shabaab finances its activities and sustains its revenue. This added some indication of the *responsibility* subframe, where contexts and background information pertaining to terrorism and how it is sustained were addressed. For example, the article discusses piracy and the illicit charcoal trade as ways terror groups receive funding, stating,

Even as police question the suspects, the case points to the bigger question of funding for terrorism. Last year, The National Counter-terrorism Centre said those funding such activities were devising new ways of remitting money after the regulation of Hawalas and the fight against piracy and illicit charcoal trade in Somalia gained momentum.

Also,

Mobile money is seen as one of the new ways of funding terrorists. Counterterrorism experts say Al-Shabaab is financed domestically and globally. Locally, the group thrives on taxation and the illegal sale of charcoal. Globally, it is funded by other terrorist groups, states, the Somali diaspora, charities, kidnapping and the extortion of local businesses and farmers.



The article also relied on sources that were credible and worked towards presenting contexts that could potentially assist in finding opportunities for peace, while highlighting some of the ways that the terror group's revenue has been diminished. This is indicative of the *conflict de-escalating reporting* subframe of *responsibility*. The article states,

The Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting project estimates that the group, which is responsible for most terrorist attacks in Kenya, earns about Sh700 million from smuggling charcoal to the middle East every year. Sources from The National Counter-Terrorism Centre say the amount of cash that flows into Kenya through the international money transfer system diminished when a crackdown was launched three years ago.

While the majority of the article points to a bleak future, with the realization that the terror groups have several streams of income, the article addresses the topic in a responsible way, showing the pros and cons of conflict without drama or sensationalism. Overall, the article steers away from the previous coverage of terrorism evident in the Westgate Mall and Garissa University College attacks, including more context and verifiable information, while highlighting both *conflict escalating* and *conflict de-escalating reporting*.

### III. Phase III: Follow-up

On this day there was no coverage of terrorism or the Riverside/Dusit attack, and due to the issues with newspaper accessibility, it was not possible to include other articles that were published close to the specific date.

## 4.2. The Standard

### I. Phase I: Breaking News

In the Breaking News phase of the Riverside/Dusit attack, 12 news articles were found in *The Standard* newspaper. The articles covered a range of topics, including, ‘Kenyans unbowed in bleak moments’ and ‘False sense of security in Shabaab terror attacks.’ Featuring the *securitization* and *sensationalism subframes*, the articles described and discussed terrorism from the perspective of dangers and threats, patriotism, and the recounting of old terror attacks, such as the Westgate Mall and Garissa University College attacks. The article shed limelight on the security personnel and dramatized descriptions of the rescue mission in the Riverside complex.

The article selected during this phase, titled, ‘Police in swift response after hotel attack,’ reflected *conflict escalating reporting*, where subframes such as *sensationalism* and *securitization* dominated the narrative. Highlighting the threats, dangers and military occupations related to the terror attack, the article stated that,

Somali-based Al-Shabaab militia claimed responsibility for the attack on 14 Riverside Drive, where the DusitD2 Hotel and an office complex are located...The six gunmen shattered the calm at the upscale complex when they stormed it in the afternoon, where they shot indiscriminately and sent panicky workers and guests fleeing.

The article focused on the police force, army and security personnel as the main sources of information, highlighting their experiences of the attack while overlooking those of ordinary people. For example, the majority of the article focuses on the police chief and his explanations of the day’s events as well as the presence of other security personnel, such as,

Police chief Joseph Boinnet explained that the 3pm attack was well coordinated. It started with a raid on a bank, an explosion targeting three vehicles outside and a suicide mission inside the hotel.

Also,

Deputy Inspector general of police... Director of criminal Investigations... Special forces from the military and the General Service Unit, and those from various embassies including the United States' and United Kingdom's arrived at the scene minutes later and managed to get to the hotel lobby, freeing dozens of trapped staff, and customers.

Additionally, the terror attack was described in a sensationalist and dramatized manner, where unfolding events were narrated like a scene from a movie through imagery, saliency and repetition: in particular, a "severed human arm" was mentioned several times in the coverage, an indicator of the *sensationalism* subframe. For example,

It was at this point that one of the attackers lobbed a grenade at three cars parked at the main barrier, setting them on fire. Flames and thick smoke rose to the skies. The terrorists then entered the main hotel lobby where one of them detonated an explosive device he had on his body. His limb was thrown out of the lobby to the main corridor about 40 meters away. "... "The main door of the hotel was blown open and there was a human arm in the street severed from the shoulder," Serge Medic, a Swiss owner of a security company who ran to the scene to help civilians when he heard of the attack from his taxi driver told Reuters.

While some efforts were made to include perspectives of ordinary people, it was mainly done through eyewitness accounts.

## II. Phase II: Aftermath

In the aftermath phase of the Riverside/Dusit attack, *The Standard* published two articles. The first pertained to the misuse of data and sensitive information as a result of a mass DNA order made by the President. The article tackled requirements set out for civilians to provide DNA samples to the state as an identifying factor. However, the article made only one reference to terrorism, where DNA samples were being requested due to “increasing terror attacks.”

The second article, titled, “17 Youth set to join Shabaab smoked out of a safe house”, focused primarily on the Riverside/Dusit attack and terrorism. Indicators of the *securitization* subframe were dominant in the article, giving limelight to the police and security issues. The article discussed the radicalization of Kenyan youth, highlighting,

Police in Kinango, Kwale County, have arrested 17 youths in a safe house in Samburu Township whom they claimed were being processed to join Al Shabaab in Somalia. The suspects, 15 men and two women, aged between 18 and 27, according to police, who claimed the youths’ homes had been traced to the coast and Rift Valley regions.

The article did not discuss much beyond the identities and investigations surrounding the recruitment and training by radical groups of young people who were found in a house waiting to travel to Somalia. The article was indicative of *conflict escalating reporting* as sub-frames such as *politicization, humanization, sensationalism, we’ness* and *responsibility* were all absent. Focusing solely on reiterating statements made by the police, it is evident that *The Standard* relied on information provided by the security personnel and by proxy aligned its coverage of terrorism with the state.

### III. Phase III: Follow-up

In the follow-up phase of the Dusit/Riverside attack, there were no articles published on terrorism or the attack, outside of a short summary discussing an abandoned bag in the city that police were investigating. Overall, with the Riverside/Dusit attack, there was little coverage in comparison to the first two attacks. There were very few instances where the effects of the attack were discussed, neither were the numbers of casualties or victim accounts discussed beyond the first conflict stage.

### 5. Conclusion

In conclusion, throughout the three terror attacks, media coverage of terrorism varied significantly. During the Westgate attack, when coverage was at its highest, both *The Nation* and *The Standard* focused primarily on the number of casualties and the visible effects of the attack. *Conflict escalating reporting* dominated the narratives in both newspapers, with specific focus on the *securitization*, *sensationalism* and *otherization* subframes. Overall, the majority of the coverage in both newspapers relied heavily on the government, security forces and social media as the main sources of information, which resulted in unverified information being published. All four conflict stages reflected similar coverage, differing only in the number of articles and the introduction of new contexts and voices in the later conflict stages. For *The Nation* in particular, coverage distinguished them as watchdogs, highlighting discrepancies and the ongoing push and pull between the police and the army. While there was not much in terms of investigative reporting, *The Nation* did attempt to highlight and seek some answers for the inaccurate information provided by the government. *The Standard*, on the other hand, relied heavily on political statements and information provided by the government and security forces, distinguishing themselves as patriotic and perhaps even a mouthpiece for the government.

The Garissa University College attack, on the other hand, surprisingly tended to utilise *conflict escalating reporting* and *conflict de-escalating reporting* to almost equal degrees in all four stages of conflict, but more so in the last three. Subframes such as *humanization*, *politicization*, *we'ness* and *otherization* dominated the narratives in both newspapers, perhaps because of the attack occurring in Garissa, which is a few hours away from the capital city. Therefore, the news media may have had to rely on the accounts of ordinary people and their experiences, which steered the coverage toward *conflict de-escalating* subframes. Also, at this point anti-terrorism legislation had been put into practice, restricting media coverage of terror attacks, which may have influenced the difference in perspectives. Like the coverage of the Westgate Mall attack, *The Nation* played the role of watchdog, highlighting discrepancies and asking questions, while *The Standard* remained patriotic, relying on information provided by the state and security personnel.

Lastly, coverage of the Riverside/Dusit attack, which had the least coverage, took on a more sensationalist approach, perhaps because it was a suicide bomb attack, which was not a typical occurrence in previous terror attacks. Articles also covered a range of topics, some less sensationalized than others, and there was no coverage in the third conflict phase. Overall, during the Riverside/Dusit attack, the Kenyan media's coverage of terrorism dwindled significantly, in both newspapers, focusing less on investigative reporting and remaining within their specific roles, *The Nation* as a watchdog and *The Standard* as patriotic.

## Chapter 6: The Systemic Factors and Structures that Influence how the Kenyan News Media Reports on Terror

### 1. Introduction

The findings from the previous chapter show ‘how’ the Kenyan news media reports on terror, highlighting *conflict escalating* and *conflict de-escalating* news frames. This chapter addresses ‘why’ the Kenyan news media represents terrorism the way it does, exploring systemic structures and factors that influence how the news media reports on terror, from the perspectives of Kenyan journalists and editors. Semi-structured interviews were conducted face-to-face with journalists and editors from The Nation media group, The Standard Group, Royal Media Services and the state-owned Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, revealing key insights into the news production process for both television and print media. The interviews also contributed to a broader understanding of the role perception of both journalists and editors, especially around national security issues, the nature of conflict reporting in the Kenyan context, and the relationship between the media, the state and the security forces during conflict. These findings are divided into two sections, based on two research questions identified in previous chapters (Chapter 1, section 5) These are:

RQ1. How does the Kenyan news media report on terror?

RQ2. What systemic factors and structures influence how the Kenyan news media reports on terror?

These semi-structured interview findings represent data collected from four of the most popular media companies in Kenya, one state-owned (KBC) and three privately owned, and comprising both print and TV platforms. Several themes emerged from the data, and analytical choices were made based on supporting evidence from the textual analysis, literature review and the researcher’s

interpretation based on familiarity with the Kenyan context. From the data several systemic factors and structures stood out as more influential than others, revealing connections to the textual analysis findings. Some of these structures and factors, such as the limits set on journalists by legislation and access to information, were evident in the textual analysis, as the coverage between the first terror attack, the Westgate Mall attack, presented as less cautious and more inquisitive than the coverage of the Garissa University College attack and the Riverside/Dusit attack. Both the Garissa University College attack and the Riverside/Dusit attack had significant similarities and differences, which reflected reliance on security officials for information and the consequences of legislative constraints, while the inaccuracies in facts and figures during the Westgate Mall attack revealed just how much conflict coverage shifted and changed with the introduction of legislative measures after the attack.

The next section delves deeper into these findings, detailing the perceptions of participants on how and why the Kenyan news media reports on terror through a majority *conflict escalating* lens, while linking them to the textual analysis findings.

## 2. Participant Perceptions on How the Kenyan News Media Reports on Terror

This section delves into interview data collected from six participants engaged in conflict reporting. However, it is worth noting that during the data collection phase, it became evident that some media houses did not have a specifically designated news desk for conflict reporting, were understaffed and/or had participants who were moving to other media houses. Thus, some of the participants interviewed were playing the role of both journalist and editor at the time of data collection and were interviewed as representing both roles. All interviews except one were recorded, based on permission granted by the participants, and the recordings were later transcribed by the author. The



participants in this chapter are identified under pseudonyms to protect their identity, despite all except one granting permission to be identified as themselves, because of the sensitivity of the research topic (see Chapter 4 for further discussion of the ethical elements of this project).

The interviews revealed that all the participants held similar views on conflict reporting and identified similar systemic factors and structures as influential when reporting on terror, regardless of whether their media house was state-owned or privately owned. The interviews also disclosed that the state-owned media company, KBC, had a stringent role set out by the state and in support of the state, and did not steer away from this role regardless of the nature of the conflict. However, while the privately owned media companies seemed to rely heavily on information supplied by the state and security forces, they revealed that this was because of the legislative restrictions introduced after the Westgate Mall attack, which resulted in a heavy reliance on the security forces for information regarding terror attacks. This also showed up in the textual analysis as the majority of the coverage in the terror attacks, specifically in relation to the facts and figures around the Garissa University College attack and the Riverside/Dusit attack, favoured the *securitization* subframe. While the *securitization* subframe was also present during the Westgate Mall attack, the coverage was more critical, revealing the missteps of the Kenya Defence force and police during the rescue mission, as there was no legislation specifically geared towards controlling or restricting media coverage of the attack.

Moreover, reminiscent of the factors identified in Chapter 3 (Section 2.3), participants outlined that while the two biggest hindrances they faced when reporting on terror stemmed from legislative constraints and government control, it was the withholding of conflict information by security forces and the government that steered their coverage towards *conflict escalating* reporting. Many participants said access to accurate and forthright information was not only difficult but was met

with hostility. As explored in Chapter 3, the government tends to maintain a strong grip on the news media through legislation which across different eras, colonial to post-independence, has been used to monitor, control and restrict media content and freedoms. Since the colonial era, when western journalistic ideals were first introduced to Kenya, legislation has remained a mode of restriction rather than a legal framework that encourages openness, as it is theoretically set out to be (King'ara 2014; Mak'Ochieng 1996; Tomaselli 2003).

Similarly, themes such as advertising, ownership and company guidelines and protocols, while they emerged from the interview data, were not considered by the participants to be a significant hindrance to conflict reporting. However, the focus on violence and violent discourses, evident through the *securitization* subframe, and the limited *conflict de-escalating* reporting in the textual analysis, reflected otherwise. The lack of ordinary voices, expert voices and more investigative journalism in the coverage, especially during the Garissa University College attack and the Riverside/Dusit attack, suggest that time constraints and resources were a significant factor in the prevalence of *conflict escalating reporting*. The coverage of the Westgate Mall attack, publishing of unverified information and inaccurate descriptions of the event revealed that media companies were trying to break the story first, prioritizing news values over verified and accurate information.

Correspondingly, some participants highlighted government pressure as a non-issue and others highlighted it as a major issue. However, what was significant in the interview data was that all the participants considered their role, as part of the Kenyan news media, was to remain patriotic, specifically while reporting on terrorism. Despite these shared sentiments on patriotism, the data emerging from the textual analysis, especially during the Westgate Mall attack, reflected an aversion to the state and its response to terrorism. Therefore, it could be concluded that the shared

patriotism as it pertains to terrorism coverage has resulted from the legislative constraints and to some extent the preservation of their identity as Kenyans against a common enemy.

All in all, the textual analysis in Chapter 5 generally illustrated three dominant *conflict escalating reporting* news frames in all three terror attacks: *securitization* (the visible effects of the attacks); *politicization* (the political environment, wrangling, and the prioritization of political elites); and *sensationalism*. Most of these subframes were at the core of news stories because the information was easily accessible to journalists and within the legislative confines, an attribute that many of the participants indicated in their interviews. This resulted in the majority of the coverage amplifying the voices and perspectives of political elites and security forces. However, in accordance with the literature on news values, conflict coverage and the idea that western journalistic practices are the ideal standard for African media systems (Mazrui 1993; Nyanjom 2012; Ogenga 2019b) (explored in Chapter 2), the significance of news values cannot be ignored, as the Kenyan news media operates within traditional western journalistic principles. Also, some participants revealed that news values, such as impact, proximity and magnitude, were a significant influence on why they report on terrorism through a *conflict escalating lens*. The next section explores this in more detail.

### 2.1. News Values and the Visible Effects of Terrorism

Participants from both the state-owned and privately owned media companies outlined that the focus of the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror was on the visible effects of the attack, with the most important detail on the news agenda being the number of fatalities and the impact of the attack. Steve from the sole state-owned media company, KBC, outlined that most of the terrorism coverage that they undertook as a media house, especially in the breaking news phase of a terror attack, prioritised,

...fatalities, then ... destruction of property ... the impact, people who are affected, people looking for their loved ones and the rescue efforts [alongside] what is being put in place to prevent recurrence. (Steve, KBC, Interview on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2018).

Both Jeremy and Sam from the Nation Media Group, a privately-owned media company, also stated that the breaking news phase of terrorism coverage for their media house focused primarily on the immediate impact and effects of the attack. He stated,

...Well, when a terror attack breaks, the first thing is to look at the nature of the attack, the number of casualties, where it has happened and basically, the immediate information. Where probably victims have been rushed to, the scope of the destruction and all that... (Sam, NTV, Interview on 6<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

Similarly, David from KTN noted this focus on the visible effects of terrorism in news coverage, because of the newsworthiness of terrorism. He stated that the Kenyan news media centred conflict coverage on fatalities and the magnitude of the terror attack as news values tended to dictate whether the attack was newsworthy. He stated,

...We look at how big it is. If it is big enough then we can despatch a team from Nairobi [head office]. But if it is in a small scale, then we can let them [remote journalists] do it from the ground. So, we attach [news] value when it comes to numbers involved... if the number of casualties, from this terror attack ... are many, then there's much value attached to it. If the numbers are less, then even in the order of news, the attachment is limited. (David, KTN, Interview on 11<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

Lee and Maslog (2005, p. 314) attribute this type of coverage, focused on *conflict escalating* reporting news frames, to the familiarity of interpretations around war journalism and the idea that facts and figures around casualties and the terror attack itself are from credible sources. Therefore, storylines are created around these narratives, as they have always been the way that journalists have communicated dominant meanings and made sense of facts. This was also evident in the textual analysis, as reporting of all three terror attacks focused on casualties and the visible effects of the attacks, especially in the breaking news phase, where this type of information was readily available and considered to be from credible sources, such as the scene of the attack, security forces and the rescue teams.

However, what was noteworthy from the interview data was the sentiments shared by David from KTN, who stated that the Kenyan news media was not concerned with the “why” question of terror attacks, but rather the “how”: the visible effects and consequences. He stated that,

Why it happened is always left to security agencies to try and grapple with... to try and tell us what exactly they think happened, who they think is responsible for it... but on the first day what we are looking for is news, what is news here? Casualties, do they have relatives? How fast can we get to relatives? We despatch teams to Nairobi hospital... it can be Kenyatta hospital; it can be at the Wilson Airport... where we expect people to be brought in from Mandera [previous attack happened here]. If it is in the city then we despatch teams live or in vans, like to Westgate, for example. (David, KTN, Interview on 11<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

This explained why the coverage of all three terror attacks focused on *conflict escalating* news frames and showed a decline after the breaking news phase. This highlights that the Kenyan news media is more reactive than proactive in conflict coverage, focusing more on the immediate outcome of attacks over contextualising the attacks. Several participants also conceded that

coverage of terrorism only occurred in response to a terror attack, which could be attributed to a lack of resources and/or the consequences of restrictive legislative measures. This is particularly evident in the textual analysis as the majority of the sources of information, especially in the Garissa University College and Riverside/Dusit attacks, were security personnel or the political elite.

As was expected for the state-owned media company, which does not own a newspaper, follow-up stories after a terror attack are not considered to be a priority. Both the participants interviewed from KBC said they did not run follow-up stories on terror attacks, especially in instances where civilians were not the only ones affected, unless the government issued a report. The state-owned media house therefore acts as a voice for the state and does not explore any narratives on national security issues outside that voice. Steve reiterated that,

... Terror is a classified kind of news coverage. So really... if they [government/security forces/ terrorists] are releasing some report [then we report] on the same. If there isn't [any report], [then the focus is on whether] people are burying people... their loved ones, [whether] people are doing DNA [tests] and such. [This] of course will form an entry point into looking into that story. (Steve, KBC, Interview on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2018).

Steve said that if security personnel were the majority affected by a terror attack, then the coverage was not explored any further as it involved classified information. This was a result of, first, the difficulty in accessing the information and, second, maintaining the company's role of preserving state affairs as a state-owned company. He stated,

...When fatalities are not civilians [but security personnel], the story is closed because getting that information is difficult, especially when compared to ordinary people, where information can be easily accessed... [In such cases the] terror is targeted, and most of the

people who are targeted are not really the ordinary people who we [could] milk easily [for] information. (Steve, KBC, Interview on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2018).

Jessica working for the same media company confirmed this statement, stating that they rely on obtaining information from civilians, as it is easier, and they only report on what the state chooses to distribute, as they are not concerned with investigating further or including other voices, such as those of security experts. She says,

...When it happens [a terror attack], we go to the site, we interview victims, we get interviews from the government officials, we get interviews from the community, from the Red Cross. That is the much we do. After the terrorist attack we can follow the families up to just some level and then that is it. (Jessica, KBC, Interview on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2018).

From the excerpt above, it is evident that the state-owned media company may withhold some information due to discretion, in support of the government, via self-censorship, especially during the breaking news phase. Also, the privately-owned media companies seem to focus on prioritising news values over contextualizing the terror attacks, which steers terrorism coverage, especially in the breaking news stage, towards *conflict escalating* reporting. This, according to a Harry, also results from the authorities' reluctance to provide information. He describes coverage in the breaking news phase of a terror attack as an experience that entails,

...shooting in the dark because authorities are not willing to give you that information to begin with, because you'll expose their soft underbelly ... that's the kind of challenge we face [at the breaking news stage]. So, the first day is usually just saying what it is that is happening. We hear there's a terror attack, so what has happened? You rely solely on what the officers will tell you or what the authorities will tell you, because [you need]

confirmation. You cannot get authoritative confirmation, for example, from sources on the ground. (Harry, Citizen TV, Interview on 27<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

He adds that,

When the story breaks is where we [discuss] what has happened, this is usually the most challenging part because most of the times when a story breaks in as far as terrorism is concerned, maybe we have had an attack somewhere, authorities are not ready to speak. Usually, they do a lot of you know... hiding information. (Harry, Citizen TV, Interview on 27<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

What was evident in the interview data was that Kenyan journalists do not really prioritize eyewitnesses or victim accounts in their coverage. While they mentioned interviewing victims, the majority of their responses focused on the state and security forces as the main sources of information. This was also evident in the textual analysis, as the Westgate attack was the only one that significantly included the voices of victims and eyewitnesses. This could be a result of three things: one, the introduction of anti-terror legislation that affected news media after the Westgate attack; two, the result of self-censorship that developed after the criticism the news media received for its coverage of the Westgate Mall attack (Media Council of Kenya 2014, p. 1) and three, a strained relationship with security forces after the Westgate Mall attack coverage, which exposed the looting and irresponsibility of the security forces, evident in the textual analysis, during the rescue mission. However, this was not the case in the Riverside/Dusit attack, which reflected more *securitization* subframes in the later conflict stages. This was perhaps due to the fact that it was the third terror attack and so the media had lost some interest in exploring it extensively.



In spite of the Riverside/Dusit attack lacking a multitude of voices in the later conflict stages, Jeremy says accessibility to information improves once the initial confusion of a terror attack subsides. From here, coverage tends to be more comprehensive and factual as there are more credible sources of information available, such as the rescue teams (Red Cross) and security experts; thus the reliance on security personnel for information is reduced. Harry also asserts that information from other credible source enriches how the media reports on terror, although most of the information pertaining to the terror attack remains focused on the effects and descriptions of the attack. He states,

The next day is usually the day we get the actual picture of what really transpired because, the battle assessment or damage assessment has already been done, and now [we] have gotten access to the area. The biggest challenge that we have as security journalists in the country is access. Sometimes you have heard about a story from a very reliable source, maybe an officer of a lower cadre, who cannot speak to the press or confirm, tells you something but then [you do not have] access to the people who can confirm and [or] sometimes access to the areas that have been attacked. (Harry, Citizen TV, Interview on 27<sup>th</sup> July 2018)

Additionally, some participants emphasized that the comprehensive coverage of terrorism occurred in later conflict stages. This was also evident in the textual analysis, where other sources such as security experts were incorporated into the narratives. Both Jeremy from *The Daily Nation* and Harry from Citizen TV stated that security experts and analysts were more useful to the press once the immediate effects of the terror attack had settled, which also gave them room to involve victims and their families for follow-up and aftermath stories. This introduction of human-interest aspects to the coverage was evident in both the Westgate Mall and Garissa University College attacks in the follow-up and aftermath phases.

However, Jessica and Steve from the state-owned media company KBC were explicit in outlining that things work differently for them at later stages of conflict. They do not delve into investigative reporting, as their role as a government institution only allows them to report on terror from a reactive point of view. Jessica states,

...mostly we report about terrorism events when they happen. We are just a reactive media, most of the time that is what we are. We don't do stories before and even if we do it's just once ...to warn Kenyans [when] there is an expected terrorist attack... (Jessica, KBC, Interview on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2018)

Thus, as a state-owned media company, KBC's coverage of terrorism does not include contextual information beyond the act of terror itself. Their focus remains on the superficial aspects of terrorism, victim accounts and government and political statements. They do not explore why the terror attack happened or try to make sense of it for their audience. Jessica states,

...after the terrorist attack we can follow the families up to just some level and then that is it. We don't have many follow up stories like what is happening in Somalia. What are our leaders doing about restoring peace...? Why are we having terrorist attacks...? What can we do as a country to prevent these attacks...? (Jessica, KBC, Interview on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2018)

She explains this as the stance that the state-owned media company takes because of its ownership and its role in supporting and personifying the government. They do not investigate further because they cannot contribute to any negative narratives that could diminish support for the government. She says,

... I think... why we don't really touch on terrorism and tell [the story] boldly, is because one, maybe we are the national broadcaster. Two, is our society, because you don't want to say these things are happening, you are going to shake Kenyans... as a government

institution ... you cannot just say it as it is, terrorism is still a delicate matter. (Jessica, KBC, Interview on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2018)

However, in contrast, the participants who work for the privately-owned media companies outlined that comprehensive follow-up stories were not only important in enriching how they report on terror, but also in carving out a niche for them as media houses, allowing them to play the watchdog role. Harry from Citizen TV asserts that follow-up stories allow him to look deeper into a terror attack, which has been his trademark as a journalist. He states that,

The thing that has cut the niche for me for example, at Citizen TV right now, is being able to do that follow up [story]... the first two days have answered the who, the what, and the where. So, the how and the why, is what you come to look for later on. By going deeper into it and investigating, sort of getting to more information on how this thing actually did happen (Harry, Citizen TV Interview on 27<sup>th</sup> July 2018)

Sam from The Nation Media group agrees with this statement and says a significant element of how the Kenyan news media reports on terror is through follow-up stories. He states that,

... if it is possible to get exclusive information on how it was planned, [even though] sometimes it is difficult to go that deep... we pose the questions of who is to blame? Were there security lapses? Were there laxities in some areas? Is someone or are there people who slept on their job? And basically, we also try to think deeper into them... or rather taking the story forward, in as far as the human face of it is concerned. (Sam, NTV, Interview on 6<sup>th</sup> July 2018)

However, participants from The Standard Group and The Nation Media Group say their follow-up stories tend to be limited to commemorating the anniversaries of specific attacks and following up with victims and their families. Thus, deeper narratives that could explore the “why” behind

terrorism in Kenya remain an area not extensively explored. This, David states, is due to the hostility of security personnel, who are unwilling to give out information and make it difficult for them to gather the information they need. He states that,

...We let it [the news story] lie there until the anniversary... until one year later, then we do a special coverage. That's all we do about it. (David, KTN, Interview on 11<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

Sam from The Nation Media Group states that follow-up stories remain confined to information that is easily accessible, which they revisit on a yearly basis. He affirms,

... [We] revisit the story almost every other time, probably on a yearly basis. Like you'll realize after the Westgate attack, almost every other year, we will go back and look [at] how things are moving on, how is the mall? Whether the security measures have been taking place, are they working? Also, if you remember the Garissa University College attack, we usually conduct some activities after every anniversary... we go there, we interrogate, [and] we look at how people are picking up pieces and moving forward. (Sam, NTV, Interview on 6<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

Steve from the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation outlines that beyond the challenges faced when reporting on terror, such as access to information, the Kenyan news media tend to focus on the visible effects of terrorism in order to increase viewership. However, he pointed out that as a state-owned media company, KBC does not rely on attracting advertisers but, alongside being the mouthpiece of government, focuses on meeting the needs of audiences. He states that,

...maybe to some extent we are a bit sensational. Of course, you feed into the need of the audience. (Steve, KBC, Interview on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2018).

He attributes this to the training and education of Kenyan journalists and the idea that audiences tend to consume information centred on the gruesome nature of terrorism, more than any other type of news content. This is a sentiment shared by Ogenga (2019b, pp. 23-27) and explored in Chapter 2. Ogenga argues that Kenyan media institutions train journalists to value western conceptualisations of journalism, especially the idea that “if it bleeds, it leads” and to prioritize news values, and this is partly responsible for coverage that is both sensationalist and inflammatory, especially when referring to terrorism and terror attacks.

Steve from KBC also asserts that this audience need coupled with journalists’ training tends to steer coverage towards *conflict escalating* reporting as journalists are taught that audiences expect several questions to be answered by the media, and answering these questions steers the direction of the news coverage towards sensationalism and violent discourses. He explains,

... The first question that comes in is, are people injured? Are people dead? What are the numbers? What is the extent? Basically, you answer to those [questions]. That is what you learn in school. (Steve, KBC, Interview on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2018).

The findings in the textual analysis indicate that the Kenyan news media generally tends to report on terrorism through a *conflict escalating* news frame, focusing on *politicization*, *sensationalism* and *securitization* subframes. The coverage highlighted fatalities, immediate effects of the attack and the voices of security personnel and political elites. The findings in this section attribute this to several factors that coincide with the process of framing around conflict situations highlighted by several scholars (Miller & Ross 2004; Scheufele 1999; Shoemaker & Reese 1996; Van Dijk 2015). As mentioned in Chapter 2 (Section 3.I), news frames during conflict situations tend to be limited in range, as a result of factors such as journalistic routines, familiarity of certain perspectives, interpretations, sources and the prioritization of some news frames over others. What

the interview data and textual analysis confirmed is that this is also the case in the Kenyan news media, as the framing of terrorism was limited to *conflict escalating* reporting because of the reliance on certain sources of information, journalistic routines (the urgency to break the story first in the Westgate Mall attack) and the familiarity of and preference for certain news frames over others. Furthermore, the saliency of the *securitization* news frame in all the terrorism coverage confirmed that journalists tend to favour easily available and retrievable conflict information, which shapes societal understandings of conflict towards war journalism, because these narratives are being reflected more than others (Miller & Ross 2004; Scheufele 1999)

To conclude this section on the participant perceptions of how the Kenyan news media reports on terror, five points can be highlighted as contributing towards war journalism/*conflict escalating reporting* in the Kenyan news media;

1. The Kenyan news media does not explore the “why” when it comes to reporting on terror. Instead the focus is on the “how” and “where,” which facilitates a surface-level understanding of terrorism.
2. Privately owned and state-owned media companies limit their coverage of terrorism to information that is easily accessible, retrievable and verifiable, because of legislative measures and the withholding of information by security forces and the state, which, according to the participants, promotes the saliency of some news frames over others.
3. *Conflict de-escalating reporting* news frames, such as *humanization*, tend to be more visible in the later stages of conflict, due to less time constraints which allow more perspectives and voices (such as security experts and ordinary people) to be present in the coverage.

4. The Kenyan news media is more reactive than proactive, which results in *conflict escalating reporting* and the saliency of the *securitization* subframe in the overall terrorism coverage.
5. Kenyan journalists and editors rely on western journalistic principles as a guide to their journalistic practice, partly due to their training and education and because of the familiarity of conflict news frames, which are steered by western conceptualisations of journalism and the prioritization of news values.

### 3. Participant Perceptions on the Systemic Structures and Factors that Influence How the Kenyan News Media Reports on Terror

As outlined in Chapter 3, systemic structures and factors have played a significant role in the practice of journalism in the Kenyan context. Furthermore, the complexity of terrorism in Kenya, colonisation, endemic corruption, and the political and social structures within which the Kenyan news media operates have all had a significant impact on the news media. When it comes to national security issues, the news media is under strict regulation, sustained through legislation and government control and pressure. This section outlines, from the perspective of Kenyan journalists and editors, the dynamics that influence how the Kenyan news media reports on terror. It is worth noting that while these systemic structures and factors are not unique to the African context, they tend to be characteristic of non-western media systems that rely on western conceptualisations of journalism within a post-colonial setting. Also, based on several studies conducted in non-western settings (Hussain 2016; Hussain & Rehman 2015b; Rawan & Hussain 2017), these systemic structures and factors are considered to be a contributing factor to the prevalence of war journalism in conflict reporting in non-western news media systems.

As explained in the textual analysis (chapter 5) and the previous section, *conflict escalating reporting* news frames tend to dominate coverage of terrorism in the Kenyan news media. Outside

of the prioritization of news values and western journalistic principles related to conflict news framing, many of the participants in this study have attributed this to eight systemic structures and factors, which they highlight as limiting to media freedoms and autonomy. These factors, outlined below, emerged from the semi-structured interviews conducted with Kenyan journalists and editors and fall under several themes. They are:

- Legislation;
- Access to information;
- Government pressure;
- Advertising and ownership;
- Company guidelines and protocols;
- Self-censorship;
- Personal safety; and
- Perceptions of terrorism

#### I. Legislation

The most dominant theme that emerged from the interview data was that legislation is a significant hindrance to how the Kenyan news media reports on terror, a sentiment shared by all the participants from the privately-owned media houses. According to most participants interviewed, anti-terror laws have been used to control content and bar the Kenyan press from extensively reporting on terror. Many of the participants highlight that these laws keep them from critiquing the state or highlighting any security lapses or shortcomings when reporting on specific terror attacks. Sam from The Nation Media Group asserts that,



.... After the 1998 attack on the US Embassy in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, a lot of things changed. The way people are reporting their stuff on terrorism and largely on security issues, [has changed as] there are Anti-Terror laws that are in place, that are governing the way we report on security matters. So, they go a long way in shaping the way we report such incidences. (Sam, NTV, Interview on 6<sup>th</sup> July 2018)

Additionally, some participants pointed out that significant changes in terms of the impact and consequences of legislation on the Kenyan press occurred in 2013, after the Westgate Mall attack. These changes resulted from coverage in which the news media critiqued the security and government response to the attack. According to David, from KTN, this critique was met with resistance from the government, which changed how their specific media house reports on terror, as both security personnel and the state stand in the way of the Kenyan news media, preventing them from fulfilling their “watchdog” function. He remarks,

Things have changed in this country. Sometime back, before 2013 [Westgate Mall attack], reporting about terrorism was easy, but because [of] incompetence. They [government] came up with laws that to some extent barred us from reporting about terrorism. We could not post pictures of Kenyan security forces attacked or bodies or stuff like that. We could not report about, the exact numbers of Kenyan security forces killed in Somalia, for example, and then we had these meetings with the department of defence... Every other time they [government] keep reminding you, these are national security matters. So, we get lost, in that thing, we feel we have a national duty to report, and again we have a national duty to protect the country from external aggression. (David, KTN, Interview on 11<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

Harry from Royal Media Services agrees that legislation limits the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror, and this hinders the fulfilment of their duties as the fourth estate. He says the government uses legislation to hide information, which limits how far media practitioners can explore certain narratives when it comes to terrorism. He affirms,

Legislation does a lot because in 2017 there is a bill, the security bill that was passed and became law. It sorts of limits us in as far as going outside there and finding that story because sometimes we have been given a story, but then again it entails, for example, naming names, and that is where the rubber meets the road in this country... You could easily get into trouble because sometimes the authorities are successful in as far as hiding a particular incident. (Harry, Citizen TV, Interview on 27<sup>th</sup> July 2018)

He asserts that the legislation does more harm than good for the Kenyan press, as it restricts more than it protects, proving to be useful to journalists only when they need access to secured areas. He says,

In my experience I have not seen instances where it has helped. Okay, instances where it has helped is, we have for example, the press card that is recognized by the Media Council of Kenya, that grants you access even in areas that are crime scenes as long as it is a matter of public interest. That is sort of a shot in the arm as far as this thing is concerned. (Harry, Citizen TV, Interview on 27<sup>th</sup> July 2018)

These findings suggest that not much has changed for the Kenyan news media since the colonial era, as legislation is still being used as a tool for control and restriction (Tomaselli 2003, pp. 429-430), as mentioned in Chapter 3 (section 2.3). The consequences of this in conflict coverage take shape as a contributing factor towards the prevalence of *conflict escalating reporting* news frames, as openness and any coverage outside of what is deemed to be in support of national interests is

discouraged. Furthermore, the prevalence of subframes such as *politicization* and *securitization* falls in line within this consequence as legislative control stemming from the post-colonial era – specifically the focus on promoting political agendas in order to encourage a Kenyan identity and unite the nation – which has resulted in the saliency of the voices of security personnel and political elites over those of ordinary Kenyans in conflict coverage. The coercive, oppressive and restrictive nature of government regulations stemming from colonialism (King'ara 2014; Mak'Ochieng 1996), tends to encourage *conflict escalating reporting*, especially for the privately owned media companies.

## II. Access to Information

As highlighted in the previous section, many of the participants identified access to information as a significant obstacle for many Kenyan journalists and editors, as security officers and the government withhold information. Jessica mentioned that access tends to negatively impact how and what information journalists cover when reporting on terror, as security officers can be evasive. She states that security officers make it difficult for journalists to access important information during a terror attack, limiting how far they can take conflict coverage. She affirms,

They [security officers] really play a very important part because, those people who even manage to get those stories, have to be [or] have a lot of confidence with security officers. And if you [do] have that confidence, you [end up] just report[ing] according to what the security offices want you to report. Meaning you won't show us the true colours [of the terror event] (Jessica, KBC, Interview on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2018).

Similarly, Sam from The Nation Media Group asserts that,

It's becoming a bit difficult [to get information from security forces] ever since Kenyan troops entered Somalia in 2011... information from security operators have not been very forthcoming. (Sam, NTV, Interview on 6<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

These sentiments are shared by David from The Standard Group, who states that information from security personnel,

...is never there, it's never there. They decide. They'll decide 20 [victims] today, tomorrow 10, 15 and we don't have a way of independently verifying this. That's why I told you from the beginning, what we normally do [is] track down victim's families, that's the only way we can say there's a burial here, there's a funeral arrangement there. So, we can get to at least know some numbers. (David, KTN, Interview on 11<sup>th</sup> of July 2018).

Meanwhile, Jeremy from The Nation Media Group and Harry from Royal Media Services state that access to information and security officers is dependent on building a relationship with security officers. Harry states that where journalists have a good relationship with security personnel, they tend to have more access to information. He says,

For instance, if you have some friendship of some sort with officers, establishing contact and establishing the trust of police officers in the top tier and the lower cadre, you're highly likely to get a lot of information in as far as confirmation of news stories is concerned. But then again if you are just starting out for example, you do not have those contacts, you get to have it a bit rough. (Harry, Citizen TV, Interview on 27<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

These findings on the access to information suggest that the “gatekeeping” process during conflict situations is primarily in the hands of the state and the security forces, which is reminiscent of the colonial and post-independence eras. Moreover, the findings suggest that a

peaceful co-existence between the state, security forces and the news media is more dependent on alignment with state interests over responsible journalistic practice. This could be attributed to the initial relationship created between the state and the news media in the post-colonial era, when media owners aligned with state interests to protect their own business interests (Heath 1997; Hornsby 2013; Winsbury 2000).

The consequence of this for conflict news frames is that the state and security forces are able to consciously and subconsciously contribute to story lines. According to Gamson (1989, p. 158), the saliency of certain news frames over others in conflict reporting can also result from key sources withholding certain information intentionally, in order to control the information communicated to audiences, with the intent of controlling the message. Based on the textual analysis findings, the Kenyan news evidently leads and closes the storyline by reporting mainly on the information provided by the state, while the state suggests the storyline by limiting the options available. As a result, conflict reporting favours the goals and interests of certain parties while creating a reliance on *conflict escalating reporting* news frames. Furthermore, Kenyan journalists and editors perceive this restriction and withholding of certain information as an indicator that the most important information and storylines are outside of their grasp (Gamson 1989, pp. 158-159). This idea is also evident in the participant responses and textual analysis, as it is clear the Kenyan news media does not afford other sources, such as victims, security experts and eyewitnesses, the same importance as the state and security personnel, which keeps them confined within conflict escalating news frames.

### III. Government Pressure

A factor that stood out in the participant interviews was government pressure, in the form of threats and intimidation, by the government itself, security officers and political elites. Several participants recounted events and instances where threats had been made towards them either by security officials or those in significant positions within the government. Jessica, recounts witnessing these threats towards a privately-owned media house. She narrates,

I remember a certain media house wanted to air a story about terrorism and what the government is doing or not doing. But they were told if they were going to air that story, they are going to be switched off... Those people who maybe have contacts with the terrorist organisers or the Al-Shabaab leaders and they want to give us that story, get a lot of intimidation from the [security] forces and the government or whoever is in charge. (Jessica, KBC, Interview on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2018).

Sam affirms,

Sometimes we do get instructions from higher authorities, on what to report and what not to report, especially when it comes to matters [of] security or even terrorism attacks. They get their own share of pressure from the government agencies because even as much as we say our media, some of them are independent, and especially those that are not directly managed by government, there is a very close link between them and the government. (Sam, NTV, Interview on 6<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

Similarly, David confirms that government pressures have implications on the media as a business. He states,

Most of the advertisements which are the backbone of how these media [companies] are running come from government advertisements and all that. So, when they are threatened

with embargos and sanctions... you can imagine the kind of pressure that comes down to us as editors. (David, KTN, Interview on 11<sup>th</sup> of July 2018).

Based on personal experience, Sam reiterates that government pressures have implications even when broadcasting live during a terror attack. He states that,

I remember when there was an attack at Garissa University, and I think our media house was one of the first to be at the scene of the attack. We began live coverage and I think we rubbed the government the wrong way. [So] personally, I began receiving calls from my seniors, [saying] ‘you are going too far... I mean, I think we are going to be attacked, probably our station is going to be shut down, so exercise caution.’ At some point we had to drop our live coverage and concentrate more on recording the event that would later be edited. (Sam, NTV, Interview on 6<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

In many ways government pressures and control tend to encourage *conflict escalating reporting* news frames, as they lead to self-censorship and reliance on facts and figures readily available at the scene of the terror attack. This is evident in the textual analysis, where much of the coverage on all three terror attacks was reliant on political statements and information pertaining to the immediate effects of the terror attacks.

#### IV. Advertising and Ownership

Advertising and ownership stood out as a theme on which participants had mixed perspectives. Participants from the state-owned media company, KBC, were explicit in highlighting that because they are not reliant on advertising revenue, they do not have the same pressures as those in the private sector. Jessica affirms,

KBC's structure is a government institution, we are a parastatal. We have an obligation to the government and the public of Kenya. So, we don't really report stories because we are looking for money [or] we are looking for advertisers. We report objectively, inform Kenyans, educate them, and entertain them because we have a mandate as a public broadcaster to do that and also for free. Not really to attract advertisement. (Jessica, KBC, Interview on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2018).

Similarly, Jeremy and Sam assert that ownership does not significantly influence how the media house works, especially when reporting on terror. Sam, however, mentions that ownership and advertising implications occur in terrorism coverage only when there is a negative impact on the interests of advertisers or when the media house's relationship with the government is interfered with. He articulates,

Not many a times [do media owners influence news content], at least not on every other thing that is recorded. But [on] issues that directly touch on advertisements, directly touch on how media houses relate to government. When it gets to that point, even politics, when it gets to that stage then they realise maybe the stakes of the company are at risk or interests of the company are at risk, then they come in. Many a times and especially on issues that are less sensitive, we are allowed, and we are given space to work. (Sam, NTV, Interview on 6<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

However, Harry had a different opinion, stating that,

Advertising and ownership does [influence how we report on terror] because for example, let's face it, Safaricom, is the biggest advertiser in the private world. An operation has been conducted in Garissa and this vehicle has been caught and this vehicle has in it a lot of sim cards belonging to Safaricom, the moment you mention such a line, then the advertisers



threaten to pull out their advertisements. Sometimes you want to report on something but the ownership of the media house that you are in does not want it out and it will never see the light of day. (Harry, Citizen TV, Interview on 27<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

While the consequences of advertising and ownership may have a significant influence on news broadcasts, it was not particularly evident in the textual analysis as there were no indicators that suggested the omission of information that could essentially affect advertising revenue or ownership of the media companies. However, the differences between the coverage in the Westgate Mall attack, which offered more state criticism, and the other two attacks which barely conducted investigative reporting may suggest that journalists were self-censoring in order to avoid ruffling feathers.

#### V. Company Guidelines and Protocols

In both the state-owned and privately-owned media companies, participants pointed out that when it comes to terrorism, company guidelines and protocols on conflict reporting tend to be flexible, due to the unpredictable nature of terror events and how quickly information spreads on social media. Jeremy attributes this to the demand for certain information by audiences, especially if it is already on social media. In a case where information circulates through social media, the mainstream media is usually pulled towards addressing or confirming the accuracy of the information. This tends to steer the direction of the coverage as the information is already out there and audiences rely on the mainstream media to verify it. Jessica from the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) states,

Considering the fact that as we speak today, most of the audience [and] most of the viewers get this information from social media, which is basically uncensored and unregulated...as

media you, are guided by the public good. So basically you, you tailor your product to suit your audience. (Jessica, KBC, Interview on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2018).

Sam also affirms that company guidelines and protocols, particularly in the area of time constraints and production pressures, tend to go out the window when reporting on terror. He says,

There's a lot of leeway in as far as reporting on terror is concerned because not a lot of people understand what really goes on in the underworld. So, if you are following up on a story, for example, where there is extra-judicial killings or forceful disappearance of persons in a particular area and terror is involved... Sometimes it is officers getting these people according to the allegations that we get... Sometimes people are being radicalised, leave their homes, and just go. People have disappeared. So, you don't really get to play by the rules in as far as time is concerned because the story is ready when it's ready. You can't quite rush some stories. (Sam, NTV, Interview on 6<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

Findings from the textual analysis suggested that social media exert a strong influence that journalists cannot ignore. While most of the participants referred to broadcast news, the textual analysis also demonstrated the social media influences, as the coverage of all three terror attacks either mentioned or quoted social media accounts, in particular Twitter. With regards to time constraints and production pressures, as mentioned earlier, there was evidence of breaking news urgency as some of the information shared, especially in the Westgate Mall and Garissa University College attack, was contradictory and seemed rushed.

## VI. Self-censorship

When it came to matters pertaining to self-censorship, participant views tended to differ, as some believed self-censorship was not an option as legislation was already restrictive, and thus there was no room to practise self-censorship. David states that,

It's not a question of self-censorship. I think we are held in the neck by the law. That's it. I mean, there are things you cannot report about anymore. (David, KTN, Interview on 11<sup>th</sup> of July 2018).

However, Sam states that self-censorship cannot be avoided as it has consequences for the personal lives of journalists and editors. He states that self-censorship tends to dictate just how far the news media can go in covering terrorism-related content,

[self-censorship] is something that we cannot avoid, we are in a country where not just security of its citizens is at risk, but even those in leadership. So sometimes you realise that maybe going this far will probably endanger my life, the life of my family and therefore you take precaution. (Sam, NTV, Interview on 6<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

Meanwhile, Harry points out that while he hasn't yet encountered it, it would be something he would consider depending on the context. He articulates,

I wouldn't put a finger into it, but that is something I would consider doing. If for example, I have information that could jeopardise my career, could jeopardise my life for example, I wouldn't put it outside there. Weighing the scale is something that we do. But then again, sometimes it really depends on how you want to look at it. The context. (Harry, Citizen TV, Interview on 27<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

## VII. Personal Safety

Additionally, personal safety was a factor that was identified as an influence on how the Kenyan news media reports on terror, although participants interpreted this in different ways. David approached it from the angle of media safety at the scene, and its influence on access to first-hand information. He said,

... in terms of personal safety and security, there is increased improvement. Media houses are re-thinking about sending their reporters to different areas. So, if we feel that our journalists are not protected well, then we don't dispatch our people to go to either Somalia or to the border towards Somalia, and in Kenya or Lamu as it were. (David, KTN, Interview on 11<sup>th</sup> of July 2018).

Jeremy and David also approached it from the angle of perceived threats, acknowledging that both the political elite and terror groups can be a huge threat to journalists. While David acknowledges that he has not received any threats pertaining to terrorism, he points out that certain stories attract more threats than others, which steers how far coverage can go. He affirms that,

It depends on what you are working on. Stories that touch on murder you get threats, stories that touch on big personalities, in political circles and government, you get threats. [In terms of reporting on terror], either from the terrorists themselves or the government, no we haven't [received threats]. I have not [experienced] had any of those. (David, KTN, Interview on 11<sup>th</sup> of July 2018).

Harry disclosed an example of how much influence personal safety could have on a journalist when reporting on terror, saying,

In terrorism, yes and no. we've had a writer, there's a lady who wrote for a county magazine who is now in exile because she wrote about a terror group, the Al-Shabaab, and then she

started receiving emails, because you know in your article you leave down your email address. So, she started receiving threats in that particular email address. She couldn't trace where exactly it was coming from, so she thought it was not very safe for her to continue operating in that particular place, so she took off. We get, [instances where] you do a security story that touches on a particular person, especially if you have touched a raw nerve of either a criminal or someone in the high ranks, [even] as far as authorities are concerned, [and] they would try to silence you. (Harry, Citizen TV, Interview on 27<sup>th</sup> July 2018)

Both self-censorship and personal safety contribute significantly to the prevalence of *conflict escalating reporting* because they tend to limit journalists, particularly around exploring *conflict de-escalating reporting* subframes such as *we'ness*, *responsibility* and *compatibility*. The fear surrounding reporting on terror from the perspective of inclusion, in this case all the voices of the parties involved in terrorism in Kenya, their grievances and different narratives on terrorism, hinders *conflict de-escalating reporting* news frames. This is because journalists fear being accused of colluding with enemies of the state, making it difficult to report on the conflict itself as the problem.

### VIII. Perceptions of Terrorism

A significant theme that stood out was the perception of terrorism, for both the journalists and editors. One participant highlighted the tug-of-war that is present when faith and patriotism converge in reporting on terror. Harry outlined how, in his experience, it is difficult to remain neutral when coverage links terrorism to religion. He explained that for him and other journalists who share the Muslim faith, their quest is always to correct the superficial interpretations of

terrorism, steering how they frame and report on terror. However, he mentioned that sometimes there is a battle between religious beliefs and patriotism as the societal views on terrorism, regardless of whether they are highlighting injustices, tend to question the media's position in the fight against terror. As a result of this and the shared sentiment by society that terrorism is an injustice against the state, journalists tend to steer clear of investigative narratives that may make them appear to be on the wrong side of the 'fight.' He states,

When it comes to investigative journalism in terrorism it is the hardest place to find yourself, because you have a population that feels that terrorism is a very bad thing, so if you come up and say that policemen killed people, whom they suspected to be terrorists, and they were not terrorists, then you become an enemy number one. People don't want to listen. So, it becomes very hard for people to be investigating stories about terrorism because there is a public perception that terror is bad, either we are taking shortcuts or not, if it's bad it is bad. So, you cannot report. (Harry, Citizen TV, Interview on 27<sup>th</sup> July 2018)

He goes on further to state that regardless of the societal pressures to remain patriotic and in support of the state, his religious beliefs, and the linking of terrorism to Islam, still tend to drive how he reports on terror events. He asserts,

I'm a Muslim and [it is] the reason as to why I chose the security and crime line. First, the first time I started doing security and crime is when back in 2013, there was a raid in Masjid Musa by police officers ...The way the media reported that thing that day sort of gave a condemnation to Islam. I mean this is my religion. [So] I put my foot forward to go and demystify this information that is moving around, that is linking terror and Islam, and tried to you know, separate the two and that is why for example, I do that. So, much as I report on terrorism and what exactly is happening, I actually go a step further to just demystify

and just try to make people understand that that is not the religion. (Harry, Citizen TV, Interview on 27<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

The perception of terrorism differed between the participants, primarily because of differences in faith. Many participants were clear about prioritizing their patriotism in coverage, which was also evident in the textual analysis where much of the descriptive language referred to and/or portrayed ethnic and sectarian division pertaining to terrorism. This, according to Lynch and Galtung (2010, pp. 6-16), is characteristic of war journalism and tends to influence exclusion and inclusion biases in society. According to Cottle (2004, p. 77), narratives that derive or portray feelings of patriotism, a communal identity or national pride, will generally favour *conflict escalating reporting* news frames because they create “us versus them” narratives both rhetorically and symbolically. Therefore, as long as Kenyan journalists perceive themselves as patriotic first, *conflict escalating reporting* news frames will be a part of their coverage of terrorism.

#### 4. Conclusion

In conclusion, the findings in this chapter indicate that Kenyan journalists and editors tend to be central to the direction of terrorism coverage. In some instances, this is evident through the lack of detachment, both as patriotic entities and as professionals, when reporting on terror in the Kenyan context. Many of the participants did not mention western journalistic ideals such as objectivity and fairness or independence as factors that govern their coverage of terrorism, highlighting that the Kenyan media is not entirely independent, despite its ownership patterns. Additionally, the systemic structures and factors evident in these findings tend to steer the coverage of terrorism in the Kenyan news media towards *conflict escalating reporting* news frames by hindering media freedom and agency, while highlighting just how much control the government has on the news

media despite its evolution and growth since the colonial and post-independence eras. Through the use of legislation, government pressure, patriotic expectations and advertising and ownership patterns, the Kenyan news media is controlled, restricted and its watchdog function minimised, in order to serve national security interests.

Similarly, the role perceptions of Kenyan journalists and editors in terrorism coverage encourage the prevalence of *conflict escalating reporting* news frames, as Kenyan journalists and editors seem to place a great deal of importance on the state and security forces as the main sources of information and prioritize patriotism above responsible conflict coverage. Moreover, the most significant differences between how the state-owned and privately owned media companies view their roles in conflict coverage is that the state-owned media company willingly plays the role of government mouthpiece, similar to its role in the colonial era, while the privately-owned media companies are coerced to play a supporting role, through self-censorship and their limiting beliefs around the types of sources that they can access. Furthermore, the findings indicate that, through legislation and by controlling access to information, the state and security agencies have taken over the ‘gatekeeping’ role, steering and influencing storylines, which steers the news media towards *conflict escalating reporting*. However, some unexpected themes emerged from the data, highlighting social media as a source that steers demand for certain information, giving some influencing power to audiences and their demands for information, which favours some news frames over others.

All in all, it is evident that many of the factors that influence how the Kenyan news media reports on terror come from a restrictive standpoint. This, coupled with a lack of creativity in seeking out other sources of information, has left the Kenyan news media in a position that favours *conflict escalating reporting* news frames, or war journalism. Some of these systemic factors and structures



are deeply embedded in Kenyan societal fabric and institutions, while others have resulted from western conceptualisations of journalism. However, the most significant contributing factor to the prevalence of *conflict escalating reporting* news frames is the reliance on easily accessible information, the newsworthiness of terrorism and familiar conflict reporting news frames that stem from western traditions around mainstream journalism.

The next chapter addresses the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan context when reporting on terror. It connects media freedoms and autonomy, as a result of the systemic structures and factors that influence how the Kenyan news media reports on terror; peace journalism principles and critiques, as it pertains to its practice in the news media; and assesses whether peace journalism can be implemented in the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror.

## Chapter 7: Assessing the Viability of Peace Journalism in the Kenyan News Media when Reporting on Terror.

### 1. Introduction

This chapter assesses the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror. It highlights that peace journalism, and the “good journalism” approach, offers tangible and practical “tools” that Kenyan journalists can utilise when reporting on terror, especially with regards to language use, word choices and framing. However, this chapter also emphasizes that as much as peace journalism would be useful for the Kenyan news media, its application and practicality will remain disconnected, because it is prescriptive in nature and does not accommodate the compromised media freedoms and the structural constraints that Kenyan journalists face. Moreover, because the Kenyan news media is restricted and controlled, through legislation and other measures, peace journalism will not achieve all its ambitious aims, unless these constraints are remedied. Therefore, peace journalism will only manage to translate partly, because of the unique challenges that Kenyan journalists face.

Thus, highlighting the findings gathered through the textual analysis and semi-structured interviews with Kenyan editors and journalists, and assessing them alongside the core principles of peace journalism (Galtung 2003), using the “good journalism” school of thought, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first contextualizes and briefly answers the following research questions:

RQ1. How does the Kenyan news media report on terror? and;

RQ2. From the perspective of Kenyan journalists and editors, what systemic factors and structures influence how the Kenyan news media reports on terror?

The second section addresses RQ 3. Is peace journalism a viable alternative for the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror? The last section concludes by summarizing the broader thesis, offering recommendations and discussing ways forward for future research.

The analysis in this chapter builds on the discussions in Chapters 2 and 3, examining the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror. It focuses on the applicability of peace journalism, to the Kenyan news media system as an alternative way of reporting on terror, contributing to peacebuilding and the processes of reconciliation and de-escalation using the news media as a peace-promoting tool. It consolidates the findings of the textual analysis of two Kenyan newspapers and the interview findings, representative of views of Kenyan journalists and editors, critically assessing whether peace journalism is a viable alternative for the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror. It identifies war journalism/*conflict escalating reporting* as the dominant news frame used when reporting on terror in the Kenyan news media and attributes its prevalence to the adoption of western journalistic principles and the systemic remnants of colonisation in the Kenyan news media. It also draws on the principles of peace journalism, using the “good journalism” school of thought to discuss the implications on the implementation of peace journalism in the Kenyan context

This chapter proposes that peace journalism as an alternative way of reporting on terror offers a broader perspective to the understanding of terrorism in Kenyan society by including different perspectives, contexts, goals and issues, creating a better understanding of conflict situations that could lead to conflict transformation (Galtung 2003; McGoldrick & Lynch 2006; Youngblood 2016). It also acknowledges that despite the noble goals of peace journalism, some scholars contend that it is not practical when reporting on conflict (Hanitzsch 2007; Loyn 2007). This they attribute to several factors: the structural conditions that influence the news production process, the context

within which the news media system exists and the autonomy and independence of media practitioners and companies, all of which limit the scope of conflict reporting (Cottle 2004; Hackett 2006).

Peace journalism proponents have addressed these criticisms, highlighting that peace journalism is not about advocacy but more about taking perspectives that give equal opportunities to peace-oriented narratives in conflict reporting (Lynch 2014; McGoldrick & Lynch 2006). This study echoes the arguments for peace journalism, which contend that it doesn't require a complete departure from mainstream journalism, but rather a subtle shift that brings the focus to peace and people while reporting on conflict (Kempf 2003; Shinar 2007). Therefore, this chapter assesses whether this subtle shift is viable in the Kenyan news media when on reporting on terror, despite the systemic and journalistic limitations on the news media and the challenges that result from compromised media freedoms in Kenya.

In order to carry out this assessment, this chapter outlines three significant themes that categorize and summarize the findings in Chapter 6, indicating why the Kenyan news media reports on terror predominantly from a *conflict escalating reporting* news frame. These three themes are:

1. Media freedoms;
2. Patriotic roles and perceptions; and
3. Ownership and independence

It then assesses the implications of these themes for the implementation of peace journalism in the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror. These themes sum up the findings in Chapters 5 and 6, considering the effects of Kenya's colonial and political legacies on the practice of journalism alongside the western traditions around mainstream journalism that influence conflict reporting and guide the Kenyan news media. Also, this analysis aims to contribute to the body of research

on “hybrid” peace journalism, discussed in Chapter 2, and in particular the idea that “African media should stay true to local nuances and contexts” (Ogenga 2019b, p. 29). The main aim of this is to add to the discussions on the need for African-centred journalism, which offers African solutions for African problems.

Furthermore, this chapter aims to bring to the forefront a different perspective on peace journalism studies by highlighting African contexts, which have not been extensively researched in qualitative peace journalism studies. It highlights the factors that influence the Kenyan news media, such as media freedoms, the newsworthiness of war journalism and the role perceptions of media practitioners, all of which need to be considered when implementing peace journalism, especially in non-western contexts.

The next section answers the research questions then leads into the analysis and thesis conclusions.

## 2. Answering the Research Questions

In the two previous chapters, the findings revealed how the Kenyan news media reports on terror and why it reports on terror the way that it does. Newspapers analysed for the prevalence of war or peace journalism showed that the Kenyan news media reports on terror primarily through a war journalism/*conflict escalating reporting* lens. From the three terror attacks analysed, the Kenyan news media primarily reflected four *conflict escalating reporting* subframes - *securitization*, *politicization*, *otherization* and *sensationalism* - all of which highlighted different elements of the conflict coverage. Both the newspapers analysed were privately owned, as there is no state-owned newspaper, and reflected similar coverage and content, while displaying two different role perceptions. *The Standard*, which has been aligned with the state since the colonial era, as mentioned in Chapter 3, took on a more patriotic role, while *The Nation* took on more of a watchdog

role. However, this watchdog role remained within the confines of highlighting the state's discrepancies and lapses during the Westgate Mall attack and rescue mission and did not necessarily extend to including other perspectives, contexts or background information on terrorism itself.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Kenyan news media's role has shifted between being a watchdog and a guard dog in both the colonial and post-independence eras. This has created a tug-of-war with regards to the role that the news media plays, especially in conflict situations, and is reflected in the coverage of the three terror attacks. Also, mainstream journalistic traditions such as the responsibility of being a 'gatekeeper,' impartiality and objectivity are core elements of journalistic practice in Kenya (Ogenga 2012, pp. 1-5), but seem to also take on more laxity in conflict coverage, as patriotism and patriotic role perceptions are considered more important by the state and by the majority of the participants in this study. However, despite these views the data does suggest that there is no consistency with the role the news media plays during conflict situations, evident in some of the differences between the coverage of the three terror attacks, as the introduction of legislative measures seem to have distorted journalistic practices. For example, during the Westgate Mall attack, the data shows that the news media played a watchdog function, but during the Garissa University College attack and the Riverside/Dusit attack it was evident that this role changed to being a mouthpiece of the state, through narratives offered, controlled and steered by the state. This was evident through the media shifting to just reporting facts without interpretation, relying on political statements and actors and refraining from investigative reporting because of self-censorship and fears around legislative consequences.

Moreover, outside of these two different roles, the coverage of the terror attacks relied on similar sources of information, primarily the government and security forces, extending slightly to security

experts/researchers and ordinary people in the later conflict stages. Based on these findings, it also became apparent that the gatekeepers of the information pertaining to terrorism, especially the facts and figures, were the government and security forces, who according to some participants would either withhold the information or give false information. What resulted from this, evident in the subsequent subframes that emerged from the textual analysis, is that the Kenyan news media, similar to the assertion made by Maslog, Lee and Kim (2006, p. 20), treated conflict as a ‘news value’, relying predominantly on the violence and violent discourses that were easily accessible to them.

However, a slight shift in the overall coverage of the Garissa University College attack, which reflected both *conflict escalating* and *conflict de-escalating reporting* subframes, due to other factors such as proximity and accessibility to the attack, indicated that there is an opportunity for the inclusion of other perspectives, voices and the utilization of *conflict de-escalating reporting* news frames in the coverage of terrorism in Kenya. The reliance of the press on victim and eyewitness accounts contributed significantly to the *humanization* subframe and steered the coverage towards *conflict de-escalating reporting*. According to Osman (2015), accessibility of the Garissa University College attack was an issue because the Kenyan news media did not have journalists on the ground and were unaware of the attack for a couple of hours. Therefore, the *conflict de-escalating reporting* could have occurred as a by-product and not as the intention of the news media.

Overall, the Kenyan news media reported on terror primarily through four lenses in all three terror attacks and across all four conflict stages. The findings showed that much of the coverage occurred through the *securitization* subframe, which was significantly influenced by legislation and the sources of information, the security personnel and the government, steering the coverage towards

the number of casualties, both verified and unverified, and the immediate effects of the attack. During the Westgate Mall attack in particular, coverage revolved around dramatized and sensationalised descriptions of the chaos and scenes related to the attack, criticism of the military response and victim and eyewitness accounts. With the Garissa University College attack, most of the coverage relied on relaying information that the government was providing, which may have been the result of legislation that had been put in place to monitor and control the news media around national security issues after the coverage of the Westgate Mall attack.

However, with the Riverside/Dusit attack, the news media fell back into sensationalist coverage, describing the scenes, focusing on casualties, and relaying victim and eyewitness accounts. What was significantly different between the Riverside/Dusit attack and the Westgate Mall attack was that the coverage of the Westgate Mall attack was escalatory but more investigative. For example, there was substantial criticism of the rescue mission, theft by security forces and the confusion by and from the state and security personnel. On the other hand, the Riverside/Dusit attack coverage was escalatory because of its significant focus on the *securitization* subframe, highlighting the immediate effects of the attack and exhibiting saliency on the perspective of the security personnel and their voices. This can be attributed to the fact that the information was easily accessible and still within the legislative confines. Therefore, while there was the introduction of legislation that potentially affected the Riverside/Dusit attack coverage, the findings suggest that legislation was geared more towards restricting and controlling any criticism of the state and security forces and not necessarily protecting victims and influencing responsible coverage.

In all three terror attacks, coverage also focused heavily on the *politicization* subframe, prioritizing politically affiliated victims, and focusing mostly on statements by political elites. In all three attacks, the political wrangling between the government and the opposition was prioritized,



highlighting terrorism and its effects through a political lens. The *otherization* subframe also stood out, as ethnic and religious differences were either implied or at the centre of most of the terror coverage, creating “us versus them” narratives between Kenyans and Somalis, and Christians and Muslims. In many ways, how the Kenyan news media reports on terror replicates the divisive colonial and political legacies that are embedded in Kenyan societal fabric along tribal and religious lines (Papacharissi & Oliveira 2008, pp. 52-53). According to Cottle (2004, p. 7), this demonstrates just how much political, historical and cultural conditions can influence and steer the news media towards war journalism. The consequence of this is that the Kenyan news media offers a superficial narrative of terrorism, devoid of context or background information that could foster any insight on terrorism in Kenya, and creates even more division within society.

To conclude this section, both the textual analysis and interview data revealed that the Kenyan news media reports on terror primarily through a *conflict escalating reporting* news frame, with the *securitization* subframe being most salient in all three terror attacks. This, according to the interview data, is a result of the introduction of legislation which is both restrictive and controlling, and the lack of access to information from the government and the security forces.

The next section explores in more detail the systemic structures and factors identified by Kenyan journalists and editors, which they identify as influential in steering the Kenyan news media towards escalatory conflict reporting.

## 2.1. The systemic structures and Factors that influence how the Kenyan News Media reports on terror

The interview findings highlighted the importance of understanding conflict reporting within local, cultural and historical contexts. They demonstrated how these dynamics, in the Kenyan context, take shape systemically and influence media freedoms, the autonomy and independence of journalism and steer storylines around conflict towards *conflict escalating reporting* news frames. From the detailed interviews with Kenyan editors and journalists, eight systemic factors and structures were identified as the most influential when reporting on terror, which are summarized into three categories. These are:

1. Media freedoms;
2. Patriotic roles and perceptions; and
3. Ownership and independence

Regarding media freedoms, Kenyan journalists and editors highlighted legislation and the security and political sources of power as the major contributing factor to how they report on terror. They identified control, restriction and censorship, with regards to conflict information, as a major stumbling block to their independence and autonomy when reporting on terror, which according to Cottle (2004, p. 2) is consistent with the prevalence of war journalism in conflict reporting. Also, Cottle (2004, pp. 2-7) points out that as the principal convener and conveyer of conflict information, the news media tends to be the first point of restriction by the state during conflict situations, which limits the array of voices and views that can be heard. He asserts that this then leads into less critical media representations, the omission of news frames that would offer a different perspective and reliance on the news values of conflict and violence. In the Kenyan news media, these controls and constraints condition the operations of media professionals and

organizations, leading to the saliency of escalatory coverage, which resonates with deep-seated news values and encourages dramatized and sensationalized accounts of the terror attacks.

Role perceptions, particularly around patriotism and a unified national identity, have also led to divisive narratives, according to the findings in this study, specifically perpetuating “us versus them” narratives and creating a news media that falls in line behind the government, both willingly and unwillingly. Both the textual analysis and the interview findings demonstrate how the government and security forces have become the “primary definers” of storylines around war journalism, creating a reliance on elite voices and statements (Cottle 2004; Galtung & Ruge 1965), and steering coverage in the Kenyan news media towards war journalism when reporting on terror. In some ways, such as through legislation and government pressure, journalism in Kenya is weakened institutionally, but in other ways, such as through the reliance on familiar conflict news frames and patriotism, the Kenyan news media is weakened by media practitioners themselves. This therefore begs the question of whether peace journalism, which at the least requires some level of autonomy and creativity through seeking other perspectives, can be implemented in the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror.

Consistent with previous studies, the three categories outlined above are explored in greater detail in the next section.

### I. Journalistic practice, Media Freedoms and State Control

Previous studies of peace journalism in Kenya, such as those carried out by Kisang (2014) and Ogenga (2012), highlight the adoption of western traditions around mainstream journalism as one of the main contributing factors to war journalism in Kenya when reporting on terror. Identifying capitalism and commercialism, which shape the broader societal structures that influence news production, as the main influencing factors, these studies argue that war journalism is the result of prioritising viewership and monetary gains and treating conflict as a ‘news value.’ While this study does not dispute this, it contributes a different perspective to the prevalence of war journalism when reporting on terror, which includes the remnants of political and historical legacies. Based on the findings in this study, media freedoms and state control, replicating political and historical legacies, are identified as the main driving force behind war journalism in conflict coverage. Many of the participants in this study focused significantly on their work being challenged by legislative restriction, access to information, personal safety, and government pressure more so than journalistic principles and practices.

The findings in this study identified three different levels at which media freedoms are compromised in the Kenyan context. The first stems from the safety of individual journalists, where participants indicated that they do not have the autonomy to practise journalism to their full capacity because of intimidation, persuasion and threats from the elite. A similar example is evident in The National baseline survey, 2013, which states that Kenyan journalists have faced increasing pressure and threats, with 91 per cent stating that they had faced threats in 2013 following the Westgate attack (Lohner, Banjac & Neverla 2016, pp. 59 - 60). The second is structural, where political and economic structures tend to control the media, despite the Kenyan media’s ability to progressively redefine itself through complex economic and political structures. Replicating the colonial and post-independence eras, especially around the structural conditions of the media, the

Kenyan state, through supervision, control, restriction and advertising revenue, has managed attain a strong position with regards to controlling the media (Lohner, Banjac & Neverla 2016, p. 57). This is also evident in the findings of this study, as participants identified the government as a major hindrance to conflict reporting.

The third is through legislation, where media freedom is severely compromised due to the modification of media laws, the overstepping of the Constitution and the introduction of anti-terror laws that touch on the media. The findings in Chapter 6 indicate that the biggest hindrance to terrorism coverage is legislation. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Kenyan media is protected under the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. The Constitution, considered an improved system of checks and balances, offering a turning point for Kenyan media, is supposed to guarantee access to information, freedom of expression and media freedom. It is also supposed to bar the state from controlling the media, protect media organizations and individual journalists, and ensure there is no interference in the dissemination or publication of any content within journalistic confines (Lohner, Banjac & Neverla 2016, p. 53). However, according to the participants in this study, the Constitution does not seem to work in their favour, as access to information is one of their biggest challenges when reporting on terror.

In addition, anti-terror legislation seems to blur the lines when it comes to reporting on terror, as the participants outline that it is used to restrict, rather than regulate, the news media. According to Lohner, Banjac and Neverla (2016, p. 53), the legislative tug of war, especially in conflict reporting, has resulted from the state overstepping the Constitution and justifying their actions based on the argument that, “a constitution cannot provide the level of detail needed to offer sufficient regulation at the national level” (Lohner, Banjac & Neverla 2016, p. 53). Therefore, the Kenyan Constitution does not serve its purpose as it pertains to preserving media freedoms, as it

remains in competition with threats and pressures from the state on one hand, and anachronistic legislation on the other (Simiyu, 201:127).

Moreover, according to Lohner, Banjac and Neverla (2016, pp. 54-55), the media laws under the Jubilee government, which is currently in office, have been modified significantly in order to control and regulate the Kenyan news media, setting provisions for the state to limit the media at their discretion. This has been maintained through altering mandates and establishing new structures of existing institutions and regulatory bodies. The Media Council Act, 2013, created an independent self-regulating body, the Media Council of Kenya (MCK), which oversees the media industry. However, it allows the state to interfere in council member selection, which leaves room for the state to exercise its power. Council members include representatives from the Ministry of Information, Communication and Technology and media stakeholders, some of whom are politically affiliated. In addition, the council relies on government funding, which requires it to report to the Cabinet secretary on its functions. The media council is, therefore, restricted through government control, political interests and commercially, which makes it not as independent as it was created to be (Lohner, Banjac & Neverla 2016, pp. 55-57). Both the media laws and the Constitution, which are supposed to protect and enforce media freedom, remain ineffective, as there is no distinction between the political environment and the media in the Kenyan context.

## II. Patriotic Role Perceptions

Another factor that severely compromises the Kenyan news media, especially with regards to terrorism, is the tug-of-war in role perceptions that Kenyan journalist and editors face, especially during conflict reporting. On the one hand, the Kenyan media subscribes to western journalistic practice, aiming to fulfil a watchdog function. However, based on its colonial legacy and practice during the post-independence era, unifying the nation and promoting a national identity, the

Kenyan news media took on a patriotic or ‘guard dog’ role, serving the regime that took over from the colonial powers. While this may have been a temporary measure, serving societal needs post-independence, the confusion around what role the Kenyan news media should play still lingers, becoming even more visible during conflict situations (Heath 1997; Iraki 2010; Mukhongo 2015; Ogola 2011). When tackling terrorism, terrorists are considered enemies of the state, as outlined by the participants in this study; therefore, there is the expectation that the news media should remain patriotic at all costs, particularly when reporting on terror. However, the consequence of this tug-of-war in conflict coverage has manifested into what Mogweku (2011:244) refers to as ‘less intellectually demanding’ news content. This includes a focus on reporting just the ‘facts,’ especially when presented by a spokesperson, counting dead bodies, and describing the event or the conflict scene. Evident in the textual analysis findings, much of the coverage of terrorism was lax, extending all the way to publishing from unverified sources (Twitter accounts) and information, especially when there was no regulation during the Westgate Mall attack. Mogweku (2011:244) asserts that this type of coverage encourages war journalism because of ‘positive incentives’ such as prestige and recognition for journalists and the attraction of audiences.

Furthermore, Kenya’s colonial legacy plays a significant part in this role perception tug-of-war, as broadcasting after the colonial era was used as a means to achieve a Kenyan identity by uniting the nation (King'ara 2014, p. 77). This has remained a blueprint for the Kenyan news media, especially around news content that is considered divisive. According to Iraki (2010, p. 146), the duality of the role of the African media is indeed a remnant of colonisation. He asserts that at various times the Kenyan news media has acted either as an agent of the elite or as a watchdog, exposing both scandals and ills that the government should address and the agendas of powerful politicians or media owners, just as it did between the colonialist and the indigenous societies. Therefore, when

it comes to national security issues, the media is expected and pressured into playing patriotic roles, regardless of the dynamics, because it is what has always been the norm.

### III. Ownership and Independence

Despite the fact that all except one media company in Kenya are privately owned, the findings on ownership and independence offered mixed perspectives. On the one hand, some participants said ownership does not really affect their day-to-day coverage, while others emphasized the opposite. However, considering the legislative restrictions and government control that govern the Kenyan news media, ownership patterns and the level of independence for all media companies in Kenya tend to fall under the same umbrella. According to Oriare, Okello-Orlale and Ugangu (2010, p. 6), the Kenyan news media's independence is controlled by the "... unpredictable and swiftly changing political, social, cultural, economic and technological environment", more than ownership. The news media therefore works within the confines of how much independence it is afforded by the state and within the media environment and structures, as it is primarily independent on paper. On the other hand, media freedoms are enjoyed in only some areas, approved by the state, as the relationship between media ownership and politics is also intertwined. As mentioned in Chapter 3, all Kenyan media companies are politically affiliated, owned or managed by political elites (Nyanjom 2012, p. 17).

Moreover, the character of media ownership and independence in contemporary Kenya still emulates the colonial era (Nyanjom 2012, p. 17), as commercial and political interests are pursued through media ownership. This, according to Ogola (2011, pp. 78-79), is a major factor that limits the normative function of the news media in Kenya. The state maintains tremendous power over the Kenyan news media through the appointment of like-minded individuals in editorial and managerial positions, as a major advertiser, and in some instances through media owners who are



politically affiliated. Media companies in Kenya therefore tend to forgo independent editorial content to protect the interests of advertisers, appease government pressures and prioritize profit motives (Oriare, Okello-Orlale & Ugangu 2010, p. 46). Where private ownership and advertising are supposed to free the press from government control (Ogola 2011, pp. 78-79), the Kenyan news media seems to be playing by a different set of rules. The link between the media and the state is so deeply rooted that the independence of the news media remains at the discretion of the state.

Similarly, Altheide (2007) and Norris, Kern and Just (2003) assert that structural factors tend to keep the news media within a war journalism orientation, which is also the case for the Kenyan news media as indicated by the findings in this study. The prevalence of war journalism results from the systemic and structural conditions of the news media, which based on the findings in this study are more external than internal, as none of the participants referred to factors such as media routines as an influencing factor when reporting on terror. This was surprising considering how much conflict reporting literature refers to journalistic routines as a significant influence on the prevalence of war journalism. However, what it did indicate was that Kenyan journalists and editors tend to focus more on the state than they do on the practice of journalism itself. This is also evident in the extent to which the overall terrorism coverage prioritized the state and state perspectives and narratives, forgoing journalistic tenets such as impartiality, objectivity and detachment.

While some of this focus is attributed to the grip that the state has on the media through legislation and other avenues, the other part of it points to the preferences of the Kenyan news media, which clearly chooses not to steer far from political narratives. Thus, while media freedoms and independence are major influencing factors in the prevalence of war journalism, a lack of creativity in exploring different perspectives and narratives by media practitioners seems to hold similar weight. This indicates a heavy reliance on familiar news frames and interpretations, such as

interpretations offered by security experts and public officials, familiar news frames that were also present during the colonial era. Therefore, if the Kenyan news media is steered towards war journalism due to these factors, this begs the question that is at the heart of this study: is peace journalism a viable alternative for the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror?

The next section addresses this question analysing the principles of peace journalism, specifically the “good” journalism school of thought, against media freedoms, journalistic practice, autonomy and independence and patriotic roles and perceptions that govern and influence the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror.

## 2.2. Peace Journalism and its Viability when Reporting on Terror in Kenya

As illustrated in Chapter 2, peace journalism has broad and contrasting linguistic and practice orientations. However, at its core peace journalism is built on Galtung’s (2003, p. 178) four orientations, which are:

### 1. Peace/conflict-orientated;

- Exploring conflict formations: parties, goals, and issues
- Opening space, time, causes, outcomes in both history and culture
- Making conflicts transparent
- Giving voice to all parties
- Humanization of all sides
- Proactive; preventative; before any violence occurs
- Focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma, damages, etc.)

### 2. Truth-oriented;

- Exposing untruths on all sides

- Uncovering all coverups

### **3. People-oriented;**

- Focusing on suffering all over (women, children, etc.)
- Giving voice to the voiceless
- Giving names to all evil doers
- Focusing on people; peacemakers

### **4. Solution-oriented;**

- Highlighting peace by equating non-violence and creativity
- Highlighting peace initiatives, also to prevent more war
- Focusing on structure, culture, and the peaceful society
- Outlining the aftermath, resolution, reconstruction, and reconciliation

In addition to these orientations, this thesis draws from the key principles that McGoldrick and Lynch (2006, p. 30) highlight in their 17 points (see Chapter 2, section 4.III), which incorporate the use of language, word choice and framing as practical tools that journalists can use in news stories to give meaning and substance. Departing from the premise that journalists have a myriad of facts to choose from when constructing news stories and that they determine what ‘reality’ they will report (Youngblood 2016, pp. 5-6), this analysis focuses on the “good journalism” school of thought, which calls for journalists to transform their professional practices and values in order to improve conflict coverage. Also, this study takes up the criticisms of peace journalism (Hanitzsch 2007; Loyn 2007), in particular the assertion that it may have little to offer journalists in practice because it fails to take into consideration the dynamics of news production, including context-specific professional values and practices.

Starting from the assumption that peace journalism is and would be a good thing for the Kenyan news media, the next section argues that to succeed in the Kenyan news media environment, peace journalism must translate its normative concerns, rooted in peace studies, into a strategy based on a contextually informed analysis of the constraints and opportunities for the practice of peace journalism. This study essentially considers three elements;

7. Is media freedom a prerequisite for the practice of peace journalism?
8. Is structural reform necessary for the practice of peace journalism?
9. Do Kenyan journalists and editors have enough autonomy to practice peace journalism?

I. “Good Journalism” approach: Language Use, Word Choice and Framing

The “good journalism” approach asks journalists to enlighten audiences to consider non-violence, by altering their professional values and practices and introducing under-represented perspectives in order to provide broader and deeper information. It does this by meshing conflict analysis, responsibility and the tenets of good journalism: that is, truthfulness, accuracy and balance (Ross 2006, p. 1), which according to Aslam (2011, p. 137), is where the value of peace journalism lies. In a more practical sense, the “good journalism” approach provides journalists with a “set of tools” when covering conflict and violence, to help them critically think about the role they play in conflict reporting. The findings in this study articulate that the role of the Kenyan news media, when reporting on terror, is not clearly defined, legislatively or otherwise, as legislative measures tend to control and restrict rather than regulate the Kenyan news media. Therefore, in this regard, the “good journalism” approach to peace journalism is a useful tool to bridge that gap and a significant reason why peace journalism would be a viable alternative for the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror.

Moreover, the Kenyan news media, as per the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, has been given a responsibility towards keeping peace through conflict coverage (Kenya 2013), which indicates that peace journalism and its external aims geared towards “peace” (Galtung 2003; McGoldrick & Lynch 2006) would not be a contested addition to the practice of journalism in the Kenyan news media. Furthermore, because peace journalism is committed to responsible reporting, a major factor that is considered lacking in Kenyan journalism when reporting on terror (Media Council of Kenya 2014, p. 1), peace journalism would be a welcomed approach because it calls for journalists to consider the consequences and impact of their coverage (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005). However, despite its potential usefulness in the Kenyan news media environment, peace journalism has been critiqued by several scholars (Hanitzsch 2004b, 2007; Loyn 2007), who argue that its proponents fail to take into consideration the constraints that come with conflict reporting and the news production process. Hanitzsch (2007) and Loyn (2007) both argue that traditional tools of journalism already do not guarantee good journalism. Therefore, peace journalism which fails to adequately take into consideration journalistic principles and practices such as objectivity, and makes assumptions that the media has linear and powerful effects, is not practical.

Nonetheless, proponents of peace journalism argue that the “good journalism” approach does not aim to depart from traditional journalistic practice, but to influence a subtle shift that makes visible and audible the subjugated aspects of reality that are still within the reportable facts (Aslam 2011; Lynch & Galtung 2010, p. 26). According to Lynch and Galtung (2010, pp. 27-52), structural factors such as journalism routines should not determine news content, but rather govern it. They assert that peace journalism and war journalism report on the same set of events, just in two different ways. Therefore, it should not be difficult to implement, especially because the “good journalism” approach is concerned with language use, word choice and better framing of these events. Moreover, Lynch (2007, p. 3) proposes that perhaps having the addition of an external aim,

such as peace, may actually be beneficial in promoting good journalism, as peace journalism “restores a welcome sense of journalistic agency and responsibility to debates (over media and democracy)” (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005, pp. 286-287).

Also, many studies advocate for peace journalism as an alternative to war journalism because it offers clear goals and ideas for the news media in conflict situations that are chaotic and difficult to report on (Galtung 2003; McGoldrick & Lynch 2006; Ogenga 2012; Youngblood 2017). In the Kenyan context in particular, the role of the news media in conflict situations changes based on the external environment, so some sort of structure would make it easier to manage unregulated conflict information. Therefore, peace journalism, in particular the 17 points offered by McGoldrick and Lynch (2006), offers a good starting point in not only establishing a clear role for the Kenyan news media but also in managing conflict information without causing more harm. Moreover, the focus on language use, word choice and framing should not be difficult to implement as it does not deviate from the reality of conflict, but offers a different angle and discourse, with the task to “...clarify, unveil [and] reveal reality to enable others to draw normative conclusions.” (Lynch & Galtung 2010, p. 52).

Similarly, the findings in this study suggest that Kenyan editors and journalists are complacent as they do not steer far from the information that the government and security personnel provide. Therefore, in this respect, peace journalism and its general orientations would be a good starting point in incorporating different perspectives and angles in terrorism coverage. The coverage of the Garissa University College attack revealed that there is an opportunity for the inclusion of different voices and perspectives, which makes peace journalism in this respect, possible. Moreover, despite the legislative constraints and the compromised autonomy of the Kenyan news media, the inclusion of some orientations, such as peace, people, and solution-oriented coverage, can introduce broader

and deeper contexts, and the voices of some parties involved, such as women and children affected by terrorism, without steering outside the legislative constraints on the news media. While not all voices and parties can be included because of the governing structures around the Kenyan news media, some elements that steer coverage towards non-violence such as focusing on victims and peacemakers are accessible and can be included. The inclusion of this type of information on resolutions and peacemakers, considering that resources and access to them were not raised as an issue by the participants in this study, can be used to highlight the trauma and the invisible effects of violence, all of which are visibly absent in the coverage of terrorism in the Kenyan news media. This type of information and perspective on terrorism can be incorporated without necessarily overstepping the legislative barriers set for the news media.

Furthermore, proponents of peace journalism assert that, through training and changing the editing and reporting of conflict, the category of reportable facts can be expanded to include the subjugated aspects of reality (Lynch & Galtung 2010, p. 26) that typically go unreported. This would be a good way to include peace journalism in the Kenyan context, as journalists can continue to grow and learn better journalistic practice as their experiences in the profession expand. Most of the coverage of all three terror attacks in both newspapers highlighted violence and violent discourses through repetition, dramatization and sensationalist coverage, all of which could have been handled better with better training and education around handling conflict situations. Therefore, the core ideas of peace journalism, where language use, word choice and framing are concerned, would be both possible and beneficial in placing accountability and steering responsible reporting, especially because the agenda of terrorism is to spread fear.

To conclude this section, the Kenyan news media has had external aims linked to development, cohesion or peace building the country gained independence in the 1960s. Therefore, the inclusion

of “peace” as an external aim attached to conflict reporting would not be outside the norm, especially when implemented through language use, word choice and the framing of terrorism. Therefore, peace journalism in this respect would be a viable alternative in the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror.

The next section assesses how structural conditions, media freedoms, autonomy and independence would impact the viability of peace journalism in the Kenyan news media.

## II. Peace Journalism, Structural Conditions and Agency

One of the main critiques around the practicality of peace journalism orientations, outside of the practical “tools” concerning language use, framing and word choices, is that it does not take into consideration the influence of structural conditions on conflict reporting (Hanitzsch 2007; Loyn 2007). Many of the studies on peace journalism agree that war journalism is prevalent in conflict reporting because it is deeply embedded in the media industry’s political economy (Kisang 2014; Lynch & McGoldrick 2005; Ogenga 2012). According to Ogenga (2012, pp. 2-6), the Kenyan news media is no different as the news, especially in conflict situations, is treated as a “commodity for sale” because the news media is in the business of cultural production and operates as an economic institution. Journalists therefore construct stories with both the advertisers and audiences in mind. The findings in this study align with these sentiments as Kenyan journalists and editors highlighted just how much their coverage is influenced by appeasing advertisers and the government and is targeted towards attracting audiences. This was also evident in how terrorism is significantly covered in the initial conflict stages, when a terror attack has happened, and then the number of articles and diverse content tends to very quickly dwindle. This, according to Ogenga (2012, p. 6), not only contributes to escalating conflicts, but also indicates just how much the Kenyan news media is commercially motivated. The consequence of news production in Kenya being informed



and steered by societal structures that value commercialism and capitalism is that it makes it difficult to implement new journalistic practices, such as peace journalism, because the current practice is accepted as normative (Ogenga 2012, p. 2).

Moreover, in the Kenyan context the state constrains and influences the news media in four capacities: compromised media freedoms, legislatively, as the biggest advertiser and through politically affiliated ownership of news media. One of the participants in this study highlighted just how much power - through threats, advertising and ownership - the state has, to the extent of interrupting a live broadcast during a terror attack. This example contradicts the assertion by proponents of peace journalism who argue that, despite structural constraints, "...the journalist as an individual carries enormous power" (Aslam 2011, p. 124) as they can make choices, which affords them some degree of agency to practise peace journalism (Shoemaker & Reese 1996, p. 261). In this regard, peace journalism in its entirety is not a viable alternative for the Kenyan news media as some aspects of its orientation, such as revealing cover-ups and giving voice to all parties, will not be possible to implement in the Kenyan news media environment, especially if one phone call can lead into a whole live broadcast being dropped. Kenyan journalists have the added pressure of balancing reporting constraints, extending all the way from their own personal safety to government pressure, legislation and internal media company regulations, that not only hinder their individual agency, but the practice of journalism as a whole. Therefore, making individual choices in their journalistic practice, especially concerning coverage of matters of national security such as terrorism, is not a guarantee for the Kenyan journalist or editor, which will make it difficult for them to ask the questions that peace journalism requires when assessing conflicts.

Furthermore, the media environment and context within which conflict coverage occurs is a significant influence on how news is distributed, produced and gathered. Introducing a journalistic

practice, such as peace journalism, that does not account for these unique media environments makes it difficult to implement, as these environments and structures shape the work of journalists in numerous ways (Hanitzsch 2007; Shoemaker & Reese 1996). For example, a significant factor that shapes Kenyan journalism is the idea that news is real and mirrors events unfolding in the real world (Ogenga 2012, p. 2), which some of the journalists in this study rationalise as just reporting on “how” terrorism occurs and not “why”. This stems from their understanding of journalistic principles, such as objectivity, impartiality and detachment, which has been influenced by their media environment and context. If these traditional journalistic principles, which have been around for centuries, are rationalised inaccurately in the Kenyan news media, then peace journalism, a relatively new concept that tends to be misunderstood based on its title and purpose, even by scholars (Hanitzsch 2007; Hoffmann 2012), will be difficult to implement.

All in all, the critiques expressed by Hanitzsch (2007) and Loyn (2007), which have been adequately addressed in other contexts by peace journalism proponents, ring true for the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror. Bearing in mind the Kenyan news media environment and context, peace journalism, more specifically with regards to its orientations, is not a viable alternative for the Kenyan news media for the following reasons:

1. Peace journalism creates an “illusion” that journalists just need to change their attitudes and behaviours to create conflict coverage that favours peace journalism (Hanitzsch 2007, p. 5).
2. Peace journalism underestimates the limitations of structural conditions and overestimates journalistic autonomy (Hanitzsch 2007; Loyn 2007).
3. Both internal and external constraints work simultaneously to shape and limit the work that journalists do and these factors “cannot be modified from the position of the individual journalist” (Hanitzsch 2007, p. 7)

### III. Peace Journalism and Free Press

In his studies on mediatized conflicts, Cottle (2004, 2006) touches on media freedoms and patriotic expectations during conflict coverage, favouring war journalism news frames. He contends that there is a tendency by journalists to create a prevalence of war journalism through “patriotic-ethnocentric mode[s] of coverage,” which create “us versus them” narratives because the pendulum of journalism during conflict situations tend to favour patriotism over journalistic practice. Moreover, according to Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Hanitzsch and Nagar (2016, p. 153), this type of coverage and the prevalence of government frames and sources indicates compromised media freedoms, which are evident in this study, and systemically supports the saliency of war journalism. The basic legal precondition of media freedom, in the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, makes provisions for freedom of expression and information and the limitation of powers exercised by specific people who may limit the media (Kenya 2013). However, based on the findings in this study, the Kenyan news media tends to exhibit limited freedom and high levels of patriotism, based on patriotic role perceptions and legislation. According to Cottle (2004, p. 84), patriotism steers conflict coverage towards war journalism because it “... tends to be historically selective and culturally eclectic”, while legislation imposed on the media through censorship tends to keep the news media in line by controlling how much freedom and room it has to cover conflicts truthfully. Based on the principles of peace journalism (Galtung 2003; McGoldrick & Lynch 2006; Youngblood 2016), it is apparent that some level of media freedom needs to be present for peace journalism to be fully realised in practice.

Moreover, peace journalism studies do not extensively touch on or explore patriotism or media freedom as an issue or hindrance to the practicality of peace journalism in conflict reporting. However, based on the findings in this study, peace journalism is not a viable alternative for the Kenyan news media because it cannot co-exist in a media environment where limited media

freedoms and patriotic role perceptions, as understood by the participants in this study, thrive. One of the most significant reasons for this is that patriotism, in the Kenyan example, is not only expected but also fuels “us versus them” narratives, which would make exploring all truths and untruths and giving voice to all parties, including the voices of adversaries who are considered enemies of the state, difficult to implement.

Furthermore, as indicated in this study, the state and security personnel are both gatekeepers and a significant influence on escalatory news frames, when reporting on terror in the Kenyan news media, because they withhold information, restrict, control, and perpetuate half-truths and distortions, while compromising media freedom through covert and overt operations targeting journalists. These factors tend to systematically embed war journalism in the Kenyan news media, creating a dependence on the state for information on the terror attacks. The consequence of this is that the authority and censorship that fuels compromised media freedoms and demands patriotic roles of the media “...institutionally emasculates journalism” (Cottle 2004, pp. 80-83). This not only limits the depth of discussions and critical and diverse viewpoints but is a detriment to the implementation and practice of peace journalism.

To conclude this section, there is no contention that the media is a significant force that could have an impact on reconciliation and peace. The Kenyan news media in particular stands in a good position to play this role as it is not only powerful, but also highly trusted. As asserted by Wolf (2009, p. 282) and Oriare, Okello-Orlale and Ugangu (2010, p. 55), almost 81 per cent of Kenyan audiences trust the media to report fairly and accurately. Therefore, the Kenyan news media stands at a prime position to help people “consider and value non-violent responses to conflict” (McGoldrick & Lynch 2006). However, based on the findings in this study and the 2019 press freedom index, which ranked Kenya at 100<sup>th</sup> out of 180, with a score of 32.44 in press freedom

(RSF 2019), the Kenyan news media has been restricted in its capacity to inform. Therefore, the orientations of peace journalism, such as truth, conflict, and people, that may require some level of freedom when reporting on terrorism may not be realisable in the Kenyan context if the media remains a victim of harassment, intimidation and other pressures to keep some information hidden.

### 3. Conclusion

In conclusion, the findings in this chapter indicate that there is a prevalence of war journalism in the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror because of the numerous constraints journalists contend with. These constraints manifest on an individual level as a result of compromised media freedoms and on a professional level stemming from the internal and external factors and structures that influence the news production process and journalistic practice. While at first look peace journalism seems like a practical “tool” that offers tangible alternatives to conflict reporting, because of the “good journalism” approach which tackles conflict reporting from the perspective of language use, word choice and framing which journalists can include in their everyday reporting, in consensus with the criticisms made by Hanitzsch (2007) and Loyn (2007) this thesis contends that there is a disconnect between the prescriptive nature of peace journalism in theory and its application in practice, especially for the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror. The disconnect is due to several constraints that peace journalism overlooks, which include;

- The structural constraints that journalists face in their work;
- Peace journalism’s individualistic approach and lack of consideration for different media contexts; and
- The implications of journalistic systems shaped by colonialism and patriotic expectations, which affect levels of media freedoms and the extent of journalistic practice

In more detail, this thesis highlights how legislative measures in Kenya are used to control, monitor and restrict the Kenyan news media, mirroring the colonial and post-independence eras, how covert and overt measures used by the political elite promote media censorship and how patriotic role perceptions of journalists all work towards embedding war journalism in conflict reporting. Thus, the implementation of peace journalism as a viable alternative to conflict reporting in the Kenyan news media is not practical without a context-specific approach. This is because peace journalism will only translate partly and not offer the major changes that it ambitiously sets out to achieve, as different reporting environments pose unique challenges, opportunities and constraints to journalists. Moreover, peace journalism in its entirety is only likely to take root in Kenya when reporting on terror if it is realisable and does not clash with the obstacles that journalists face in their daily work. Until factors such as the structural conditions of journalism, hostility towards the news media and journalists, media freedoms and legislation are assessed and remedied, peace journalism in its entirety cannot be implemented in the Kenyan context. Therefore, this thesis validates the existing body of literature that suggests that peace journalism needs to consider factors outside of individual journalists and include specific contexts for its theory and practice to meet.

Furthermore, proponents of peace journalism need to consider both journalists and the environment in which they work, as not all journalists have sufficient autonomy to make choices to put peace journalism into practice, as Hackett (2006); Shinar (2007) and Hanitzsch (2007) suggest. Given the complexities of the Kenyan news media environment and the findings of this study, peace journalism's aims regarding stimulating dialogue and reporting conflicting parties, asking the hard questions and revealing 'deficits' (Abdul-Nabi 2015; Lynch & Galtung 2010) are not practical, as is evident in the findings, because the restriction and control of this kind of information is still normalised in post-colonial Kenya. It is evident in this study that because the biggest hindrance to journalism in the Kenyan context is media freedom and access to information, giving equal voice

and opportunity to all parties, especially when the other party is ‘invisible’ and considered to be an enemy of the state, is difficult. Therefore, terrorism coverage in Kenya focuses on the commonality of victims and information that is accessible because of necessity. As a result, root causes, contexts and the rationale for attacks tend to be under-investigated and, in some cases, unreported entirely. Bearing these factors in mind, while peace journalism offers valuable distinction and important insight regarding language use, word choice and the framing and narration of conflict news stories, it does not sufficiently account for the constraints that hinder the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror. Thus, outside of including the voices of victims and peacemakers, it is not a viable alternative for the Kenyan news media.

## Chapter 8: Conclusion and Recommendations

### 1. Broader Summary of the Study

This study set out to add to the research component of studies on African-centred journalism and contribute to the literature on “hybrid” peace journalism initiated by Ogenga (2019a). It has done this by adding to the pool of studies that advocate for African solutions for African problems and including the perspectives and first-hand insights of a public, Kenyan journalists and editors, lacking in many studies. It also adds significantly to the pool of knowledge on peace journalism in non-western contexts, introducing new information around colonial legacies, media freedoms and the complexities around reporting on terrorism in African news media systems that are systemically compromised. By using a textual analysis and face-to-face interviews, this study determined that the Kenyan news media faces several challenges that stem from colonialism and government control, which impact media freedoms and the autonomy and independence of journalists and privately owned media companies. These challenges have also created an inconsistency with what role the news media plays, especially in conflict reporting, which makes it difficult to implement peace journalism in its entirety. Through the experiences of participants and the finding from the textual analysis this study determined that the Kenyan news media is more systemically inclined towards war journalism, because of the external and internal structures that govern the news media environment. Therefore, the study concludes by determining that peace journalism, as a full concept, is not viable in the Kenyan news media, but the “tools” offered, through framing, language use and word choice, can still be implemented.

There are some limitations that were inherent with the methods used in this study, which did not affect the outcome of the study significantly, but still deserve a mention. First, with regards to the context of this study and findings, this study did not develop or conceptually contribute to the



principles of peace journalism. It did identify whether the concept of peace journalism is a viable alternative for non-western media environments considering the challenges that journalists face in these unique contexts. It does, however, aim to contribute to future studies committed to developing context-specific peace journalism. Thus, the motivation of this study is to help improve journalistic practice in African contexts by offering insight on why African media systems should develop their own practices, that can be inspired by western conceptualisations, but still meet their specific needs.

Second, because this is a doctoral study, funding, space and time limited the breadth and diversity of the research. Also, peace journalism is only beginning to gain momentum in academia, so its conceptualisation and understanding is a developing area, which makes it difficult to make more definitive and conceptually grounded conclusions. However, within these limitations, this study has been able to identify trends, assess outcomes and draw links and parallels to historical, political and economic dynamics, structural constraints on the news media and the practice of peace journalism in an African context. This has been possible through a textual analysis and interview data gathered from the perspectives of Kenyan journalists and editors, a public that has not been explicitly included in peace journalism studies, representing a different context and a different set of challenges to the implementation of peace journalism. Therefore, this study includes and recognises the different perspectives of western and non-western scholars and media practitioners and the complexities of conflict coverage in different contexts.

Third, this thesis did not include social media platforms, such as twitter and Facebook, which tend to offer alternative perspectives and additional insight on the coverage of conflict. This was due to limited time and the decision to narrow the scope of this thesis solely to the Kenyan news media, in order to offer an extensive analysis. However, this study does aim to contribute to the debates

around social media and conflict coverage in future research projects by drawing from and adding to the findings in this thesis.

It is within these perspectives that the viability of peace journalism has been assessed and arguments made to establish the challenges around the theory of peace journalism meeting its practice in diverse and complex conflict and media environments. It is also in this perspective that these insights can be used to develop context-specific peace journalism by contributing to other studies.

## 2. Conclusion

The objectives of this study were distributed across three research questions, which included:

1. How does the Kenyan news media report on terror?
2. From the perspective of Kenyan journalists and editors, what systemic factors and structures influence how the Kenyan news media reports on terror?
3. Is peace journalism a viable alternative for the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror?

As argued in the analysis chapters, because of the reliance of Kenyan audiences on the news media for information, the Kenyan news media is in a good position to promote dialogue that could ultimately lead into peace building. However, peace journalism will not be realisable in the Kenyan and broader African contexts if there is no remedy for the remnants of colonisation, such as government control of the media and compromised media freedoms, that are still deeply embedded in systemic structures and factors, which affect the practice of journalism. Moreover, while many scholars advocate for Afro-centric approaches to journalistic practice, such as “hybrid” peace

journalism, this thesis is a clear indication that any type of good journalistic practice will fall short if the media lacks autonomy, independence and freedom.

The first conclusion that this study makes is that the Kenyan news media reports on terrorism from a war journalism perspective, focusing on violence, violent discourses and information that is easily accessible. It also draws the conclusion that the government and security personnel have taken on the role of gatekeepers, steering storylines around terrorism to favour their narratives and perspectives over those of ordinary Kenyans. Moreover, news values and the “commodification of conflict” tend to steer coverage towards war journalism news frames, keeping the coverage of terrorism within familiar conflict news frames, with western conceptualizations of journalism, that dramatize and sensationalize terrorism coverage. In this regard, the way that the Kenyan news media reports on conflict is no different from western news media.

Regarding the second research question, it is concluded that how the Kenyan news media reports on terror is steered by three factors: one, the perceptions and perceived limitations of Kenyan journalists, who are not proactive in utilizing opportunities to include other voices and perspectives in their coverage of terrorism; two, internal and external structural conditions that stem from journalistic norms and practices and Kenya’s political, economic and historical dynamic; and three, limited media freedoms that are enforced through legislation that restricts and controls and other overt and covert means, that touch on government pressure and the individual safety and autonomy of journalists. All of these factors keep the Kenyan news media within a war journalism orientation when reporting on terror.

The third research question, tackling the viability of peace journalism, concludes by illustrating that peace journalism does offer valuable tools, distinctions and clear roles and goals for journalists

in conflict reporting. Peace journalism also offers important insight into how journalists can use language, word choices and framing to create better and more balanced narratives on terrorism in their news stories. However, as shown in this study, peace journalism does not sufficiently account for the constraints that hinder the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror, as they pertain to contexts, structural conditions of journalism and the individual journalist, which makes it not a viable alternative for the Kenyan news media in its entirety. Nonetheless, this study acknowledges that some aspects of peace journalism, such as the inclusion of peace makers and victim voices and perspective, can be implemented in the Kenyan news media, despite the structural constraints.

### 3. Recommendations and Future Research

Several recommendations are made considering the above discussion. They apply to the specific needs of the Kenyan news media when reporting on terror and may extend beyond the specific country and region if they apply to other contexts. These recommendations also draw from the findings in this study which highlight that some aspects of peace journalism, such as the inclusion of people in the coverage of terrorism, is possible and well within the constraints that face the Kenyan news media.

#### **3.1. Kenyan journalists should be proactive and include other sources of information to which they have access:**

Contrary to the beliefs that majority of the participants in this study have about their limitations, sources and access to information when reporting on terror, it is evident that Kenyan journalists are not proactive in seeking, including and reporting on other aspects and perspectives on terrorism. Galtung (2003) and Lynch and McGoldrick (2013) contend that, despite the context, there are always opportunities to practise peace journalism to some degree, as it is at least partly about changing attitudes and framing news stories in a manner that helps audiences interpret conflict

better. Therefore, current journalistic practice can be improved upon using the “tools” of peace journalism, even if the structural constraints on the Kenyan news media make the practicality of peace journalism in its entirety challenging.

### **3.2.Introduction of independent media laws that protect the autonomy of Kenyan journalist:**

In order to make the leap from theory to practice, this study suggests there is a need for media laws that specifically protect Kenyan journalists and revenue streams that sustain the media’s independence outside of the state. Implementing any journalistic practice will not bear fruit in African contexts if the state has control over the media system and the autonomy of journalists through legal measures and other ‘not-so-legal’ measures. Therefore, in the Kenyan context peace journalism will continue not to be a viable alternative when reporting on terror if journalists have no way to protect themselves in a professional capacity outside of the freedoms afforded to them via the Constitution and the mercy of political elites.

### **3.3.Structural conditions need to be taken into consideration when implementing peace journalism:**

As participants pointed out, two major impediments burdened their jobs: legislation and access to information. This thesis suggests that for peace journalism to be implemented in the Kenyan context, there needs to be measures put in place to promote the independence of the Kenyan news media, both institutionally and individually. There also must be a clear role specified for the news media when reporting on conflict which would help accommodate the orientations of peace journalism that may be achievable in the Kenyan context. Also, since peace journalism relies on the agency of reporters to put the tools it provides into practice, the outside constraints that pose a major threat to reporters’ ability to use those tools in their work need to be considered when

implementing peace journalism. There needs to be a way to preserve journalistic practices despite the economic and political interests of news organizations, which Bläsi (2004); Hackett (2006); Hanitzsch (2007); Shinar (2007) draw attention to in their critique of peace journalism. The questions that Kenyan media practitioners and scholars need to raise is “who or what has to be changed in order to implement peace journalism for a broader audience” (Bläsi 2004, p. 1).

In the light of the findings, this research proposes directions for future research that consider the “structural confines of the journalistic settings” and perhaps look into the viability of peace journalism in online spaces such as YouTube, where some independent Kenyan media companies, such as “Africa Uncensored,” spearheaded by the independent Kenyan Journalist John-Allan Namu, appear to be carrying out balanced, truthful and investigative journalism on Kenyan issues. It would be interesting to gain his insights on how restrictive legislation applies in these online spaces and the kinds of constraints and benefits these spaces offer to Kenyan journalists, which could assist and inform ways that Kenyan journalists can go around or shift traditional journalistic practices and the challenges they face, to better serve the news media.

## Appendices

### Appendix 1 – Conflict Escalating and Conflict De-escalating Reporting Model

#### Conflict escalating reporting

##### 1. Politicization

Ethnic and sectarian affiliations are politicized, the victims belonging to political groups are considered worthy, and common people get scant coverage, political wrangling's are highlighted. The aggressors and sufferers are identified through their presumed political affiliations; deaths, suffering, trauma in conflicts are neglected, and the emerging conflicting political scenario becomes the focus of media attention, where political statements, controversies appear to be the only news. Vested interests of political parties are ignored, and media are always ready to provide a conduit to blame others, thus creating turmoil.

##### 2. Securitization

Conflicts are securitized; they are discussed in terms of threats, dangers, and occupations. Police force, army personnel and elites get the limelight. Conspiracies, issues of national sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, independence, and patriotism are related to the conflict. The system, culture and social values are securitized and feared to be lost if the enemy prevails.

##### 3. Otherization

Media take sides in conflicts, one party is treated as 'other, alien to our culture, and not belonging to 'us' and hence dangerous if it prevails. Bias dominates media discourse, and the whole conflict story is told from just one perspective. Collective fears are aroused and the 'bad deeds' of aggressors highlighted to send a message 'that the whole nation is united against you'

##### 4. Incompatibility

Conflict is presented as a tug of war in which interests are incompatible. Compromises are not possible. The parties involved cannot agree on a single agenda and hence are doomed to a worse scenario in the future. The conflicting parties represent antagonistic interests, each hell-bent to prevail over the other. The antagonistic parties stand for diametrically opposed values where a zero-sum orientation prevails.

##### 5. Sensationalism

Conflict reporting is dramatized and sensationalized; every unfolding event is treated as mysterious, historic and unprecedented, drama and hostile outbursts are highlighted. Arguments and counter-arguments of antagonists are the major discourses where the opposing group is ridiculed and challenged. Future is predicted to be more violent and ominous, no chances for peace overtures.

#### Conflict de-escalating reporting

##### 1. De-politicization

Focus on the non-political aspects of conflicts; affiliations like politics, ethnicity, religiosity or other considerations are avoided. The social, cultural and economic costs of conflicts are highlighted. Political manipulations and conspiracies are exposed in non-political and less sensational tones; The artificial barriers among conflicting groups produced by politicians are scrutinized, threadbare arguments, agendas and interests of politicians are exposed, examples of different ethnic and sectarian groups having political affiliations that live together peacefully are highlighted.

##### 2. Humanization

Conflicts are humanized, individual sufferings are highlighted, and trials and tribulations of ordinary people get maximum coverage. Plight of women and children and other vulnerable groups is discussed. Conflict is covered from the perspective of ordinary people. Loss to social institutions and local culture is counted and steps urged for their recovery.

##### 3. We'ness

Conflicting parties are treated equally; 'us versus them' notions are avoided. Grievances of aggrieved parties are shared and calls for resolution highlighted. Responsibility for law and order situation is equally shared. Negative attributes are avoided. Conflict itself is treated as a problem and efforts urged for solution. The people are sympathized with, and the concerns of estranged elements are shared and violence is explained from a wider context.

##### 4. Compatibility

The commonalities and sameness in the standpoints of conflicting parties are explored and urged for reconciliation. The conflicting parties are encouraged and extolled for overtures that promote dialogue and bring the antagonists closer. History, culture and other interests that forge unity are highlighted. Conflicts are contextualized and mistakes of both sides are exposed for rapprochement.

##### 5. Responsibility

Reporters feel responsibility to society, outcomes of unfolding conflicts are given beforehand, damage to society is told and re-told, caution is advised, reporting is devoid of sensationalism, pros and cons of conflicts are presented, and opportunities for peace explored. Contexts and backgrounds and root causes of the conflict are presented with encouragement for peaceful resolution

## Appendix 2 – Interview and Research Documents

## 1. Interview information and contact sheet

**PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET**

**PROJECT TITLE:** Reporting on Terror: Is Peace Journalism Possible in Kenya?

**HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL NUMBER:** H-2017-222

**PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR:** Dr. Kathryn Bowd

**STUDENT RESEARCHER:** Rukia Yusuf Abdulrahman Nzibo

**STUDENT'S DEGREE:** Doctor of Philosophy

Dear Participant,

You are invited to participate in the research project described below.

**What is the project about?**

This research project aims to assess if and how the Kenyan media can be utilised as a peace-promoting tool, using peace journalism, when reporting on terror. It aims to identify the structures within and around the media system and environment that influence the practice of journalism and how the news media reports on terror. The project also aims to assess how these factors could potentially hinder or allow the implementation of peace journalism in the Kenyan media system, with the aim of potentially assisting journalists, in the future, when reporting on complex issues such as terrorism. The study aims to potentially influence and inform media policies that allow the preservation of media freedoms, and ethical and professional standards, while assisting in the promotion of peace when reporting on terror.

**Who is undertaking the project?**

This project is being conducted by Rukia Yusuf Abdulrahman Nzibo. This research will form the basis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Adelaide under the supervision of Dr. Kathryn Bowd and Dr. John Budarick.

**Why am I being invited to participate?**

The criteria for inclusion include Editors;

- Registered and accredited by the Media Council of Kenya
- Employed by one of the four main registered media establishments selected for this study. That is, KBC, Royal Media Service, Nation Media Group and Standard Media Group
- Currently working for one of the two independent daily newspapers with the highest readership selected for this study. i.e. The Daily Nation and The Standard OR
- Currently working for one of the four highest rating television stations selected for this study. i.e. KBC, NTV, KTN and Citizen TV
- Who use English as their primary language of communication
- Who work in a local and traditional news media platform (print or broadcast)





**What will I be asked to do?**

Participate in a face-to-face, semi-structured interview conducted by the research student. With permission and the confidentiality of the participant as the priority, the interview will be audio recorded. A public location will also be agreed upon by both the participant and student researcher for where the interview will take place.

**How much time will the project take?**

The interview will take an estimated 45 minutes – 1 hour. No follow up visits are necessary unless requested by the participant.

**Are there any risks associated with participating in this project?**

The foreseeable risks for this project are minimal; while the study does not intend to collect any personal information, there is a slight possibility that participants become identifiable through the data they provide. However, aside from giving up some time and information related to the study for the interview, there are no serious risks associated with this study.

The potential for any unforeseeable risk will be mitigated by ensuring confidentiality using pseudonyms, unless permission is granted to do so otherwise by the participant. Personal information will only be collected and coded if it is essential to the research activity. The identities of the participants will not be released without the express consent of the participant. Questions relating to this study will only focus on professional roles and the wider context of the research topic.

**What are the benefits of the research project?**

The research may contribute to knowledge within the field of peace journalism in Kenya, which may potentially inform media policies and practice in the future

**Can I withdraw from the project?**

Participation in this project is voluntary. If you agree to participate, you can withdraw from the study at any time prior to the submission of the thesis.

**What will happen to my information?**

- The information and project records will be confidentially stored by the student researcher in a University-approved, secure location.
- Printed copies of the transcribed interviews will also be secured in a locked file cabinet at the University of Adelaide.
- Access to the information will only be granted to the student researcher, the principal supervisor and the co-supervisor.
- The University of Adelaide will keep the information collected for 5 years.
- The information collected from the interviews will be transcribed, analysed and the results will be reported and publicised in a PhD thesis and in academic publications, conferences and presentations by the researcher(s).



- Participants will not be identified in publications without consent; only aggregated data will be published.
- Participants can request access to their transcripts.
- Your information will only be used for the purpose of this research project and it will only be disclosed with according to the consent provided, except as required by law.
- Results/summary of project will be available through the University of Adelaide's public repository, under the Creative Commons CC-BY licence v4.0, and may be used in the future in related papers or post-doctoral research.

***Who do I contact if I have questions about the project?***

**Primary contact:**

Dr. Kathryn Bowd  
kathryn.bowd@adelaide.edu.au  
831 35617

**Other contacts:**

Dr. John Budarick  
[john.budarick@adelaide.edu.au](mailto:john.budarick@adelaide.edu.au)  
831 34289

Rukia Y.A Nzibo, Student Researcher  
[rukia.nzibo@adelaide.edu.au](mailto:rukia.nzibo@adelaide.edu.au)  
830 36442

**What if I have a complaint or any concerns?**

The study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Adelaide (approval number H-2017-222r). If you have questions or problems associated with the practical aspects of your participation in the project, or wish to raise a concern or complaint about the project, then you should consult the Principal Investigator. If you wish to speak with an independent person regarding a concern or complaint, the University's policy on research involving human participants, or your rights as a participant, please contact the Human Research Ethics Committee's Secretariat on:

Phone: +61 8 8313 6028

Email: [hrec@adelaide.edu.au](mailto:hrec@adelaide.edu.au)

Post: Level 4, Rundle Mall Plaza, 50 Rundle Mall, ADELAIDE SA 5000

Or

Tele Boit

Phone: +254 716 584 874

Email: [teleboit@gmail.com](mailto:teleboit@gmail.com)

Any complaint or concern will be treated in confidence and fully investigated. You will be informed of the outcome.



**If I want to participate, what do I do?**

Respond to the e-mail sent by the student researcher to set up interview dates and time.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Kathryn Bowd

Dr. John Budarick

Rukia Y.A Nzibo, Student Researcher

## 2. Interview consent forms



Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC)

### CONSENT FORM

1. I have read the attached Information Sheet and agree to take part in the following research project:

Title:	Reporting on Terror: Is Peace Journalism Possible in Kenya?
Ethics Approval Number:	H-2017-222

2. I have had the project, so far as it affects me, fully explained to my satisfaction by the research worker. My consent is given freely.
3. Although I understand the purpose of the research project, it has also been explained that involvement may not be of any benefit to me.
4. I have been informed that, information gained during the study may be published and there is the slight possibility that I could be identifiable. However, unless I give consent my personal identity will not be divulged.

5. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time.

6. I agree to the interview being audio recorded. Yes ☐ No ☐

7. I agree to being identified as myself Yes ☐ No ☐

8. I agree to being Identified under a pseudonym Yes ☐ No ☐

9. I am aware that I should keep a copy of this Consent Form, when completed, and the attached Information Sheet.

10. Participant to complete:

Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Researcher/Witness to complete:

I have described the nature of the research to \_\_\_\_\_  
(print name of participant)

and in my opinion she/he understood the explanation.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_ Position: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

2013\_consent\_form\_for\_professionals\_only

## Appendix 3 – Interview transcripts

### Interview 1

#### **Part A: Factors that Influence how the Kenyan Media Reports on Terror**

##### **How long have you worked in the Kenyan media?**

Kenyan media... ummm... 13 years.

##### **From an editor's perspective, what does reporting on terror in the Kenyan context entail?**

##### **During the terror event (breaking news), following the event (i.e., next day), after the terror event**

Of course you look for fatalities, then of course you look at ummm... you look at ahhh... destruction of property, then of course there's the impact, people who are affected, people who are coming to look at ummm... basically people looking for their loved ones and of course the, the rescue efforts and probably what is being put in place to prevent uhhh... such recurrence.

##### **Following the event ... the next day?**

Ummm what is being done to basically avert uhhh... similar, similar, similar attacks. [Silence]

##### **After the terror attack, several days, weeks or months later is there a follow up?**

Depending, of course it, it will all depend because uhhh... what for instance if you want to, to follow up on, of course, terror is a classified kind of news coverage. So, you really uhhh... if they [government/security forces/terrorists] are releasing some report on the same yes, if there isn't and people are burying people, their loved ones, people are doing the DNA's and such yes, of course it will form an entry point into looking into that story. But if there isn't probably, most of the time it's closed because uhhh... most of the guys, the guys who are affected, most of them are not mostly

civilians. Because most terror, most of the terror it's targeted, and most of the people who are targeted in terror attacks are not really the ordinary people. Who we would want to milk easily information from.

**In your opinion, what factors do you think determine what is reported on/ newsworthy, with regards to terrorism, in the Kenyan context?**

hmmm [silence]

**Based on studies, the role of legislation, information provided by security forces/government, self-censorship, time pressures, personal safety, advertising and ownership, company guidelines or protocols and personal experiences have been outlined as influences to the kind of information that is shared by the media. What role do those factors play in the Kenyan media?**

I think in Kenya we are not really barred by a law or government considering the fact that uhhh... as we speak today most of the audience, most of the viewers get this information from social media, which is basically uncensored and unregulated. So, media most of the time your guided by the public good. You place yourself in the, in the shoes of a viewer, a reader, or a listener, uhhh... for, for you to report. So basically you want to answer the needs of that. Yeah!

**what about advertising and ownership, do those influence the kind of information that is shared?**

In terror not really. Not really, because, you see, terror basically, it's an enemy against a government so, not just a government per se, but uhhh... a specific part of the government, of course home security, homeland security, or defence. Yes! [silence]

**Company guidelines, protocols, personal experiences?**

[long pause] mmmh... to a small extent. But it will be very small because as media you are guided by the public good. So basically you, you tailor your product to suit your audience. Yes! [silence].

**From an editor's perspective, how do you think Journalists in Kenya report on terror? What is the focus, for example, effects and outcomes, investigative reporting, peace building, the underlying causes of terrorism, the negative aspects?**

Negative... ummm... maybe to some extent we are a bit sensational. Of course you feed into the need of uh... of uh... umm... of uh... the audience. Uhhhhh... [Stammers] when a terror happens today, you will assume..., you will want to imagine that there are loved ones who will want to be looking out for their loved ones. So, the first question that comes is uh... are people injured? Are people dead? What are the numbers? What's the extent of, basically you answer to those and basically that is what you learn in school. Yes! And basically just trying to... yeah... for instance if you said there's a terror attack people will want to know, uh... to what magnitude? There's an earthquake, to what magnitude? And how does it affect me as a person? Of course those are answers you... those are questions you are answering to. If... and that's why for instance, a terror attack in Nairobi, however small it is, is likely to be reported than a fatal attack, depending on the numbers in an, an area outside Nairobi because we will want to imagine that there are so many people in Kenya who have got their loved ones in Nairobi, so Nairobi is basically the nerve point, the central point. Yeah!

**Part B: Peace journalism**

**Are you familiar with what peace Journalism is?**

Peace journalism mmmh! [silence]

**Yes or no?**

[silence]

**no?**

[silence]

**According to a proponent of peace journalism, Jake Lynch (2008), “Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters make choices - about what to report, and how to report it - that create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value nonviolent responses to conflict.”**

**There have been some studies that say some Kenyan journalists have undergone peace journalism training. Have any in KBC done peace journalism training?**

There should be, there should be. There’s been so much focus about of course ummm.... When you are reporting about those negative stories, negative stories that of course hurt the image of the country, there’s also the positive part of it. Is it that uhhh, it’s all that gloom? Of course the thing is that uhhh... it’s not. For instance, out of uhhh... one successful uhhh... attack, there could be as many as uhhh.... Even forty that have been trotted. But then most of the time, of course you will not get to hear the forty that were trotted. But uhhh... I think in recent years we’ve been getting such information about umm...about police, uhhh...police preventing attacks, maybe they are arresting people who are planning attacks, I think it’s been coming out in recent years. Yes.

**Do you think root causes are some of the things that are looked at by journalists in Kenya?**

Sorry?

**The root causes of terrorism?**

I think so, yes. I think so yeah! We’ve been looking at it. [silence]



**So according to scholars, “Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters make choices - about what to report, and how to report it - that create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value nonviolent responses to conflict. Do you agree with this statement?**

Mhhh... yes!

**When these choices are being made, from an editor’s perspective, what do you think primarily, is the main influence, especially in the Kenyan context?**

It all depends with the... you see, news comes in context we just don’t broadcast, that’s why for instance given uhhh... a scenario today, you’ll... as an editor, as a reporter you will want to report it differently, given the underlying. You remember, if you were in Kenya, you remember a scenario where there was a Muslim who, in Mandera county, who tried to shield or rather to talk terrorists out of attacking Christians. Yes! It all depends with the context, and as a media there is a message we want to pass out. If... you want to pass out the message that terrorism is not a blanket Muslim affair, rather its individuals, of course, that is what we want to focus on.

**In your opinion, do you think it is the responsibility of the Kenyan media to promote peace, particularly when reporting on terror?**

Yes, of course ... you are part of this.

**Why do you think so?**

Of course, promoting peace is not a blanket thing, because uhhh... you ... your core value, your core coral is basically to inform whatever is happening. Of course ahhh.... But then there’s that context, there is that uhhh... what we call the ... to.... Journalism and ummm... after you have broken the story, what next? After you have broken the story and more details are coming out, what next? Of course that’s where the peace journalism comes in. of course, yeah...

**Peace journalism advocates for the exploration on contexts, background information, conflict formation, presenting causes and options on every side and going beyond the violence and events happening on the ground. Do you think this is a realistic way to shape news reports on terror in Kenya?**

Yes! Yes! To some extent... of course when you are breaking the news probably no, because breaking is just saying what's happening. But then uhhh... of course you've got time to get to... like for instance analyse and that's why, whatever part of the country, if there's an attack in Paris, Of course uhhh... within the first ten minutes, it will just be a message as they try to gather more information but if you tuned in after probably an hour yes there will be that peace journalism, peace journalism should come in play even thirty minutes after that.

In your opinion, do you think peace journalism is something that can be practiced in Kenya when reporting on terror?

Yes! Yes!

**Why do you think so?**

Information, news is given out in context, and uhhh and of course uhhh...where context means of course you have to give... for instance if you are reporting about an accident, an accident is caused by several factors, of course it could be human error, it could be the state of the road, it could be the state of the uhh...the vehicle, all that... so that apart from reporting that there was an accident that claims the life of uhhh like ten people, of course there is that context. Yes! That's why I said yes. It is. [Silence]

## Interview 2

**Part A: Factors that Influence how the Kenyan Media Reports on Terror**

**What does reporting on terror in the Kenyan context entail? During the terror event (breaking news), following the event (i.e. next day), after the terror event?**

So mostly we report about terrorism event when they happen. We are just a reactive media, most of the time that's what we are... what happens. We don't like do stories before and even if we do it's just once, before to warn maybe Kenyans there is an expected terrorist attack which is going to happen. This is ... We are supposed to get out of this place or you are going... you are supposed to be safe this this ... [...00:01:23]. Because we think if you do that you are going to make people fear. People won't even operate. So most of the time we just report an event when it happens. When it happens, we go to the site, we interview the victims, people who have been affected, we get interviews from the government officials. We get interviews from the community, from the Red Cross. That is the much we do.

After the terrorist attack we can follow the families up to just some level and then that is it. So we don't continue. Like right now if you watch maybe the Kenyan media, even our media included we don't have stories on terrorism and you know terrorism, terrorists or terrorist attacks are with us. So like we don't have, we don't have many follow up stories like what is happening in Somalia. What are our leaders doing about restoring peace... Why are we having terrorist attacks... What can we do as a country to prevent these attacks...

**Why is that so? Is it a choice all Kenyan media make or specifically just KBC?**

No... I'm thinking... I think the main eh... aim, why we don't really eh... touch on terrorism and terror stories and tell them boldly is because, one, maybe we are the national broadcaster. Two, is our society. Because you don't want to say these things are happening, you are going to shake Kenyans. Because the few terrorist incidents we've had, they are just bad. Second, as a government institution [speaks slowly], which we are, you cannot just go and say maybe the government is complacent or maybe our forces are in, in Somalia, they are supposed to get out of there, because if they get out of there, we are going to have peace because we are being fought by Al-Shabaab because they think we have invaded their country. You know, those are very sensible issues. You cannot just say it as it is, terrorism is still a delicate matter.

**In your opinion, what factors do you think determine what is reported on/ newsworthy, with regards to terrorism, in the Kenyan context? Linked to studies is it legislation, information provided by security forces/government, self-censorship, pressures, safety advertising and ownership, company guidelines or protocols and personal experiences play?**

I think it is everything, because I remember a certain media house wanted to air a story about terrorism and what the government is doing or not doing, but they were told if they were going to air that story they are going to be switched off. What is that? So if they didn't air that story and they were switched off, what is that? That is self-censorship. And then alsooo ... there uhh... are laws which govern us, what we are supposed to put on air and what we are not supposed to put on air. So what is that? Legislation. So, I'm thinking there are so many things that play a part. Mmh!

**What about security forces? Do they play an integral part?**

Yes, yes, yes, they really play a very important part because, those people who even manage to get those stories, you have to be... to have a lot of confidence with security officers. And if you have that confidence, meaning you will just report according to what the security offices want you to

report. Meaning you won't show us the true colours. And those people who maybe have contacts with the terrorist organisers or the Al-Shabaab leaders and they want to give us that story, they get a lot of intimidation from the, from the forces and the government or whoever is in charge.

**What about advertising? Is it something that influences what makes it to the news on terror?**

Not really, because you know KBC's structure is like we are a government institution, not really a government... we are a parastatal. But we have an, an ...we have an obligation to the government and the public of Kenya. So we don't really do stuff or report stories because we are looking for money... We are looking for advertisers, but if it could be another media house it could be different, because when they have those exposes you get all advertisers are there. Meaning they are doing it for advertisement. Us we do it, we report objectively, inform Kenyans, educate them, and entertain them because we have a mandate as a public broadcaster to do that and also for free. Not really to attract advertisement.

**In your opinion, how do you think Journalists in Kenya report on terror? i.e. the focus: effects and outcomes, investigative reporting, peace building, underlying causes of terrorism.**

Okay for the past so many years we just report on the effects and outcomes of terrorism. We don't really focus on peace initiatives, because peace initiative, we are saying maybe our government to have peace with Al-Shabaab, something like that, to have dialogue, we haven't reported like on that. So we have been having investigative pieces but just maybe one, two or three investigative pieces. So when it comes to terrorism mostly, we talk about the effects.

**Part B: Peace journalism**

**Are you familiar with peace Journalism? Done any peace journalism training?**

theoretically not really... but I know peace journalism, what I understand by peace journalism... because I have never gone to like a class and learnt about peace journalism, but I know peace journalism is maybe when you report or when you do stories or produce stories which bring cohesion and cohesiveness and harmony in the society. Yeaah! So you build that, you build that peaceful coexistence among communities, among nations and even maybe among what.... Families.

**Do you think all Kenyan journalists should be trained in peace journalism?**

Yes, I, I think it is very necessary because I think some few years Internews [...00:07:33] was doing a lot of peace journalism, but I think lack of funding, they didn't take part in it. And even in Kenya, peace journalism just started here around 2007 after post-election violence, is when journalists were taught about how to report on peace. Because it was a process of building peace among the communities who had disintegrated because of election violence. So there were various programs, you could even see peace programs in Kibra, in Rift Valley, Nyanza, but it was because of a result of that. But I think peace journalism is important especially in Kenya, when we are approaching elections period. So if journalists can be able to have a knowledge where, a background of peace journalism, then they won't report on stories that are volatile. Which are supposed even to make a country disintegrate.

**One of the proponents of peace journalism Jake Lynch (2008) states that “Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters make choices- about what to report, and how to report it-that create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value nonviolent responses to conflict.”**

**Do you agree/disagree with this statement above? Why? Who or what factors make/influence these choices in the Kenyan context?**

I think peace journalism is important for every journalist. So that when even, when they decide to make volatile statements or stories, they know they have an obligation for peace journalism. But now you know, for community journalists, for public broadcasting journalists, for who? Maybe international journalists it matters but what about for commercial broadcasters? You know the more sensational the story is, the more you attract advertisers and viewers. So, there's a clash between, how do you sugar coat these stories and how do you tell the truth? Yah! And also maybe you can say you want to do a story, you don't really want to touch those volatile issues, but they are very important, its only issue is that they are disturbing a society or a community, so I think that's the dilemma with the Kenyan media houses.

**In your opinion, what do you think determines how those choices are made for a journalist in Kenya?**

Editorial policies of the organization, of their respective media houses. Because if our editorial media policies is not to report about violence, eehh... to rise tension in the country, we won't do that. But if an editorial policy of a certain eehh... institution is about free reporting, tell it as it is, they are going to do exactly that.

For me, I'll see what the information I give out there, which impact will it have to the society at large. If I'm going to do a story that is going to lead to conflict. Why should I do that story? I'm supposed to do a story that is going to create... to contribute to the harmony and peaceful co-existence of Kenyans. So in my own terms I cannot do a story, which I know it is going to raise tension, fears and conflict. I cannot.

**Do you think it necessary for people to also know those volatile stories?**

Yes, if it is well balanced, because you know you can also report such stories and then you are just giving the one side of the story. If you can give the two sides of the story, we see this, and what is the government maybe doing about it, what is the community doing about it and it is balanced we can do that and then leave it to the public and then at least you can have given everyone an opportunity. But if we just put it one sided and then there are no answers, we just left an open ended questionnaire, I don't think it's right.

**In your opinion, do you think it is the responsibility of the Kenyan media to promote peace, particularly when reporting on terror?**

Yes

**Why?**

I think so because the Kenyan media houses has the power to put the country intact and also to disintegrate. That's why in 2007/8 when they realised, they are the ones who are going to fuel this thing, they came together and they started preaching peace, peace, peace and after some time we had peace because if you keep on showing burning houses, people burning, what are you doing? You're not helping the society. But if you can be able to preach peace, peace and harmony people will just live in peaceful coexistence. Yeah!

**Do you believe the Kenyan media has that kind of impact on society?**

Yeeesss, yes, yes... the Kenyan media is still, the mainstream media in Kenya still has a very strong place in the society. We cannot downplay the role that the social media is playing, but even when news has been broken on social media, people will still wait, what has KBC said, what has nation said, what has citizen. If it is just in social media and the mainstream media doesn't take it up, no one is going to believe the news. So the mainstream media in Kenya still has such power.



**Do you think sometimes that social media influences the mainstream media on what they report on?**

Yes! In fact nowadays people are saying journalists are very lazy, they just wait for what is trending on social media then you pick it up. But it is because maybe the society is waiting [speaks in Swahili, then translates], “oh, that thing that was on social media will we be able to see it on KBC” yah...mmh.

**Peace journalism advocates for the exploration on contexts, background information, conflict formation, presenting causes and options on every side and going beyond the violence and events happening on the ground. Do you think this is a realistic way to shape news reports on terror in Kenya?**

Yes, I think. Because I think if they have background information, they have... If you report about the background information of people, like maybe if it is because the Muslim society or the Somali's are feeling their being ... their freedom is being curtailed people are invading them, you give us that background. And then you tell us why is it a must our military be there and what are you doing? What are these... how... [stammers] Is there time that these people are going to sit on a table and resolve? If you can give us all that background information and then you keep on educating us, I think it can help and it is important.

**Do you think there is room for looking at the terrorist's [Al-Shabaab] side in the Kenyan media?**

Maybe they should look at that, they can... if they've tried all the strategies and it's not working, maybe there is a time they give them an ear so that they can know what to do. Because we cannot just be living in fear [speaks in Swahili] waiting, when will Al-Shabaab attack us? When is the

next attack? Maybe we should also listen to what are their fears, what they think, why they do what they are doing and then maybe it can inform some of the choices that are being made.

**In your opinion, do you think peace journalism is something that can be practiced in Kenya when reporting on terror considering how putting together a news segment works?**

No, but you know even in news we have uhhh... special features. So if we cannot cover it fully in news we can do still on special features, yes, and it can be covered. Yeah... Because all that you cannot cover in two seconds or in one minute, no, it needs a holistic approach and every newsroom and every organisation I know they have special features. Maybe they appear over the weekends or mid-week so that they can be covered thoroughly during the special features... special assignments.

**In your opinion, do you think peace journalism is something that Kenyan media should be practicing when reporting on terror? Is it something journalists should fight to keep?**

Yeah! I think they [journalists] should fight to keep, but you also know the other players should be informed about that as well. Because as long as ... if you teach us journalists and then you don't tell even the government the importance of this, then we'll just be at crossroads, the government and the journalists. So, maybe ... the crusaders of peace journalism can do a holistic training. There are trainings where we go, we have... if we are doing a health issue, we'll have doctors, we'll have policy makers, journalists, everyone. So that we can put our... all our fears, or what we need on the table, it can be deliberated and then we can have a way forward. But if you just put like, you only train journalists and then you tell them importance and when they come back to their station, they cannot be able to practice that, because it has not been, because maybe the authorities won't want, you see still a problem. Yeah! It is important but it has their own challenges. It needs a holistic approach.

**Can peace journalism be utilised in Kenya the way it has been in other western countries?**

yup ... No, no, no, our challenges are different, you cannot just take something from the west and put ... bring it direct, maybe you also need to have our input, what are our challenges, what and what, and then we can be having it. Because I told you there's an organisation, Internews... do you know Internews? Internews, I think it's based in the US.... So they train journalists mostly on health and peace, but nowadays they don't train peace journalism, they only do health, so before they even do training, they take questionnaires, they train the leaders, they train the policy makers and then maybe they can be able to... to restructure their training. So you cannot just copy paste, because their fears are different from our fears, their challenges are different. Yeah...

## Interview 3

**Part A: Factors that Influence how the Kenyan Media Reports on Terror**

**What does reporting on terror in the Kenyan context entail? During the terror event (breaking news)?**

Well, when a terror attack breaks, the first thing is to look at the nature of the attack, uhh... the number of casualties, where it has happened and uhh... basically, the immediate information. Where probably victims have been rushed to, the scope of the destruction and all that.

**Following the event (i.e. next day)?**

The next day, the follow up story would be, looking deeper into the attacks, uhh... if it is possible to get exclusive information on how it was planned, sometimes it's difficult to go that deep, but sometimes you do get a leeway, and uhh... we also pose a question of who is to blame. Were there security lapses? Were there laxities in some area? Is someone or are there people who slept on their job? And basically, we also try to think deeper into them... or rather taking the story forward, in as far as the human [face?] of it is concerned. The affected, sometimes you find umm... the breadwinners becoming victims or succumb to such attacks, and how families have been affected. How a society or a community is affected and basically those are the angles that we usually look at. And basically looking at the strategy of government, uhhh... moving forward in terms of ensuring security prevails and ensuring that those [who] are responsible are brought to book.

**After the terror event i.e. a year after?**

Yeah, normally we go, we go uhh... we revisit the story almost every other time, probably on a yearly basis. Like you'll realize after the Westgate attack, almost every other year, we will go back and look, uhh... how things are moving on., how is the mall, whether the security measures have been taking place, are they working? Also, if you remember the Garissa University attack, we

usually conduct some activities after every anniversary and we go there, we interrogate, uhh... we look at how people are picking up pieces and moving forward.

**In your opinion, what factors do you think determine what is reported on/ newsworthy, with regards to terrorism, in the Kenyan context? (Linked to studies and ask the role of legislation, info provided by security forces/government, self-censorship, pressures, safety advertising and ownership, company guidelines or protocols, personal experiences/examples if they are willing to share)**

### **Legislation?**

Sure [it plays a role], because after the 1998 attack on the US Embassy in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, a lot of things changed, the way people are reporting their stuff on terrorism and largely on security issues, there are anti-terror laws that are in place, there are also, uhh... Laws that are governing the way we report on security matters, so they go a long way in shaping the way we report such incidences.

### **Security forces**

it's becoming a bit difficult [to get information from them] and uhh... ever since uhh...Kenyan troops entered Somalia in 2011, umm... I think that event also in a way or the other, has uhh... in the past, increased the number of times Kenya has fallen prey to the terrorists and therefore security operators... information from security operators have not been very forthcoming, uhhh... and sometimes distorted they tend to fit the side of the governments story, but we always try our level best to report objectively without necessarily uhh... jeopardising the security strategy and all that and also putting in mind the right of Kenyans to know what is happening in their country and outside their borders.

**Self-censorship, is it something journalists and editors do?**

it's something that we cannot avoid, we are in a country where not just security of its citizens is at risk, but even those in leadership. So sometimes you realise that uhhh... maybe going this far will probably endanger my life, the life of my family and therefore you take precaution. As a human being it's normal and therefore you can imagine the kind of self-censorship that comes with that kind of uhhh mhhh ...

**Media companies**

sometimes we do get instructions from higher authorities on uhh...what to report and what not to report especially when it comes to matters [of] security or even terrorism attacks and they get their own share of pressure from the government agencies because even as much as we say our media, some of them are independent, and especially those that are not directly managed by government, but there is a very close link between them and the government. Most of the advertisements which are the backbone of how these media's [companies] are running come from government advertisements and all that. So, when they are threatened with embargos and sanctions, therefore you can imagine the kind of pressure that comes down to us as editors, yes.

**Ownership/ media owners (do they influence what makes it to the news?)**

not many a times, at least not on every other thing that is recorded, but there are issues that uhh... touch on. Directly touch on advertisements, directly touch on how media houses relate to government, when it gets to that point, even politics when it gets to that stage then they realise maybe the stakes of the company is at risk or interests of the company is at risk, then they come in, yes. Many a times and especially on issues that are less sensitive we are allowed and we are given space to work, yes.

**Personal experiences (e.g. something you have experienced)**

yeah! I remember when there was an attack at Garissa University, and uhh... I think our media house was one of the first to be at the scene of the attack and uhh... we began live coverage and I think we rubbed the government the wrong way. We began receiving... personally I began receiving calls from my seniors, I mean "you are going too far... I mean I think we are going to be attacked, probably our station is going to be shut down, so exercise caution, and uhhh... limit your words in as far as uhhh" ... and at some point, we had to drop our live coverage and concentrate more on recording the events that would later be edited uhh... to some level. So basically yeah... it was a scary experience and bearing in mind you're always used to reporting things without self-censorship or otherwise, so that for me was a bit out of odds.

**How do you think Journalists in Kenya report on terror? (The focus: effects and outcomes, investigative reporting, peace building, underlying causes of terrorism)**

I think both [effects and outcomes and peace strategies], but uhhh... basically once we report on terrorism attacks, we always sit down and say hey guys we cannot go back and uhhh... look at uhhh... at how terrorists .... Who won, who lost, the best thing is to look at how a country moves on, how a country picks up the pieces and move on... its people, those who are affected. So, we try to put forward umm... a positive story, a positive feel, not necessarily looking at the wounds and how and when they will heal, but rather look at uhhh... how as a nation we move forward. Basically, it goes hand in hand with peace, uhhh... and basically trying to uhhh let people know that security begins with them, this is their country, this is our country and we have to do everything, in our jurisdiction to make sure that our country is safe.

**has that always been the case?**

many a times yes, because uhhh... initially Kenya was one of the bedrocks of uhhh...peace and tranquillity in the region, uhh... but uhhh... after the 2011 decision by government to take its forces there we realized that we are getting hit from the Al-Shabaab of this world and the likes. So, we learnt through experience, I would say.

### **Part B: Peace journalism**

**Are you familiar with peace Journalism? Done any Peace journalism training?**

No, not really.

**In your opinion, what do you think peace journalism is?**

I think uhh., I could be wrong. I think it uhh... basically trying to ... trying to instil, that knowledge of patriotism because you cannot be peaceful unless you love your country. Because most of these terrorists, the tactics they used, later on in their advanced stages to recruit people within the country, people who are not uhhh, basically Somali's and Arabs and all that, they used natives, Christians and it was easy for them to penetrate because they were less suspicious. Uhhh... so basically, we try to advocate for patriotism, people to love their country. Once you love your country, you will die for it... you will die for it.

**Lynch (2008) states that “Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters make choices- about what to report, and how to report it-that create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value nonviolent responses to conflict.”**

**Do you agree/disagree with this statement above? Why? (Who or what factors make/influence these choices in the Kenyan context?)**

Yes, I want to agree with you on that because I think that uhhh... focusing more on an event and uhhh... when you want to gauge who won who lost, you would probably be in a position or rather,



you'll be forced to say, probably the terrorist won, because many lives were lost, a lot of people's lives changed after an attack and uhhh... with that you, one, You actually give more strength to the terrorist but on the other hand, you also make your citizen feel like they are helpless and at times they will need to take revenge and therefore you can imagine how the environment will be toxic. So, we discourage such, such kind of approach and uhhh... we try to avoid the who lost, the who won aspect of the news.

**In your opinion, do you think it is the responsibility of the Kenyan media to promote peace, particularly when reporting on terror? (Why?)**

Sure.

I think it cuts across, because as journalists, as editors uhh... we enjoy the [leverage?.00:14:08] of believability uhh... we cannot do it alone, we also need the support from government, support in the sense that uhhh... we report uhh... without prejudice, umm... so therefore I would say, it cuts across, both government and media should really work hand in hand to promote peace journalism.

**Peace journalism advocates for the exploration on contexts, background information, conflict formation, presenting causes and options on every side and going beyond the violence and events happening on the ground. Do you think this is a realistic way to shape news reports on terror in Kenya? (Is there room for this description of peace journalism in Kenyan newsrooms and why?)**

It would be very difficult. One, uhhh... because many of us journalists, or some of us, are victims of those incidences, of terrorism. Uhhh... either directly or indirectly and therefore, to go and listen to terrorist perspectives and come and try to justify why they are doing that. I don't think its... it would be really disserving. Probably you air such stories and uhh... I'm very sure, majority of your audience will probably... [Be upset].

Our media, and those who, those that are private, are business oriented media and therefore commercials and adverts come first and uhh... the tendency of those who want to spend on media uhh... focusing more on prime time bulletins where majority of viewership is found. It becomes almost impossible to have a story that looks into all such kind of information. Including all those details in a story and therefore we may not really have that leverage of time to report as much as we would want to.

**In your opinion, do you think peace journalism is something that can be practiced in Kenya when reporting on terror? (why)**

I doubt whether it is possible to report as it is because that would mean that you would probably travel to Somalia, spend days, if that is possible with the Al-Shabaab, who know their motives and you come and report, uh... objectively on why, basically you will be seen as enemy of the state and not just by the state, but also by the audience. So, you really need to alter some of uhh... your ways of reporting such, without necessarily umm... distorting your information, but at least to... you know exercise some censorship in your reporting to suit both your audience and both the government and the stringent rules that are in place in terms of reporting matters security ... uhhh... But also remain objective. Yes!

Interview 4

**Part A: Factors that Influence how the Kenyan Media Reports on Terror**

**How long have you worked in Kenyan media?**

more than 11 years.

**What does reporting on terror in the Kenyan context entail? (During the terror event (breaking news), following the event (i.e. next day), after the terror event)**

This information comes to us, in terms of alerts, it could be from a police source. It could be from a victim of a terror attack. It could be from our bureaus across the country. For example if there is an attack in Mandera. So our (bureau?) reporter or camera man will get in touch with us and say, a university has been attacked, so we set up teams, we decide... we look at how big it is. If it is big enough then we can despatch a team from Nairobi. But if it's in a small scale, then we can let them do it from the ground. So, we attach value, ummm.... When it comes to numbers involved. I think... It works like that across the world. So if the numbers are many, the number of casualties, from this terror attack ... are many, then there's much value attached to it. If the numbers are less, then even in the order of news, umm... the attachment is limited. It's not like in the UK where a child goes missing and its breaking news the whole day. It's different in this country.

So yes. So we scale it down compared to the magnitude of the terror attack itself. It can last from one day to three days, and it can last from one day to three days, and then we let it lie there until the anniversary... until one year later, then we do a special coverage [...mumbles]. That's all we do about it.

Why it happened is always left to security agencies to try and grapple with it, to try and tell us what exactly they think happened, who they think is responsible for it... but on the first day what we are looking for is news, what is news here? Uhhh... casualties, do they have relatives? How fast can we get to relatives? We despatch teams to Nairobi hospital ... it can be Kenyatta hospital, it can be at the Wilson Airport... where we expect people to be brought in from Mandera. If it's in the city then we despatch teams live or [in vans?] like to Westgate, for example and then now we start looking for security experts who can talk about this... umm... get family members, who can talk about the missing family member, stuff like that. So, that's how we do it. And assign people, we say Dennis you will do this, Naomi you will do this, Rukia you will do this and then we decide and see how it goes.

**In your opinion, what factors do you think determine what is reported on/ newsworthy, with regards to terrorism, in the Kenyan context? (Linked to studies and ask the role of legislation, info provided by security forces/government, self-censorship, pressures, safety advertising and ownership, company guidelines or protocols, personal experiences/examples if they are willing to share)**

**Legislation?**

Things have changed in this country. Ummm... sometime back, before 2013 [Westgate Mall attack]. Umm... reporting about terrorism was easy okay, but when terrorism became a matter of national security, umm... not necessarily that those in government umm... feel that the country is under threat, but necessarily so because umm... they are trying to cover up their incompetence. They came up with laws that to some extent barred us from reporting about terrorism. Okay. We would not post pictures of Kenyan security forces attacked or bodies or stuff like that. Uhhh... we could not report about, the exact numbers of Kenyan security forces killed in Somalia for example, and then we had these meetings with the department of defence. Every other time they keep

reminding you, these are national security matters. So, we get lost, in that thing, we feel fine, we have a national duty to report, and again we have a national duty to protect the country from external aggression. So, legislation yes, as at umm... on one front it has really impacted on journalism, on the other front it has really strengthened the war on terrorism, especially when they are cracking down on terror suspects. There are stiffer penalties in place now. So that works for the security, but for journalism... you can't talk about some things and when there is a vacuum in information it is very hard for you to confirm [because of the law] that we lost 50 people, 20 people, you have to rely on the state to tell you.

**What about information provided by security forces and government?**

It's never there, it's never there. They decide. They'll decide 20 today, tomorrow 10, 15 and we don't have a way of independently verifying this. That's why I told you from the beginning, what we normally do... we track down victim's families, that's the only way we can say there's a burial here, there's a funeral arrangement there. So we can get to at least know some numbers. Exactly, exactly.

**In terms of self-censorship?**

It's not a question of self-censorship, I think we are held in the neck by the law. That's it. I mean, there are things you cannot report about anymore. Yes!

**What about personal safety?**

It's better now because I think uhhh... security agencies, because of... especially after Westgate, uhhh... the government took a lot of slack... beating from media and from the general society, that we lost so many people and no one was doing anything about it. So, there has been improved security in terms of tracking down the terrorists and stopping terror before it happens. So, in terms of personal safety and security, yes, there's an increased improvement. Media houses are re-thinking about sending their reporters to different areas. So if we feel that our journalists are not

protected well, then we don't dispatch our people to go to either Somalia, or to the border towards Somalia, and in Kenya or Lamu as it were.

**I have read some previous studies, done by scholars on the experience of Kenyan journalists receiving threats, is that something that still happens?**

Yes, yes. It depends on what you are working on. Umm... stories that touch on murder you get threats, stories that touch on umm.... Big personalities, in political circles and government you get threats.

**what about specifically on terrorism?**

we haven't, either from the terrorists themselves or the government, no we haven't. I have not [experienced] had any of those.

**What about advertising and ownership does it influence reports on terrorism?**

No, it doesn't, it doesn't. In this country terrorism is umm... is a crime placed above murder. Anyone associated with terrorism, either by design or issue or by rumour. I mean it becomes a very small world for you. So, people have become victims of ... You run a good business, I'll tell you, for example ummm... I don't have evidence to this, but someone who runs a bus company and the fact that two or three people, who are related to him, who are involved in terrorism, then you have them killed, so thinking maybe if you kill him you stop the supply of money to these terror organizations, it doesn't work like that, I mean those are shortcuts to dealing with crime. So, if you are associated with anyone, either your business being associated with terrorism then you are in trouble, it doesn't matter.

**How do you think Journalists in Kenya report on terror? (The focus: effects and outcomes, investigative reporting, peace building, underlying causes of terrorism)**

I think the focus is more on the effects of terrorism, umm... casualties and umm... victims, trying to get back on their feet after one year, of being attacked. Umm... when it comes to investigative journalism in terrorism it is the hardest place to find yourself, because you have a population that feels that terrorism is a very bad thing, so if you come up and say that policemen killed people, whom they suspected to be terrorists, and they were not terrorists, then you become an enemy number one. People don't want to listen. So, it becomes very hard for people to be investigating stories about terrorism because there is a public perception that terror is bad, either we are taking shortcuts or not, if it's bad its bad. So you cannot report. Yes!

**Part B: Peace journalism**

**Are you familiar with peace Journalism? Have you done any peace journalism training?**

No

**What do you think Peace Journalism is?**

Ummm... loosely, ummm... how journalists can promote peace, maybe. I'm not sure. It's a long time since I was in class.

**Lynch (2008) states that "Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters make choices- about what to report, and how to report it-that create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value nonviolent responses to conflict."**

**Is it realistic in the Kenyan context (looking at underlying issues etc)?**

We are getting there, not people who have been charged in a court of law, for example, but people suspected to have links to terrorism. Uhhh... we had a case sometime back where we had very [young] umm... children in Mombasa, who had been radicalized and umm.... So, we took a stand as a media house, and we said these are very young people and you can't go arresting them or

chucking them out of mosques or killing their parents in front of their eyes. We did a story about it and there was a backlash, to that effect, saying as long as their young and they are radicalized that they should face the law, but we were of the opinion no, you can't... these are young people, they can be de-radicalized, they can be taken through lessons (by the CID...?). So Yes, I think there is a chance for that to happen in this country. Is it happening? Baby steps. But I have not come across any training tailored towards that end of what you call "peace journalism."

**Do you agree/disagree with this statement above?**

Yes, but civic education is important and media has to do it. People must get to start prepared by the media, that it is okay for, people charged for terrorism, people singled out as terrorists, to be given a chance to explain their side of the story. We have had instances [mumbles... I'll take a minute?] where, terror suspects are taken to court and they admit to taking part, because when I speak to them in prison, I have access to prison most of the time... when I speak to them in prison, they say that is the only way they can remain (sane/ Safe?). So, I admit I am guilty, so I am not taken... I'm not dragged through this process in court. Yes! I take responsibility then I go to jail, but when you ask prison authorities, give me a chance to speak to terrorists, we can't speak to them. So, is it important that they are given a chance? I think, it's very important. Yes!

**In your opinion, do you think it is the responsibility of the Kenyan media to promote peace, particularly when reporting on terror? And why?**

No. Ummm facts are stubborn. So, if.... It's not our place to promote peace. We have security agencies to promote peace. The only thing I can advocate for is if there was anything to do with promoting peace, it's to have a close working relationship with the state. Ok, if there are peace activities, they want transmitted or informed to the public then that can work. But it's not the work of journalists, and that's the mistake we made, I'll take another minute, when we had Westgate, we



made a very big mistake of siding with the state, saying Kenya is under attack. We had news bulletins where we had Kenyan flags in newsrooms, we got lost, we could not ask the state questions, and we got lost. We got more attacked because we thought we were being more patriotic. We got more attacked... we did not ask questions, so we got more attacked. So, I cannot advocate for peace... media houses promoting peace. That is not our place.

**Peace journalism advocates for the exploration on contexts, background information, conflict formation, presenting causes and options on every side and going beyond the violence and events happening on the ground. Do you think this is a realistic way to shape news reports on terror in Kenya?**

Yes, on the part of the media, we are able to do it, because I think decisions are made at the editorial level. If media houses decide, we can then start focusing on those areas that you are speaking about. We can only do it if the state is a bit flexible in giving us access to information. If there is access to information about terror activities, not impending ones, the ones that have happened and why they think they happened, then it will become very easy for media houses. Yes, exactly of what exactly ails this country in terms of terrorism.

**In your opinion, do you think peace journalism is something that can be practiced in Kenya when reporting on terror? (Why?)**

Yes, it will take time, as I said civic education first and then close working relationship with the state agencies and of course non- government organizations and actors, that way we can get somewhere but not now, yes.

**Considering that this media company is privately-owned, do you think the state plays a significant role in terms of the level of independence?**

Ummm, I should not be quoted on this. Media houses are politically and individually owned, media houses depend on commercials and advertisements to pay and to run their services. So, that is the short and long of it. It starts and ends with commercial and political interests. So, and again you know government advertises 50 per cent of revenue that [keeps us running]. It's from government, so if you step on the government in a bad way... [Mumbles...you are in their bad books], but there is room... laws allows us... there's room for us to do what we must do, sometimes, the pressure is too much, but somehow, we get it done. Yes!

## Interview 5

**Part A: Factors that Influence how the Kenyan Media Reports on Terror**

**What does reporting on terror in the Kenyan context entail? (During the terror event (breaking news), following the event (i.e. next day), after the terror event)**

Okay! First of all, uuhh... when the story breaks is where we do what has happened and this is usually the most challenging part because most of the times when a story breaks in as far as terrorism is concerned, maybe we have had an attack somewhere, authorities are not ready to speak. Usually they do a lot of uhhh... you know, hiding information. So it is us getting information from sources in the field and sometimes it is very far away like, you could have something happen in, like, let's say in the border of Kenya and Somalia. So, something has happened down there, in a remote village, for example Yumbis, that's twenty kilometers away from the Kenya-Somali border, an attack happened, Al- Shabaab is said to have come into the country, raised their own flag, lowered the Kenyan flag, preached to the people there for around uuhhh... two hours or so, before attacking a police convoy and making away with a police vehicle. Information that has just come, scanty information, so we sort of do ummm... shooting in the dark because authorities are not willing to give you that information to begin with because you'll expose their soft underbelly and then yeah... that's the kind of challenges that we face. So, the first day is usually just saying what it is that is happening. We hear there's a terror attack, so what has happened? So, you rely solely on what the officers will tell you or what the authorities will tell you, because confirmation... you cannot get authoritative confirmation for example from uuhh... sources on the ground. Yeah!

**What about the next day?**

now, the next day is usually the day that now we get now the actual picture of what really transpired because there, the battle assessment uuhh... or damage assessment has already been done and

mostly now you have gotten access to the area, because mostly, what we say is that uhhh...in our .... The biggest challenge that we have as security journalists in the country is access. Sometimes you have heard about a story from a very reliable source maybe an officer of a lower cadre, who cannot speak to the press or confirm, tells you something but then [without confirmation?] access to the people who can confirm and sometimes access to the areas that have been attacked. Yes!

**After the terror attack is over, is it still something your specific media house looks into?**

Okay, mostly uhhh... what I do, the reason... the thing that has cut the niche for me for example, at Citizen TV right now, is being able to do that follow up. You know something has happened, the second day you have already reported about it, now the third day, now come and answer the question why? Because uhhh... the first two days have answered the who, have answered the what, yeah... and the where. So, the how and the why is what now you come to look for later on. By looking at uhhh... going deeper into it and investigating, sort of getting to more information on how this thing actually did happen.

**In your opinion, what factors do you think determine what is reported on/ newsworthy, with regards to terrorism, in the Kenyan context? (Linked to studies and ask the role of legislation, info provided by security forces/government, self-censorship, pressures, safety advertising and ownership, company guidelines or protocols, personal experiences/examples if they are willing to share)**

**Legislation, anti-terror laws, media laws?**

Yes. Legislation does a lot because ummm... in 2017 there's a bill, the security bill that was passed and [mumbles ... president] became law. It sort of limits us in as far as uhhh...going outside there and finding that story, because sometimes we have been given a story but then again it entails, for

example, uhhh...naming names, and that is where the crunch... the rubber meets the road in this country because you could easily get into trouble because sometimes the authorities are successful in as far as hiding a particular incident is concerned. Let's say a police vehicle was hit by terrorists, what they use these days is the IEDs [Improvised Explosive Device) and landmines they have planted, and the security has been hit by that, all officers die, it is remote, no one has seen it apart from only one person somewhere, who saw and saw what happened but then again, the authorities decide to sweep this thing under the carpet. It remains within their circles and you come out and report. The crime scene has been dusted, the rubble has been collected. You reported that somewhere in El Wak [city in Somalia] a land cruiser was hit, then the authorities get hold of you and tell to substantiate your story. So sometimes legislation has hampered our operation, yes.

**Has there been instances where it has helped?**

In my experience I have not seen instances where it has helped. Okay, instances where it has helped is uhhh... we have for example, the press card that is recognized by the Media Council of Kenya, that grants you access even in areas that are crime scenes as long as uhh... it is a matter of public interest. That is sort of a shot in the arm as far as this thing is concerned.

**Security forces?**

yes, and no depending on how you want to look at it. For instance, if you have some friendship if some sort with uhh... officers, establishing contact and establishing the trust of police officers in the top tier and the lower cadre, you're highly likely to get a lot of information in as far as confirmation of news stories is concerned. But then again if you are just starting out for example, you do not have those contacts, you get to have it a bit rough. Yes.

### **Self-censorship?**

yes. Sometimes. Okay, I wouldn't put a finger into it, but that is something I would consider doing. If for example I have information that could jeopardise my career, could jeopardise my life for example, I wouldn't put it outside there. Weighing the scale is something that we do. Uuhhh... but then again, sometimes it really depends on how you want to look at it. The context.

### **Safety Pressures?**

in terrorism, yes and no. we've had a writer, there's a lady who wrote for a county magazine who is now in exile because she wrote about a terror group, the Al-Shabaab, and then she started receiving emails because you know in your article you leave down your email address. So she started receiving threats in that particular email address. She couldn't trace where exactly it was coming from so, she thought it was not very safe for her to continue operating in that particular place so she took off. We get, ehhh... you do a security story that touches on a particular person especially if you have touched a raw nerve of either a criminal or someone in the high ranks, as far as authorities are concerned and they would try to silence you.

### **Advertising and Ownership?**

A lot. Advertising and ownership does because for example, let's face it Safaricom is the biggest advertiser in the private world. Umm...an operation has been conducted in Garissa and this vehicle has been caught. And this vehicle has in it a lot of sim cards belonging to Safaricom, yeah... the moment you mention such a line, then the advertisers threaten to pull out their advertisements. Uhh... sometimes you want to report on something but the ownership of the media house that you are in does not want it out and it will never see the light of day.

**company guidelines and protocols?**

There's a lot of leeway in as far as reporting on terror is concerned because not a lot of people understand what really goes on in the underworld and uhh... So, if you are following up on a story for example, where there is extra-judicial killings or forceful disappearance of persons in a particular area and terror is involved, you know, sometimes it is officers getting these people according to the allegations that we get. Sometimes it is the officers getting these people and you know extra-judicial killing uhh... happens. Sometimes these people are being radicalised and leave their homes and just go. People have disappeared. So you don't really get to play by the rules in as far as the time is concerned because the story is ready when it's ready. You can't quite rush some stories.

**If you are willing to share, are there any personal experiences that have influenced how you report on terrorism?**

uhh... yes. I'm a Muslim and the reason as to why I chose the security and crime line. First of all, the first time I started doing security and crime is when Masjid Musa was attacked, back in 2013, there was a raid in Masjid Musa by police officers and then they got into the mosque and you know sort of blanketly did an operation inside that mosque and both innocent and to say maybe guilty people were very very hurt and the way the media reported that thing that day it sort of gave a condemnation to Islam. I mean this is my religion. I put myself, uhh... I put my foot forward to go and demystify this information that is moving around, that is linking terror and Islam, and tried to you know, separate the two and that is why for example I do that. So, in every other... I'm on the frontline of these things every other time and uhh... as much as a hundred percent of the time there are related suspects usually subscribed to the Islamic faith, I am one of those people who still believe that Islam advocates for peace. So, much as I report on terrorism and what exactly is

happening, I actually go a step further to just demystify and just try to make people understand that that is not the religion. Yes.

**How do you think Journalists in Kenya report on terror? (The focus: effects and outcomes, investigative reporting, peace building, underlying causes of terrorism)**

what I have observed myself, is that what we do is usually the knee-jerk sort of journalism, where we will talk about terrorism when a terror attack has happened. We will not go, uhh... for example, to dig deep and find out why these youths are joining these terror outfits in such large numbers, but we wait until such a time that uhh... an attack has happened in the country, to sort of put ourselves outside there to tell the people what has happened on that day. And then, the second, third it disappears.

### **Part B: Peace journalism**

**Are you familiar with peace Journalism? Have you done any peace journalism training?**

No. I haven't

**What do you think peace journalism is?**

Maybe umm... what I get from the word, peace journalism, is maybe preaching peace. Just like tourism development journalism has turned out to be these days, people talking more about development and challenges facing the country. So may... I presume, that peace journalism is uhh... using your journalistic platform to sort of preach peace. Yes.

**Lynch (2008) states that “Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters make choices- about what to report, and how to report it-that create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value nonviolent responses to conflict.”**



**Do you agree/disagree with this statement above? Why? (Who or what factors make/influence these choices in the Kenyan context?)**

Well, that would be but then again that would also... two-folds, yes and no because uuhh...if I have purposed for example to preach peace, what happens now to a story that requires some black and white sort of reporting, then what has happened or do you mean that we should now, have a paragraph or two to always talk about the outcome outside there. I think yes, that would be it.

**In your opinion, do you think it is the responsibility of the Kenyan media to promote peace, particularly when reporting on terror?**

Absolutely.

**why?**

Because we have seen our country slip down a very slippery slope in 2007 [Post-election violence] and a lot of blame was portioned on the media. On how we reported for example on tribal clashes, on how we reported political violence across the country. It sort of escalated more than reduced the flame in as far as the post-election violence is concerned. I absolutely think this is something. This is the direction we should take. Yes.

**Peace journalism advocates for the exploration on contexts, background information, conflict formation, presenting causes and options on every side and going beyond the violence and events happening on the ground. Do you think this is a realistic way to shape news reports on terror in Kenya? (Is there room for this description of peace journalism in Kenyan newsrooms and why?)**

well yes. Because honestly, we haven't had any. In my years of experience as a journalist, I have only gotten to speak to people who have been there and they have changed their, you know, their ways and returnees, talking about how Somalia was but then again, we haven't gotten an

opportunity to speak to someone who is actively involved in Al-Shabaab, for example to tell us why they are attacking us, for example. So, I think that is something we could do, that is something that is a good idea but we don't know how to do it, because again access.

**In light of that, do you think patriotism would hinder the practice of peace journalism when it comes to terrorism?**

that would... personally I wouldn't, but then again I think the country would, because a lot of times we have been condemned of ... for example, I remember the late uhh... cabinet secretary [for internal security and coordination of national government] Nkaissery, is actively quoted, several times saying that we use a lot of cut-away's or film video footage showing Al-Shabaab, uhhh... training for example, you know they are mark timing and they are holding guns in our stories, but then again, a lot of times we do not show that to this other side of security forces, what they do. So, it sort of is a split. So I would say yes, it would question... it would make the country question my patriotism because of how the government will perceive and the rest of Kenyans will perceive my perception of that particular story.

**what kind of role do you think social media plays when it comes to reporting on terror, is it a hindrance or an asset?**

both ways. It could get us a lot of information or sometimes it is uhh... for example, Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahedeen (sp), twitter handle that, you know gives the confirmation... that they actually do uhhh.... Sometimes, take responsibility of attacks in the country, take responsibility of attacks uhh... in Somalia. That will push you to more information, but it could also push you to uhhh... the wrong information when someone, for example, tweets and says 40 police officers have been killed, I am in Mandera and I have seen. And the officers on the other hand are telling you no, not a single police officer has been killed. So, it could lead you astray if you choose to believe

them. That's why, speaking to the authorities and gaining access from the authority's perspective, is always, you know... the better way to go about it.

**In your opinion, do you think peace journalism is something that can be practiced in Kenya when reporting on terror? (Why?)**

I wouldn't say it is easy to practice it in Kenya, because gaining access to both sides of the divide is hard. Radicalized youth for example, speak ill of uuhhh... The media, even in their propaganda videos we have them quote sections of the media, of what we have aired and said... and hurled salvos at us, saying that we are not professional, we are not... So, imagine someone who has already condemned you without seeing you, what they would do to you if you now approached them and said I want to, you know... speak to you. That would put you in a corner.

**What is the most difficult thing you have experienced when reporting on terror?**

what I have gone through? It's a face-to-face with uhh... Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) troops, who did not know who we are and they reacted in a not very, very good way. So, this day we were in Garissa covering how much teachers, you know after the April attack [Garissa school attack] back in 2015, where people were killed, mostly students... so we go there, after you know three, four weeks later, teachers, nurses, doctors and everyone who is a non-local of Garissa have moved away and the schools have been left empty. So, we go there to see how student have resorted to teaching students because teachers are not there because of terror. To see how the small number of Somali doctors is grappling with this huge number of patients in the hospital all because they are no non-Somali uhh...doctors have fled the area because of this insecurity. So, while in the process of covering that, a town called Yumbis is attacked, Al-Shabaab is said to have come in lowered the Kenyan flag, raised their own, preached to the people, abduct police officers and have gone with a police vehicle. So we get the information, then the office, as it would, since you are already in

Garissa, why don't you find out what has happened there. So, we start driving to Yumbis, unknown to us is that the government had already gazetted that place, that very morning after the attack it was gazetted an operation zone. So, we get into the operation zone, in front of us is a vehicle a land cruiser with KDF inside we could only see one because it was a dusty terrain but then again there were like 7 vehicles flashing lights at us, we stop, then we were sort of accosted by those officers and then gotten out of our vehicles and then forced to lie down, uhhh... our vehicle was searched, we identified ourselves later on as journalists and they told us that was an active operation and that we should vacate with immediate effect. So we came back, that was not a very pretty scene. That was one of the biggest challenges in covering this. Yes.

Security and government, authorities are the biggest headache that we have, and it depends on the nature of the attack. If for example there is an Al-Shabaab cell that has been raided upon and uhh... Destroyed, terrorists killed and others arrested, there are some things found. It is the inspector general police, who will himself convene that press conference that day and be willing to give any information that requires interest, but when it is the other way around, we get little or no information at all. That is why some numbers do not make sense to us, because for example if, if an attack happened today, we have emergency response teams, by red cross for example, who will give you a particular figure, maybe people have been injured or died but then again, the police comes up and gives you another figure, for example, a perfect example would be Mpeketoni, red cross went there, by 10 am on that day of attack red cross was placing its numbers at 24 people dead. On the other hand, the confirmation being given by the Coast regional coordinator was at 11 people. So you are wondering, what exactly is this? And before we know it, when the dust settles 38 people have lost their lives.

**How do you sieve through that conflicting information?**

now that is where the common man comes in because myself, now speaking for me, I'm that journalist who does not believe in reporting that there's two conflicting information about something. I take it upon myself to go and find out [mumbles] if for example, today uhh... the president says, it is raining and the opposition leader says it is not raining, it is not my business to say these two leaders have two different information it is my business to walk myself out and find out who is telling the truth. Yes.

## Interview 6

### **Part A: Factors that Influence how the Kenyan Media Reports on Terror**

**How long have you worked in the Kenyan media?**

5 years

**What does reporting on terror in the Kenyan context entail? (during the terror event (breaking news), following the event (i.e., next day), after the terror event)**

The first thing we look for is the immediate impact and the effects of the attack. We find out about the casualties. How many are dead? Who are they? We look for numbers and what exactly happened.

**What about the next day?**

The next day, we follow-up with the victims, their families. We try to find out what damage has been done at the scene. Are there any more casualties? We look for more information on the attack and the impact of the attack and how it has affected people.

**What about after the terror event, say after a year, a few months?**

Usually, we just do follow-up stories with the victims and their family. We try to see what the consequences of the attack are a year down the line. We try to remember the victims and re-cap the events that took place. But we mostly focus on the victims and keeping their memories alive.

**In your opinion, what factors do you think determine what is reported on/ newsworthy, with regards to terrorism, in the Kenyan context? (linked to studies and ask the role of legislation, info provided by security forces/government, self-censorship, pressures, safety, advertising and ownership, company guidelines or protocols, personal experiences/examples if they are willing to share)**

Legislation is definitely a huge problem for us, we have to make sure that what we report on is not going against the law. Access to information is also a problem sometimes but that depends on the kind of relationship you have with the authorities. If you have a good relationship then they give you some information, especially after the initial confusion is over. The accessibility to information usually gets better after the confusion is over.

**What about self-censorship, safety?**

With self-censorship and safety, I wouldn't say that it influences how I report. I haven't encountered any challenges that would require me to self-censor or that has made me fearful.

**Advertising and ownership?**

Ownership and advertising does not significantly influence how we report on terror. It's hard to control that type of information because it is usually already on the internet. It spreads on social media very quickly, so the demand for the news to cover that information cannot be ignored. Plus, there is so much demand from audiences for us to cover terror attacks, so if it does not affect the media company or advertisers, there is no issue.

**Company guidelines and protocols?**

With terrorism I wouldn't say they have a significant impact. Aside from the standard protocols and guidelines every media house has, the media has to be flexible when it comes to terrorism because of the demand for the information by audiences. They can see it on the internet, so we have to report on it.

**How do you think Journalists in Kenya report on terror? (the focus: effects and outcomes, investigative reporting, peace building, underlying causes of terrorism)**

Definitely the effects and outcomes. Maybe on TV you will see some investigative reports, but that is usually under special coverage. When it comes to the news, effects and outcomes. Sometimes we focus on victims as well, but usually it's the effects and outcomes that are important. We look at who attacked us? where? What were the outcomes? How many people were affected? How were they affected? and how it has impacted us as a country. We don't do much beyond that.

**Why?**

That is what the audience usually wants to know.

### **Part B: Peace journalism**

**Are you familiar with peace Journalism? (peace journalism training and what peace journalism is)**

Yes. I've heard of peace journalism, but I haven't done any training.

**In your opinion, what do you think it is?**

Reporting in a way that tells people to be peaceful.

**Lynch (2008) states that "Peace Journalism is when editors and reporters make choices-about what to report, and how to report it-that create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value nonviolent responses to conflict."**

**Do you agree/disagree with this statement above? Why? (who or what factors make/influence these choices in the Kenyan context?)**

Yes. I agree, because it is what we do. When we report on terrorism it is because we don't want the same mistakes to be repeated. So, what we report on is focused on that. Showing people what the effects are so that they are vigilant. We need to keep the peace, especially after terror attacks.



**In your opinion, do you think it is the responsibility of the Kenyan media to promote peace, particularly when reporting on terror? (why)**

Yes and no. It is our responsibility to report the 'facts,' but also, we have to promote peace because terrorism affects all of us. We can't just sit back as a media and do nothing. So, we need to support the government and the people of Kenya so that we promote peace.

**Peace journalism advocates for the exploration on contexts, background information, conflict formation, presenting causes and options on every side and going beyond the violence and events happening on the ground. Do you think this is a realistic way to shape news reports on terror in Kenya? (is there room for this description of peace journalism in Kenyan newsrooms and why?)**

That will be hard. We are all affected by terrorism and it will not be a good thing if we give terrorists airtime. They are enemies of the state. People just want to know what is happening on our side. They want to know what the government is doing about and what Kenyans are facing. We don't want to justify terrorism. So, some of those things we will not be able to put in the news.

**In your opinion, do you think peace journalism is something that can be practiced in Kenya when reporting on terror? (why)**

In as far as promoting peace messages, yes. But to include terrorists and their perspective, probably not. Will they even speak to us or tell us the truth? It is very difficult. Our job is to report what is happening here and to make sure that Kenyans know that we are with them and we support them.  
[silence]

**Anything else you would like to add?**

No, not really.

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